Peachtree-Cain Co. v. McBee

49 Citing cases

  1. Bell South v. Widner

    229 Ga. App. 634 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997)   Cited 9 times
    In Bell South Telecommunications v. Widner, 229 Ga. App. 634, 637 (495 S.E.2d 52) (1997), we reversed the trial court's denial of Bell South's motion for summary judgment and remanded the case with the direction that summary judgment be entered in Bell South's favor.

    The standards to be considered when determining whether an employer is liable for the negligence of a contractor are set out in OCGA § 51-2-5. Although this list is not exclusive ( Peachtree-Cain Co. v. McBee, 254 Ga. 91, 93-94 ( 327 S.E.2d 188)), the only provision realistically at issue is (5): "If the employer retains the right to direct or control the time and manner of executing the work or interferes and assumes control so as to create the relation of master and servant or so that an injury results which is traceable to his interference." When the contract between Bell South and Brookins is construed properly, it establishes that Brookins was an independent contractor and not an employee of Bell South. None of the traditional measures through which improper control is maintained are present (see OCGA § 51-2-5), and the contract provides for Brookins to have independence in the manner in which it performed the work.

  2. Public Defender Standards v. State

    284 Ga. App. 660 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007)   Cited 4 times

    [Cits.]Peachtree-Cain Co. v. McBee, 254 Ga. 91, 93 ( 327 SE2d 188) (1985). When considered in this context, it is apparent that the trial court misconstrued the General Assembly's intention in creating the Council.

  3. Motorsports of Conyers, LLC v. Burbach

    317 Ga. 206 (Ga. 2023)   Cited 4 times
    Noting that ("[o]ur decisional law has long distinguished between restrictive covenants that are reasonable (in scope, duration, and geographic reach) and those that are unreasonable")

    In doing so, the General Assembly adopted the longstanding public-policy-based distinction in our decisional law between unenforceable contracts in general restraint of trade and reasonable restrictive covenants. See Peachtree-Cain Co. v. McBee , 254 Ga. 91, 93 (1), 327 S.E.2d 188 (1985) (noting that "when a statute is codified from ... decision[s] of this court, unless the language of the [statute] imperatively requires a different construction, it will be presumed that the General Assembly in adopting it intended merely to adopt the principle of law announced in the decision[s] from which it is taken" (citation and punctuation omitted)). See also Crum v. Jackson Natl. Life Ins. Co. , 315 Ga. 67, 77 (2) (c) (ii), 880 S.E.2d 205 (2022) ("we presume that the legislature enacted the new statute ‘with full knowledge of’ the extant body of decisional law").

  4. Anderson v. Sentinel Offender Servs., Llc.

    784 S.E.2d 791 (Ga. 2016)

    See Robeson, 248 Ga. at 307, 282 S.E.2d 896. Further, though the General Assembly is presumed to act with the full knowledge of existing law, see Peachtree–Cain Co. v. McBee, 254 Ga. 91(1), 327 S.E.2d 188 (1985), it is also true that “a statute must be viewed so as to make all its parts harmonize and to give a sensible and intelligent effect to each part” because “[i]t is not presumed that the legislature intended that any part would be without meaning.” Houston v. Lowes of Savannah, Inc., 235 Ga. 201, 203, 219 S.E.2d 115 (1975).

  5. Anderson v. Sentinel Offender Servs., Llc.

    784 S.E.2d 791 (Ga. 2016)

    See Robeson, 248 Ga. at 307, 282 S.E.2d 896. Further, though the General Assembly is presumed to act with the full knowledge of existing law, see Peachtree–Cain Co. v. McBee, 254 Ga. 91(1), 327 S.E.2d 188 (1985), it is also true that "a statute must be viewed so as to make all its parts harmonize and to give a sensible and intelligent effect to each part" because "[i]t is not presumed that the legislature intended that any part would be without meaning." Houston v. Lowes of Savannah, Inc., 235 Ga. 201, 203, 219 S.E.2d 115 (1975).

