Opinion
C. A. 3:21-3433-JMC-PJG
04-12-2023
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
PAIGE J. GOSSETT, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
Plaintiff Leo Lionel Payne, proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This matter is before the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.) for initial review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Having reviewed the Complaint in accordance with applicable law, the court concludes that this action should be summarily dismissed because it is duplicative.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiff brings this civil rights action against the solicitor who prosecuted Plaintiff for a 2014 trespassing arrest in Richland County. Plaintiff claims that the solicitor's prosecution of him violated various constitutional rights and he seeks damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Specifically, Plaintiff claims that the solicitor lacked probable cause to pursue the charges against him. This is the fourth civil action Plaintiff has filed against this defendant in this court over this same issue. See C/A No. 3:15-2785; C/A No. 3:16-3792; C/A No. 3-18-1993. In the most recent case, the court summarily dismissed Plaintiff's claims with prejudice because the defendant is immune from claims for damages pursuant to § 1983. See C/A No. 3-18-1993 (ECF No. 22); see also Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976)).
II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the pro se Complaint. The Complaint has been filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit. This statute allows a district court to dismiss the case upon a finding that the action “is frivolous or malicious,” “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
This court is required to liberally construe pro se complaints, which are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 214 (4th Cir. 2016). Nonetheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for “all civil actions”).
B. Analysis
The court concludes that this action is subject to summary dismissal because it is duplicative of Plaintiff's previously filed action that was dismissed with prejudice. The court considers duplicative claims frivolous because it is a waste of judicial resources to unnecessarily consider the same claims in multiple cases. See Cottle v. Bell, 229 F.3d 1142 (4th Cir. 2000) (“Because district courts are not required to entertain duplicative or redundant lawsuits, they may dismiss such suits as frivolous pursuant to § 1915(e).”) (citing Aziz v. Burrows, 976 F.2d 1158, 1158 (8th Cir. 1992)); Wilson v. Lynaugh, 878 F.2d 846, 850 (5th Cir. 1989) (“To this end, IFP complaints may be dismissed as frivolous pursuant to § 1915(d) when they seek to relitigate claims which allege substantially the same facts arising from a common series of events which have already been unsuccessfully litigated by the IFP plaintiff.”); see also Quinonez v. Texas, No. CV H-16-0822, 2016 WL 2894920, at *2 (S.D. Tex. May 17, 2016) (stating “[a] prisoner civil rights complaint is considered ‘malicious' for purposes of the PLRA if it duplicates allegations made in another federal lawsuit by the same plaintiff,” and also dismissing a duplicative, successive § 1983 action on the basis of res judicata) (citing Pittman v. Moore, 900 F.2d 994, 994 (5th Cir. 1993)). Here, Plaintiff's claims are duplicative of those brought in his last three cases because they raise the same issues against the same defendant based on the same occurrence. In his most recent suit, the action was dismissed with prejudice, which precludes Plaintiff from raising those claims again against the same defendant. See generally United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 432 (1980) (J. Rehnquist, dissenting) (“While res judicata is a defense which can be waived, see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(c), if a court is on notice that it has previously decided the issue presented, the court may dismiss the action sua sponte, even though the defense has not been raised . . . This result is fully consistent with the policies underlying res judicata: it is not based solely on the defendant's interest in avoiding the burdens of twice defending a suit, but is also based on the avoidance of unnecessary judicial waste.”) (internal citations omitted); Headwaters Inc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 399 F.3d 1047, 1054 (9th Cir. 2005) (“As a general matter, a court may, sua sponte, dismiss a case on preclusion grounds ‘where the records of that court show that a previous action covering the same subject matter and parties had been dismissed.' ” (quoting Evarts v. W. Metal Finishing Co., 253 F.2d 637, 639 n.1 (9th Cir. 1958)). Consequently, this case should be dismissed as frivolous.
IIII. Pre-Filing Injunction
The court further recommends that the court issue a pre-filing injunction requiring that Plaintiff be barred from proceeding in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 if he files future lawsuits against the named defendant, Jessica Mangum, seeking damages for her prosecution of Plaintiff s trespassing charge. See Cromer v. Kraft Foods N. Am., Inc., 390 F.3d 812, 817-19 (4th Cir. 2004) (providing that the court may limit a litigant's access to the court for exigent circumstances, such as “continuous abuse of the judicial process by filing meritless and repetitive actions”). This is the fourth lawsuit filed by Plaintiff against the same defendant, in which all of his claims and allegations against her have been the same. Plaintiff has no good faith basis for pursuing such claims, especially after the court dismissed his most recent lawsuit with prejudice. This sanction is narrowly tailored as it allows Plaintiff to proceed with a lawsuit if he pays the filing fee, and it does not prevent him from proceeding in forma pauperis in any other action. Plaintiff is hereby warned that his repetitive, duplicative, and frivolous lawsuits may invite sanction by this court.
IV. Conclusion
Accordingly, the court recommends that this action be summarily dismissed with prejudice and without issuance and service of process, and that the court issue a pre-filing injunction against Plaintiff.
Plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
901 Richland Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).