Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING; Petition for Extraordinary Writ. Denied., Super. Ct. No. CK52644
P.B., in pro per., for Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
CHANEY, J.
Office of the Los Angeles County Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel, and Byron G. Shibata, Associate County Counsel, for Real Party in Interest.
P.B. (“mother”) is the mother of three young children who have come under the jurisdiction of the dependency court. We consider mother’s Petition for Extraordinary Relief under California Rules of Court, rule 8.452 (“petition”), in which she challenges orders made by the trial court at a July 29, 2009 hearing regarding her three children, D.D., T.S., and Baby Girl. As explained below, we deny the petition.
Background
1. Section 300 petition as to D.D. and T.S.
This case began in September 2007, when mother’s second child T.S. (who was two years old at the time) was hospitalized for first-degree burns, a black eye, lacerations and multiple other injuries in different stages of recovery. The attending physician at the hospital told the social workers that T.S.’s injuries were not consistent with mother’s explanations (i.e., that the injuries were accidental). The doctor suspected child abuse, which suspicion a doctor at UCLA’s Department of Pediatrics supported in a later report.
On September 14, 2007, the Department of Children and Family Services (“Department”) filed a petition under section 300, alleging D.D. and T.S. were children described under section 300, subdivisions (a) (serious physical harm), (b) (failure to protect), (e) (severe physical abuse to a child under five years old), (i) (cruelty), and (j) (abuse of sibling). At the detention hearing, the trial court ordered the children detained, ordered family reunification services and authorized monitored visits for mother and T.S.’s presumed father (“father”), who had recently been released from jail after serving 18 months for selling drugs.
All section references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
The Department has been unable to identify or locate D.D.’s father.
In a subsequent substance abuse evaluation, it was revealed that mother spent much of her childhood in foster care, due to her own mother’s drug use. Mother indicated that the Department had placed D.D. in foster care in 2002, after mother was arrested and detained at Los Padrinos Detention Center for two weeks. In 2004, mother violated her probation for failing to attend therapy and anger management classes, and was again detained. Apparently, during those years, mother did not tell her own mother of her whereabouts and she did not reunite with D.D. until 2005. Mother also revealed having been treated for psychological problems (beginning when she was seven years old) as well as having recently experienced psychological and emotional problems.
The disposition hearing was held on March 3, 2008, during which the trial court sustained counts a-1, b-1, b-3, e-1, and i-1, as amended. The court dismissed all other counts, found the children dependents of the court and ordered them placed in the Department’s care for suitable placement. Although the court found neither mother nor father in compliance with their case plans, the court ordered family reunification services for both parents, including monitored visits, drug testing and counseling.
Prior to the six-month review hearing, various reports were submitted, which revealed the following: As to D.D. and T.S., they were in a caring foster home. D.D. stated he wanted to reunify with mother and, while T.S. could not give a meaningful statement regarding placement, she did say she was scared of mother.
As to father, he visited with T.S. but was not fully compliant with his case plan. In particular, father was not complying with drug testing and, in fact, had some positive drug tests. Father desired reunification services and his mother (“paternal grandmother”) offered to have T.S. placed with her. By October 2008, father had been incarcerated for a parole violation.
As to mother, she visited with both children and seemed to be progressing. She participated in court-ordered programs, but was inconsistent with individual counseling. She also desired reunification. Mother’s plan to live with her own mother (“maternal grandmother”) was problematic, however, because, in August 2008, a voluntary family reunification case was opened relating to mother’s abuse of her two younger brothers, Michael (“maternal uncle”) (then 16 years old) and Stephen (then 11 years old). A condition of that voluntary family reunification plan was that mother was not allowed in maternal grandmother’s home. In September 2008, however, the Department agreed to allow mother to reside at maternal grandmother’s home. Subsequently, maternal uncle refused to live at maternal grandmother’s house.
The six-month review hearing was held in October 2008. The trial court retained jurisdiction over the children, but ordered the children returned to mother under the following conditions: (a) mother was to maintain weekly contact with the Department and was to allow the social worker weekly access to the children, (b) mother was to find suitable housing, not in the same apartment complex as maternal grandmother, (c) maternal uncle was not to live in the same home as the children, (d) mother was to participate in all court-ordered programs, and (e) mother was to provide a minimum level of care and protection for the children. The court ordered family maintenance services for mother.
2. Supplemental and subsequent petitions as to D.D. and T.S.
In December 2008, the Department learned that, in violation of the trial court’s order, mother and the children were living with maternal grandmother. The Department discovered mother’s violation of the court’s order because maternal grandmother had called the police to have mother evicted. The police arrested mother because they discovered an outstanding warrant for her arrest, stemming from the alleged child abuse of T.S. in September 2007. The children were removed and placed with a paternal aunt. The Department filed a supplemental petition under section 387, alleging not only that mother violated court orders, but also that maternal grandmother physically abused D.D. Although the trial court found reason to detain the children, it later dismissed the supplemental petition without prejudice.