  6. May v. State

    295 Ga. 388 (Ga. 2014)   Cited 47 times
    Framing the same rule in the broader context of statutory construction

    Scalia & Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 167 (West 2012). For context, we may look to other provisions of the same statute, see Hendry v. Hendry, 292 Ga. 1, 3(1), 734 S.E.2d 46 (2012), the structure and history of the whole statute, see Deal, 294 Ga. at 184(2)(b), 751 S.E.2d 337, and the other law—constitutional, statutory, and common law alike—that forms the legal background of the statutory provision in question. See Peachtree–Cain Co. v. McBee, 254 Ga. 91, 93(1), 327 S.E.2d 188 (1985). With these principles in mind, we turn now to the context of OCGA § 19–7–5(c)(1), and we start with the other provisions and structure of the statute.

  7. Godfrey v. Georgia Interlocal Risk Mgmt. Agen.

    S10G1902 (Ga. Oct. 17, 2011)

    Although the Godfreys describe OCGA § 36-85-4 as merely "nominally excluding" GIRMA from the arena of commercial insurance policies, the General Assembly's enactment must be given weight. See Peachtree-Cain Co. v. McBee, 254 Ga. 91, 93 ( 327 SE2d 188) (1985). In contrast to the clear legislative intent that the contracts entered into by GIRMA are not to be treated as those of an "insurer," the statutory requirement that the Godfreys would impose on GIRMA's contract specifically references insurers.

  8. Fifth Club, Inc. v. Ramirez

    196 S.W.3d 788 (Tex. 2006)   Cited 186 times
    Holding that violations for accepting secondary employment and for using profanity to a member of the public would not put employer on notice that hiring officer "would create a risk of harm to the public"

    Because these reasons are not applicable under Texas law, and have not been otherwise addressed by the Legislature, we are not persuaded that Texas should adopt such a rule. See also Malvo v. J.C. Penney Co., 512 P.2d 575, 583 n. 13 (Alaska 1973) ("[T]he duty owed to the public by a store owner seeking to protect his property may be nondelegable in certain circumstances."); Tarzia v. Great Atl. Pac. Tea Co., 52 Conn.App. 136, 727 A.2d 219, 225 (1999) ("The possessor of premises who has invited persons to those premises for a business purpose cannot escape liability for a claimed breach of its duty to exercise reasonable care to keep the premises in a safe condition by hiring another to maintain the premises in a safe condition."); Peachtree-Cain Co. v. McBee, 170 Ga.App. 38, 316 S.E.2d 9, 10-11 (1984), aff'd, 254 Ga. 91, 327 S.E.2d 188, 191 (1985) (holding that it was proper to impose liability on property owners for the intentional torts of security personnel hired to protect their property because of the "opportunities for gross injustice"); Rockwell v. Sun Harbor Budget Suites, 112 Nev. 1217, 925 P.2d 1175, 1179 (1996) ("However, in the situation where a property owner hires security personnel to protect his or her premises and patrons, that property owner has a personal and nondelegable duty to provide responsible security personnel."); Adams, 257 N.Y.S. at 781-82 (holding that if a store owner receives the benefit of having a security guard do surveillance for criminal activity then he should also be subject to liability for false arrest of the persons the security guard tries to detain); Hendricks, 159 S.E.2d at 367-68 (holding that hiring security personnel to protect one's property is a nondelegable and personal duty that subjects the employer to liability for the torts of its security personnel); Szymanski, 74 N.E.2d a

  9. Dudley v. State

    273 Ga. 466 (Ga. 2001)   Cited 19 times
    Overruling Division 1

    In the present case, the Court of Appeals, in essence, incorrectly concluded that the additional language in OCGA § 45-11-4 could be ignored. Yet, it is presumed that statutes are enacted by the General Assembly with full knowledge of the existing condition of the law and with reference to it. Peachtree-Cain Co. v. McBee, 254 Ga. 91, 93 ( 327 S.E.2d 188) (1985). Thus, when the General Assembly in 1990 modified OCGA § 45-11-4 to, inter alia, make plain that its protections encompassed those formerly in office, it fully realized that OCGA § 17-7-52 mandated that such protections be extended to peace officers.

  10. Davis v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan of Georgia, Inc.

    271 Ga. 508 (Ga. 1999)   Cited 13 times

    That being so, it must be presumed that the legislature intended to adopt the principles of law announced in Duncan. Peachtree-Cain Co. v. McBee, 254 Ga. 91, 93 (1) ( 327 S.E.2d 188) (1985). The Duncan majority rested on policy considerations.