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Payne v. Ritchey

United States District Court, Middle District of Pennsylvania
Oct 18, 2023
CIVIL 1:22-CV-1517 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 18, 2023)

Opinion

CIVIL 1:22-CV-1517

10-18-2023

JOSHUA PAYNE, Plaintiff, v. BRAD RITCHEY, et al., Defendants.


(Judge Mariani)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Daryl F. Bloom United States Magistrate Judge

I. Introduction

This is a prisoner civil rights lawsuit filed by the pro se plaintiff, Joshua Payne, an inmate incarcerated in the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections at the State Correctional Institution at Camp Hill. (Doc. 1). Payne's amended complaint asserted claims of First Amendment and due process violations, as well as a civil conspiracy claim against Unit Manager Brad Ritchey, Correctional Officer Timpe, and a John Doe defendant. (Doc. 7).

The defendants filed a motion to dismiss (Doc. 21), which was granted in part and denied in part. (Docs. 30, 32). In an order dated June 29, 2023, Judge Mariani dismissed the First Amendment retaliation claim against Officer Timpe and the conspiracy claim but permitted the plaintiff to proceed on his procedural due process claim against Defendant Ritchey and his First Amendment retaliation claim against Ritchey and the John Doe defendant. (Doc. 32). Judge Mariani gave the plaintiff leave to amend his remaining claims, but no amended complaint was ever filed.

Prior to the filing of the motion to dismiss, the plaintiff filed a motion for a preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order, alleging that the defendants, along with other unidentified correctional staff at SCI Camp Hill, were refusing to provide him with grievance paperwork and were denying him yard, commissary, and other privileges. (Doc. 15). Payne requests a separation from these correctional staff, as well as a transfer to a different facility. (Id. at 3). He further requests that he be permitted leave to amend his complaint to include new retaliation, due process, and conspiracy claims without having to exhaust his administrative remedies. (Id.). In their response, the defendants assert, inter alia, that at least two of the plaintiff's requests- separation and transfer-are moot since Payne was transferred to another unit at SCI Camp Hill on December 22, 2022. (Doc. 29 at 9-10). They also contend that Payne has not made the necessary showing for injunctive relief. (Doc. 29).

Upon consideration, we conclude that the plaintiff has not made the exacting showing necessary to obtain preliminary injunctive relief. Accordingly, we recommend that this motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction be denied.

II. Discussion

A. Preliminary Injunction - the Legal Standard

Inmate requests for preliminary injunctive relief are governed by Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Such requests are reviewed under an exacting legal standard, by which the plaintiff must show: (1) a reasonable probability of success on the merits; and (2) irreparable injury if relief is denied. Gerardi v. Pelullo, 16 F.3d 1363, 1373 (3d Cir. 1994). The court must also consider whether granting injunctive relief would harm the nonmoving party, and whether such relief is in the public interest. Id. Preliminary injunctions are an extraordinary remedy, and the burden lies with the plaintiff to show that an injunction is “the only way of protecting the plaintiff from harm.” Campbell Soup Co. v. ConAgra, Inc., 977 F.2d 86, 91 (3d Cir. 1992) (quotations and citations omitted).

Particularly, in the prison setting, courts have limited authority to issue injunctive relief, and such authority is tailored by statute. Thus, 18 U.S.C. § 3626 limits the authority of courts to enjoin discretionary acts by prison officials, requiring that any injunctive relief granted be narrowly tailored and “shall extend no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right of a particular plaintiff or plaintiffs.” §§ 3626(a)(1)(A), (a)(2). Further, we are reminded that the purpose of preliminary injunctive relief “is to preserve the status quo, not to decide the issues on their merits.” Anderson v. Davila, 125 F.3d 148, 156 (3d Cir. 1997). Accordingly, a plaintiff requesting mandatory injunctive relief faces a particularly heavy burden, as the Third Circuit has directed that such mandatory relief be issued sparingly. United States v. Price, 688 F.2d 204, 212 (3d Cir. 1982); Punnett v. Carter, 621 F.2d 578, 582 (3d Cir. 1980).

