Opinion
Civil Action 5:19-cv-00144-TMC
03-24-2022
Caroline McKinney Peace, Plaintiff, v. Kilolo Kijakazi, [1] Commissioner of Social Security Administration, Defendant.
ORDER
Timothy M. Cain United States District Judge
This matter is before the court on Plaintiff Caroline McKinney Peace's motion for attorney's fees pursuant to the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). (ECF Nos. 28; 34). Plaintiff seeks an award of attorney's fees in the amount of $12,362.63, which Plaintiff contends represents less than 25% of the back benefits awarded to Plaintiff, the remainder of which is to be paid to other Plaintiff's counsel for work at the administrative level. (ECF No. 28-1 at 1-2). The Commissioner has filed a response informing the court that she does not object to Plaintiff's motion for fees. (ECF No. 30).
Pursuant to Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 808 (2002), in reviewing a request for attorney's fees under § 406(b), a court must look first to the contingent fee agreement and assess its reasonableness. A reduction in the contingent fee may be appropriate when (1) the fee is out of line with the character of the representation and the results achieved; (2) counsel's delay caused past-due benefits to accumulate during the pendency of the case in court, or (3) past-due benefits are large in comparison to the amount of time counsel spent on the case. Id.
Based upon a review of the petition and these factors, the court finds that an award of $12,362.63 is reasonable. Pursuant to a contingency fee agreement, Plaintiff agreed to pay counsel twenty-five percent (25%) of any past-due benefits. (ECF No. 28-3 at 2). Plaintiff was awarded $73,451.00 in back benefits, (ECF No. 34-1 at 4), and twenty-five percent (25%) of this award, or $18,362.63, was withheld for attorney's fees, id. at 3. In compliance with 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A), the court finds an award of $12,362.63 does not exceed twenty-five percent (25%) of these past-due benefits. Furthermore, the awarded fee is reasonable given the hours counsel expended working on this matter at the court level. (ECF Nos. 28-1 at 5, 9; 28-2). See Wrenn v. Astrue, 525 F.3d 931, 937 (10th Cir. 2008) (noting that under § 406(b) the court makes fee awards only for work done before the court). Additionally, Plaintiff's counsel achieved a successful result without any unreasonable delay. See (ECF No. 20). In light of counsel's specialized skill in social security disability cases, the attorney's fee award does not amount to a windfall. Cf. Brown v. Barnhart, 270 F.Supp.2d 769, 772-73 (W.D. Va. 2003).
Therefore, based on the foregoing, Plaintiff's motion for attorney's fees (ECF No. 28) is GRANTED, and Plaintiff is awarded a total of $12,362.63 in attorney's fees.
As noted above, “[f]ee awards may be made under both [EAJA and § 406(b)], but the claimant's attorney must refund to the claimant the amount of the smaller fee[, ] . . . up to the point the claimant receives 100 percent of the past-due benefits.” Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 796 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Plaintiff was previously awarded $4,770.00 in attorney's fees under the EAJA in this action. (ECF No. 22). Accordingly, Plaintiff's counsel is to refund to the Plaintiff the previously ordered EAJA fees of $4,770.00 immediately after he receives the payment of the § 406(b) fees.
IT IS SO ORDERED.