Opinion
Index No. 503632/2023 Mot. Seq. Nos. 1 2
01-09-2024
GAVIN PAYNE, Plaintiff, v. SIGNATURE MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATES INC., 315 FENIMORE LLC, 1975 EQUITIES LLC, MENDY WILHELM and NADAV AVIKASIS, Defendants.
Unpublished Opinion
Motion Date: 6-27-23
DECISION/ORDER
PETER P. SWEENEY, J.S.C.
The following papers, which are e-filed with NYCEF as documents 9 through 36 were read on these motions:
In this action commenced pursuant to the Labor Law and 29 U.S.C. 216(b), the plaintiff moves for an order: (1) removing the pending eviction case of 315 Fenimore LLC v. Garvin Payne index number LT-319388-22, from the Housing Court of Kings County to this Court pursuant to CPLR §§ 325(b) and 602(b); (2) Staying 315 Fenimore LLC v. Payne pending removal, pursuant to C.P.L.R. § 326(a); (3) Consolidating this action with 315 Fenimore LLC v. Payne pursuant to CPLR § 325(b) and 602(a); (4) or, in the alternative, issuing a preliminary injunction pursuant to C.P.L.R. §6301 et seq. staying pending the eviction case pending a resolution of the matter, and (5) Granting such other and further relief as this court may find just and proper. The defendants cross-move for an order dismissing the action pursuant to CPLR § 3211 and to Enforce the Parties' purported Agreed Upon Settlement pursuant to CPLR § 2104. The two motions are consolidated for disposition.
Background:
The plaintiff worked as a residential superintendent for the defendants until he was terminated on May 19, 2022. As part of his residential position as superintendent, the defendants provided Mr. Payne with an apartment located at 315 Fenimore St. Apt. DI, Brooklyn, NY 11225 (hereinafter the "premises"). Plaintiff alleges that he was terminated because he complained about not receiving his wages. Following plaintiff s termination, the defendants brought a holdover proceeding against Mr. Payne seeking possession of the premises (315 Fenimore LLC v. Garvin Payne index number LT-319388-22) which is pending in the Housing Court of Kings County.
The plaintiff commenced this action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. 216(b) and NYLL § 215(2)(a) seeking, among other things, reinstatement as a superintendent, lost wages, compensatory' damages, and liquidated damages.
Discussion:
The Court will first address the cross-motion. The defendants' contention that the parties entered into a binding stipulation of settlement is without merit. To be enforceable, a stipulation of settlement must conform to the requirements of CPLR 2104 (see Matter of Dolgin Eldert Corp., 31 N.Y.2d 1, 8, 334 N.Y.S.2d 833, 286 N.E.2d 228; Graffeo v. Brenes, 85 A.D.2d 656, 657, 445 N.Y.S.2d 223). The plain language of CPLR 2104 requires that such a settlement agreement be in writing and subscribed by the parties (or attorneys of the parties) (see Bonnette v. Long Is. Coll. Hosp., 3 N.Y.3d 281, 785 N.Y.S.2d 738, 819 N.E.2d 206). Here, the defendants have not submitted a settlement agreement, subscribed to be by plaintiff or his attorney, that demonstrates that the parties have agreed to all of the material terms of a settlement of the action. Further, the purported settlement is not enforceable under the "open court exception" provided for in CPLR 2104.
The court rejects defendants' contention that the e-mail correspondence between the attorneys for the parties satisfies CPLR 2104. While e-mail correspondence may satisfy the writing requirements of CPLR 2104, the email message must contain all the material terms of the settlement (see Forcelli v. Geico Corp., 109 A.D.3d 244, 251, 972 N.Y.S.2d 570,575-76; see also, Kolchins v. Evolution Mkts., Inc., 128 A.D.3d 47, 59). Contrary to defendants' contention, the emails exchanged between the attorneys for the parties demonstrate that the parties did not reach agreement on all the material terms of a settlement, particularly, how long the plaintiff would be allowed to remain in possession of the premises as part of the settlement. Indeed, the email dated August 2, 2022, which defendants claim shows that a settlement had been reached, actually demonstrates the opposite. This email provides as follows: "This email is to confirm that we have an agreement in principle for $15,000, to be held by you in escrow until Mr. Payne moves out of his apartment. I will draft the settlement agreement and get to you in the next couple of days, I am discussing the timeline for Mr. Payne to move out with my client and will get back to you soon." It is apparent that as of the time this email was sent, the parties had yet to reach an agreement on how long the plaintiff would remain in possession of premises as part of the settlement which the Court views as a material term of the settlement. For the above reasons, the cross-motion is denied.
Turning to plaintiffs motion, CPLR 2201 provides as follows: "Except where otherwise prescribed by law, the court in which an action is pending may grant a stay of proceedings in a proper case, upon such terms as may be just." Stays have frequently been granted where an issue essential to resolution of the summary proceeding is pending in another forum (see 5201 Snyder Ave. Assocs. LP v. Clarke, 32 Misc.3d 1203(A), 932 N.Y.S.2d 760; Maguire v. Ardea Realty Corp. 279 AD 904; 60 Bleeker street Owners v. Brzizinski, NYLJ, November 20, 2001, p 22, col 6 (Civ Ct, N.Y. Co); Romag Realty v. Saunders, 12 Misc.2d 11). A motion for a stay of proceedings is primarily addressed to the discretion of the Court and such discretion must be exercised sparingly and only where there has been an affirmative showing that the equities involved are strong and apparent (see Peerce v. Peerce, 97 A.D.2d 718). The Court finds that this is the case here. The plaintiff correctly contends that the balance of equities favors the plaintiff, since if a stay is not granted, he may very well be irreparably harmed by being rendered homeless before his claims, including rehiring or reinstatement, are determined (see 5201 Snyder Ave. Assocs. LP, 32 Misc.3d 1203(A), 932 N.Y.S.2d 760).
Accordingly, after due deliberation, it is hereby ordered that plaintiff s motion is granted solely to the extent that the Housing Court proceeding shall be stayed pending a resolution of this action. The stay is conditioned on the plaintiff paying "use and occupancy" on the first day each month following the issuance of this order. The Court hereby directs that a use and occupancy hearing be conducted by a Special Referee who shall hear and report, with recommendations, on how much monthly use and occupancy should be. With the parties consent, the Special Referee may determine the issue. Until there has been a determination of the amount of monthly use and occupancy that the plaintiff must pay, the plaintiff is directed to pay interim use and accuracy, in the amount of $600, on the first of every month.
Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDRED that the motion and cross-motion are decided as indicated above. This constitutes the decision and order of the Court.
Note: This signature was generated electronically pursuant to Administrative Order 86/20 dated April 20, 2020