"Stacking" is the multiplication of the policy limits of an insurance policy by the number of vehicles covered by that policy. It is well-settled in West Virginia "there is no common law right to stack coverage available for multiple vehicles under the same policy[.]" Payne v. Weston, 195 W. Va. 502, 508, 466 S.E.2d 161, 167 (1995). Rather, "the right to stack must arise from the insurance contract itself (as that is the agreement of the parties) or from a statute (as in the uninsured and under insured motorist coverage statutes)."
Our review of the circuit court's decision to grant summary judgment is de novo . See Syl. Pt. 1, Painter v. Peavy , 192 W.Va. 189, 451 S.E.2d 755 (1994). As we recognized in Payne v. Weston , 195 W.Va. 502, 466 S.E.2d 161 (1995), "[t]he interpretation of an insurance contract, including the question of whether the contract is ambiguous, is a legal determination which, like the court's summary judgment, is reviewed de novo on appeal." Id. at 506-07, 466 S.E.2d at 165-66.
When interpreting such contracts of insurance, we determine the parties' intent from the policy language itself. Payne v. Weston , 195 W.Va. 502, 466 S.E.2d 161, 166 (1995) ; Keffer v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. , 153 W.Va. 813, 172 S.E.2d 714, 715-16 (1970). We consider "all parts" of the policy together. Payne , 466 S.E.2d at 166.
"[T]he interpretation of an insurance contract, including the question of whether the contract is ambiguous, is a legal determination which, like the court's summary judgment, is reviewed de novo on appeal." Dairyland Ins. Co. v. Fox, 209 W. Va. 598, 601, 550 S.E.2d 388, 391 (2001)( quoting Payne v. Weston, 195 W. Va. 502, 506-07, 466 S.E.2d 161, 165-66 (1995)). Keeping these standards in mind, the Court now examines the issues raised by the Appellant.
This endorsement sets forth an “EFFECTIVE DATE” of “01/01/08” and a “DATE ENDORSEMENT ISSUED” of “01/30/2008[.]” There is no “retroactive date” on the face of this endorsement.In addressing WVMIC's reformation argument, the circuit court found that “[i]t is only when the document has been found to be ambiguous that the determination of intent through extrinsic evidence become[s] a question of fact.” Blake v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 224 W.Va. 317, 323, 685 S.E.2d 895, 901 (2009) (quoting Payne v. Weston, 195 W.Va. 502, 507, 466 S.E.2d 161, 166 (1995)). Based on the parties' stipulation that the provisions of the 2010 Policy are clear and unambiguous, the lower court concluded that WVMIC could not seek reformation of the policy through the introduction of extrinsic evidence of intent.
This endorsement sets forth an “EFFECTIVE DATE” of “01/01/08” and a “DATE ENDORSEMENT ISSUED” of “01/30/2008[.]” There is no “retroactive date” on the face of this endorsement.In addressing WVMIC's reformation argument, the circuit court found that “[i]t is only when the document has been found to be ambiguous that the determination of intent through extrinsic evidence become[s] a question of fact.” Blake v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 224 W.Va. 317, 323, 685 S.E.2d 895, 901 (2009) (quoting Payne v. Weston, 195 W.Va. 502, 507, 466 S.E.2d 161, 166 (1995) ). Based on the parties' stipulation that the provisions of the 2010 Policy are clear and unambiguous, the lower court concluded that WVMIC could not seek reformation of the policy through the introduction of extrinsic evidence of intent. Disagreeing with the rulings of the circuit court in its summary judgment order, WVMIC appeals.
Single policy covering multiple vehicles: Allstate Ins. Co. v. Mole, 414 F.2d 204 (5th Cir. 1969); Greer v. Associated Indem. Corp., 371 F.2d 29 (5th Cir. 1967); Gov't Employees Ins. Co. v. Lally, 327 F.2d 568 (4th Cir. 1964); Basso v. Allstate Ins. Co., 19 Ariz.App. 58, 504 P.2d 1281 (Ariz.Ct.App. 1973); Gibbons v. Shockley, 341 So.2d 260 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1977); Maine v. Hyde, 350 So.2d 1161 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1977); Cook v. Suburban Cas. Co., 54 Ill.App.2d 190, 203 N.E.2d 748 (1964); Oarr v. Gov't Employees Ins. Co., 39 Md.App. 122, 383 A.2d 1112 (1978); Maher v. Chase, 52 Mass.App.Ct. 22, 749 N.E.2d 717 (2001); Cmty. Serv. Ins. Co. v. Price, 41 Mich.App. 604, 200 N.W.2d 450 (1972); Hilden v. Iowa Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 365 N.W.2d 765 (Minn. 1985); Houser v. Gilbert, 389 N.W.2d 626 (N.D. 1986); Thompson v. Cont'l Ins. Cos., 291 S.C. 47, 351 S.E.2d 904 (1986); Pac. Indem. Co. v. Thompson, 56 Wash.2d 715, 355 P.2d 12 (1960); Payne v. Weston, 195 W.Va. 502, 466 S.E.2d 161 (1995); Shamblin v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 175 W.Va. 337, 332 S.E.2d 639 (1985); Rosar v. Gen. Ins. Co. of Am., 41 Wis.2d 95, 163 N.W.2d 129 (1968). Two or more policies covering separate vehicles: Palmisano v. Horace Mann Mut. Ins. Co., 446 F.Supp. 232 (W.D.Mo. 1978); Gordon v. Gordon, 41 P.3d 391, 393 (Okla. 2002) (noting that opinions in two federal circuits and "from at least nineteen state appellate courts . . . all have refused to allow liability coverages to be stacked"); Giles v. Whitaker, 297 S.C. 267, 376 S.E.2d 278 (1989); Agnew v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 150 Wis.2d 341, 441 N.W.2d 222 (1989).
Syl. Pt. 4, W.Va. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Stanley, 602 S.E.2d 483 (W.Va. 2004), and “a court should read policy provisions to avoid ambiguities and not torture the language to create them.” Payne v. Weston, 466 S.E.2d 161, 166 (W.Va. 1995).
Insurance policies are controlled by the rules of construction that are applicable to contracts generally. Payne v. Weston, 195 W. Va. 502, 466 S.E.2d 161 (W.Va. 1995). Where provisions of an insurance policy contract are clear and unambiguous, they are not subject to judicial construction or interpretation, but full effect will be given to their plain and ordinary meaning.
' Payne v. Weston, 195 W.Va. 502, 507, 466 S.E.2d 161, 166 (1995), quoting Syllabus Point 1, in part, Shamblin v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 175 W.Va. 337, 332 S.E.2d 639 (1985)." Est. of Tawney, 219 W.Va. at 272, 633 S.E.2d at 28