. . . Penal statutes, though important in the interest of public safety, are construed strictly." Peabody v. Campbell, 286 Mass. 295, 304 (1934). No citation of authority is necessary to demonstrate that the rule of strict construction of criminal statutes is deeply imbedded in our law. It recognizes the fairness of clear warning to everyone "of what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed," McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931), and it also recognizes the "plain principle that the power of punishment is vested in the legislative, not in the judicial department."
Commonwealth v. Hayden, 211 Mass. 296. Libby v. New York, New Haven Hartford Railroad, 273 Mass. 522, 525-526. Peabody v. Campbell, 286 Mass. 295, 304. It follows that, since the ordinance was not applicable, there was error in admitting it in evidence.
Ed.) c. 231, ยง 85. It was for the jury to determine whether the plaintiff's operation of the automobile without a license contributed to the injury. Peabody v. Campbell, 286 Mass. 295, 301. The jury could have found that the plaintiff started the automobile from a position on her right side of Melha Avenue; that she shifted into second gear when about one hundred to one hundred fifty feet from the intersection; that she intended to go "straight" through the intersection; and that she was not travelling faster than ten miles per hour.
Conroy v. Mather, 217 Mass. 91, 92, 93, 94. McDonough v. Vozzela, 247 Mass. 552, 555, 559. Gordon v. Bedard, 265 Mass. 408. Peabody v. Campbell, 286 Mass. 295, 301, 305. But the plaintiffs had no inherent right as travellers on the highway to ride in an automobile in the general possession and control of the defendant with respect to which he stood as to them for the time being in the position of an owner.
The decisions of this court dealing with the unlawful operation of unregistered motor vehicles have heretofore dealt with the provisions of ยง 9 of said chapter and its predecessors as those which gave rise to criminal and civil liability, and the court has not heretofore discriminated in these respects between automobiles of resident or nonresident owners. See Dudley v. Northampton Street Railway, 202 Mass. 443, 444, 447, 448, 449; Peabody v. Campbell, 286 Mass. 295, 303, 305; Simpson v. Eastern Massachusetts Street Railway, 292 Mass. 562. "A statute as a whole ought, if possible, to be so construed as to make it an effectual piece of legislation in harmony with common sense and sound reason." Morrison v. Selectmen of Weymouth, 279 Mass. 486, 492.
Noble v. Boston Elevated Railway, 287 Mass. 364. See also Conrad v. Mazman, 287 Mass. 229; Peabody v. Campbell, 286 Mass. 295; Janusis v. Long, 284 Mass. 403. Although this question is close, we think that the automobile here involved was not a nuisance on the highway but was legally registered, notwithstanding the failure of the defendant to be licensed under G.L. (Ter.
Hathaway v. Huntley, 284 Mass. 587, 592. Peabody v. Campbell, 286 Mass. 295, 301. Hoxie v. Bardwell, 287 Mass. 121. Kzcowski v. Johnowicz, 287 Mass. 441, 444.
Violation of a statute is mere evidence of negligence and in order to have legal efficacy such violation must causally contribute to an accident or the injuries resulting therefrom. Peabody v. Campbell, 286 Mass. 295, 301, (1934). None of the words appearing in a statute can be regarded as superfluous. Springfield v. Director of the Division ofEmployment Security, 398 Mass. 786, 789 (1986).