Mother was released from jail in late-December and placed on probation for five years. The Department returned the children to mother with Department oversight and mother indicated she would look for suitable housing.
In March 2009, however, maternal uncle called 911 to report mother’s alleged physical abuse of T.S. Mother was arrested and T.S. was hospitalized with multiple injuries, including bruising on her face and body and a cut on the back of her head requiring staples. Her eyes were also swollen shut. The doctor treating T.S. stated her injuries were “[d]efinitely consistent with physical abuse.”
The Department filed a subsequent petition under section 342, which was later amended. As in the original petition, the section 342 petition described D.D. and T.S. as children described under section 300, subdivisions (a), (b), (e) and (j). The petition alleged that, on March 24, 2009, mother dropped T.S., resulting in a bleeding laceration to T.S.’s head, struck T.S. on her face and body, causing injuries, and stuck her fingers in T.S.’s eyes, causing T.S.’s eyes to swell.
A detective with Sheriff’s Department Special Victims Bureau interviewed the family following the alleged abuse. Maternal grandmother was uncooperative and denied mother had done anything wrong and maternal uncle could not be found. T.S. told the detective that mother “hurt her all the time,” she was scared of mother and did not want to live with her. Although D.D. was reluctant to speak with the detective, he did tell the detective that mother had “whooped” him with a belt. Mother told the detective conflicting stories, initially denying any wrongdoing, then admitting she abused T.S.
At the detention hearing, the trial court ordered the children detained, ordered family reunification services, and ordered monitored visits at least three times a week.
The Department later filed an interim report, summarizing subsequent interviews with the children. T.S. continued to confirm the abuse allegations and did not want to live with mother because T.S. was scared of her. T.S. stated mother also had “socked” D.D. on his chest and back. D.D. similarly confirmed the abuse allegations and stated mother would also “pop” and “whoop” him. Although he stated he was scared of mother, he also said he wanted to go home with her. The Department was unable to contact mother or father for the interim report, both of whom were incarcerated. In a subsequent April 2009 report, the Department indicated it had located and interviewed mother in jail. At that time, mother was seven months pregnant and stated the father of her third child was Rupert L. Mother again denied abusing T.S.
As of May 6, 2009, D.D. and T.S. were placed with paternal grandmother.
In a June 2009 interim report, the Department summarized recent interviews with family members. Maternal uncle was interviewed on the phone as well as at his high school. He stated mother regularly abused T.S. since she was two years old. He also stated he had been sexually abused. He said his mother (maternal grandmother) once asked him to bathe her and not to tell anyone, his uncle once touched his leg, and his sister (mother) once had sex with him. He also stated mother was physically abusive to him and his brother Stephen. The Department also interviewed Stephen at the home of maternal grandmother, who was present. Stephen told a very different story. He said mother did not abuse T.S. and that maternal uncle called 911 because, the night before, mother had taken his phone. Stephen said T.S. caused the serious injury to her head by scratching her scalp until it bled. T.S.’s and D.D.’s accounts of events remained consistent with earlier statements.
The trial court adjudicated the section 342 petition on June 25, 2009. The court sustained the amended a-1 and j-1 counts and dismissed the b-1 and e-1 counts of the section 342 petition.
3. Section 300 petition as to Baby Girl
Mother gave birth to her third child (“Baby Girl”) on June 15, 2009. On June 19, 2009, the Department filed a section 300 petition on behalf of Baby Girl, alleging the baby was at risk because of mother’s abuse of T.S. and that the baby’s father, Rupert L., had a limited ability to provide for Baby Girl. Mother stated she wanted Baby Girl placed with Rupert L.’s mother, who indicated “she was thrilled and so happy to have the infant come stay with her.” Rupert L. stated he wants custody of Baby Girl. He is father to eight other children, including infant twins currently in his care, and has three prior convictions for narcotics sales, although he stated he is no longer on parole or probation. The trial court eventually found Rupert L. to be Baby Girl’s presumed father. Baby Girl was placed with Rupert L.’s mother.
4. July 29, 2009 hearing
On July 29, 2009, the trial court held a disposition hearing under the section 342 petition as to D.D. and T.S. and a pre-trial resolution conference (“PRC”) and hearing on the section 300 petition as to Baby Girl. By clear and convincing evidence, the court found mother to be a person described by section 361.5, subdivision (b)(3), (5) and (6). As to both D.D. and T.S., the court denied mother’s request for an additional six months of family reunification services. Based on mother’s repeated severe physical abuse of T.S., the court found that neither D.D. nor T.S. would benefit from reunification with mother. As to D.D., the court set a section 366.26 permanency planning hearing for November 24, 2009, ordering the permanent plan to be adoption by or legal guardianship with paternal grandmother. As to T.S., the court reinstated family reunification services as to her father and set a section 366.21(f) review hearing for January 28, 2010.