B. Payne's Request for Injunctive Relief Should Be Denied.

In the instant case, Payne's motion for injunctive relief requests that he be separated from the defendants and transferred to another facility. (Doc. 15). He also requests leave to amend his complaint without having to exhaust his administrative remedies because he was being denied grievance paperwork. (Id.). However, after consideration, we conclude that Payne has not shown a likelihood of success on the merits of his claims, or that denial of injunctive relief will result in immediate, irreparable harm.

At the outset, to the extent Payne's motion requests us to mandate his transfer to another facility or to another unit within the institution, we note that such claims have been rarely embraced by the courts. Rather, the Third Circuit has explained that housing assignments within the prison are matters consigned to the discretion of prison administrators. See Rinaldi v. United States, 904 F.3d 257, 273 (3d Cir. 2018). In fact, “an inmate does not have a constitutional right to choose his place of confinement, security classification, any particular housing assignment or cellmate.” Milhouse v. Heath, 2022 WL 18106389, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 7, 2022) (Mehalchick, M.J.) (citing Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 245 (1983)). Accordingly, Payne may not use a motion for injunctive relief to choose his place of confinement. Moreover, the defendants have asserted that following Payne's motion, he was transferred to a different unit within the prison, which resulted in his separation from the defendants. (Doc. 29 at 9-10). Thus, any request for a transfer or separation is now moot.

Further, Payne has not shown that the denial of injunctive relief will result in immediate, irreparable harm. Payne's motion asserts that he was denied time in the yard, meals, and showers on several occasions between October 27 and November 2, 2022, and thus, feared for his wellbeing. (Doc. 15 at 2). However, as we have noted, it appears that Payne was transferred to a different unit in December of 2022. (Doc. 29 at 9-10).

The Third Circuit has found that “in order to warrant a preliminary injunction, the injury created by a failure to issue the requested injunction must “ ‘be of a peculiar nature, so that compensation in money cannot atone for it....' ” Acierno v. New Castle County, 40 F.3d 645, 653 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting A.O. Smith Corp. v. F.T.C., 530 F.2d 515, 525 (3d Cir. 1976)). Accordingly, where an inmate-plaintiff asserts that damages may adequately compensate him for the alleged wrongs, a preliminary injunction is often not appropriate because the inmate has not shown that he faces an immediate, irreparable harm. See e.g., Burton v. Wetzel, 2017 WL 4284345, at *9 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 27, 2017) (Carlson, M.J.) (denying injunctive relief where the plaintiff's complaint suggested damages were an appropriate remedy). Payne's complaint suggests that damages may be an adequate remedy to address the violations he has alleged. The complaint requests $11,000,000 in compensatory damages and $20,000,000 in punitive damages against the defendants, suggesting that Payne believes that monetary compensation may be an adequate remedy to address the events that took place in October and November of 2022. (Doc. 1 at 11). Therefore, this factor weighs against the entry of a preliminary injunction in this case.

While Payne has not made the requisite showing for injunctive relief because he has not shown a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits and irreparable harm, consideration of the remaining factors also weighs against granting injunctive relief in this case. Granting relief in this context would set a precedent for federal courts making decisions regarding the transfer and discipline of inmates in the state correctional system. Moreover, while there is an interest in the protection of First Amendment and due process rights, there is also a strong interest in maintaining order and safety in correctional facilities.

Accordingly, given that Payne has failed to establish “both a likelihood of success on the merits and the probability of irreparable harm if relief is not granted,” Hohe v. Casey, 868 F.2d 69, 72 (3d Cir. 1989) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted), the motion for preliminary injunctive relief and temporary restraining order should be denied.

III. Recommendation

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the motion for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order (Doc. 15) be DENIED.

The parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:

Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a
habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.

Submitted this 18th day of October 2023.


Summaries of

Payne v. Ritchey

United States District Court, Middle District of Pennsylvania
Oct 18, 2023
CIVIL 1:22-CV-1517 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 18, 2023)
Case details for

Payne v. Ritchey

Case Details

Full title:JOSHUA PAYNE, Plaintiff, v. BRAD RITCHEY, et al., Defendants.

Court:United States District Court, Middle District of Pennsylvania

Date published: Oct 18, 2023

Citations

CIVIL 1:22-CV-1517 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 18, 2023)