As to Baby Girl’s section 300 petition, the court sustained the section 300, subdivisions (j)(1) and (j)(2) counts, but struck the section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) and (b)(2) counts. The court also set adjudication of the section 300 allegations against Rupert L. for September 15, 2009 and authorized overnight visits for him.
Following the July 29 hearing, mother filed an appeal and a notice of intent to file writ petition. On September 10, 2009, writ counsel for mother filed a letter indicating that, under Glen C. v. Superior Court (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 570, she was unable to file a petition for extraordinary writ on behalf of mother. Five days later, mother filed a form petition for extraordinary writ in pro per. Mother did not attach a memorandum to her petition, nor did she clearly articulate her challenges to the trial court’s orders. The clerk’s office sent a letter to the parties indicating we would decide the matter on its merits and requesting opposition from DCSF, which DCSF filed.
Discussion
1. Noncompliance with California Rules of Court
Rule 8.452 of the California Rules of Court requires that a writ petition to review an order setting a section 366.26 hearing include certain specified information. In particular, the petition “must be accompanied by a memorandum” that provides a summary of the significant facts and supports each point with argument and citation to authority and the record. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452(a)(3) and (b). See also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.456(a)(3) and (b).) A petition that fails to comply with these rules is subject to dismissal. We “dismiss as inadequate any rule 39.1B [now rule 8.452] petition that does not (1) summarize the particular factual bases supporting the petition, (2) refer to specific portions of the record, (3) relate the facts to the grounds alleged as error, (4) note disputed aspects of the record, and (5) have attached to it a particularized memorandum of points and authorities.” (Cheryl S. v. Superior Court (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 1000, 1005. See also Cresse S. v. Superior Court (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 947, 955-956.)
Mother failed to comply with these rules. Her petition does not include a memorandum of points and authorities and she offers only conclusory statements—unsupported by either facts or legal authority—as “support” for her petition. The complete “grounds” for her petition are as follows: “violated equal protection & due process under 14th A [sic] denial of family reunification service[es] improper disposition under 342 petition, physical custody removal under WIC 361(b). Improper placement. Inappropriate permanent plans, adoption, or legal guardianship.” Similarly, the complete “factual basis” for her petition is: “Family reunification services not offered. Remanded dependent children under WIC 300 subdivisions A B E I. Improper disposition under 342 petition, removal from physical custody pursuant to WIC 361(b), physical custody taken and placed in DCFS placement.”
Although we could dismiss the petition for its clear failure to comply with the applicable court rules, we decline to do so in light of the importance of the right at stake and the critical stage of these proceedings.
2. Arguments
Although the petition is unclear, mother appears to challenge all orders made at the July 29, 2009 hearing. The petition is appropriate, however, only as to the trial court’s order denying reunification services and setting a section 366.26 hearing as to D.D. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.450(a).) The petition is unauthorized as to the court’s orders regarding T.S and the infant. Thus, we construe the writ petition as challenging only the order terminating family reunification services and setting a section 366.26 hearing as to D.D. (“the order”).
Mother’s argument, as best as can be determined, may be characterized as follows: (a) substantial evidence does not support the order, and (b) mother’s constitutional rights to equal protection and due process were violated.
We review an order terminating reunification services for an abuse of discretion. (In re Brequia Y. (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 1060, 1068.) We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s decision and will reverse the termination order only if no judge reasonably could have arrived at that decision. (In re Robert L. (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 1057, 1067, superseded by statute on another ground as stated in Cesar V. v. Superior Court (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1023, 1032.)
As indicated above, D.D. was detained in September 2007 based on sustained allegations of mother’s severe physical abuse of D.D.’s sibling, T.S. Mother was offered reunification but she failed to reunify and again severely abused T.S. Mother was incarcerated as a result of her physical abuse of T.S. There was also evidence that mother physically abused D.D. (socking, popping and whooping him) as well as her younger brothers. The trial court terminated reunification almost two years after D.D. was originally detained and family reunification or maintenance services were ordered. We conclude this constitutes substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s order terminating reunification services and setting a section 366.26 hearing as to D.D.
As to mother’s apparent constitutional challenge, the petition simply states “violated equal protection & due process under 14th A.” Mother offers no argument as to how her rights were violated, nor does she point us to any such violations in the record. Under these circumstances, we conclude mother has forfeited any objection on constitutional grounds. (See Evans v. CenterStone Development Co. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 151, 165.)
Disposition
The petition is denied.
We concur: MALLANO, P. J., JOHNSON, J.