Payne v. Madigan

10 Citing cases

  1. Strickland v. United States

    295 F.2d 186 (8th Cir. 1961)   Cited 3 times

    "It was appellant's contention that the words `consecutively' and `with' were incompatible with each other, and that such an ambiguity was therefore created as legally to require that all of the sentences against him be accorded concurrent operation. "We have held in a corresponding situation that `the use of the expression "to run consecutively with" could [not] reasonably be regarded as having any other natural or contextual meaning in the situation than "consecutive to"'. Young v. United States, 8 Cir., 274 F.2d 698, 702, affirmed [ 366 U.S. 761] 81 S.Ct. 1670, [ 6 L.Ed.2d 853]. See also Fulton v. United States, 5 Cir., 250 F.2d 281; Payne v. Madigan, 9 Cir., 274 F.2d 702, affirmed [ 366 U.S. 761], 81 S.Ct. 1670 [ 6 L.Ed.2d 853].

  2. U.S. v. Garcia

    37 F.3d 1359 (9th Cir. 1994)   Cited 89 times
    Holding that, for purposes of proving a criminal violation "under the money laundering statutes, due to the fungibility of money, it is sufficient to prove that the funds in question came from an account in which tainted proceeds were commingled with other funds"

    An oral sentence which leaves uncertainty as to the amount of time to be served is ambiguous but not so ambiguous as to be illegal. See Payne v. Madigan, 274 F.2d 702, 704-05 (9th Cir. 1960), aff'd, 366 U.S. 761, 81 S.Ct. 1670, 6 L.Ed.2d 853 (1961). Garcia's oral sentence is ambiguous as to the time to be served before becoming eligible for parole, but it is not illegal.

  3. Young v. United States

    457 F.2d 800 (8th Cir. 1972)   Cited 3 times

    Young's attack on his conviction and sentence is one of many 2255 motions we have considered. Young v. United States, 228 F.2d 693 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 913, 76 S.Ct. 704, 100 L.Ed. 1447 (1956); 246 F.2d 901 (8th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 917, 78 S.Ct. 348, 2 L.Ed.2d 277 (1958); 259 F.2d 641 (8th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 917, 79 S.Ct. 595, 3 L.Ed.2d 579 (1959); 274 F.2d 698 (8th Cir. 1960), aff'd sub nom. Payne v. Madigan, 366 U.S. 761, 81 S.Ct. 1670, 6 L.Ed.2d 853 (1961); 300 F. Supp. 373 (D.N.D. 1969), aff'd 423 F.2d 677 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 915, 90 S.Ct. 2221, 26 L.Ed.2d 574 (1970). The trial court in this case determined that petitioner's claims were based essentially on the same grounds previously raised and denied by this Court.

  4. Borum v. United States

    409 F.2d 433 (D.C. Cir. 1967)   Cited 63 times   2 Legal Analyses
    In Borum, as in the instant case, the sentencing judge neglected to state whether the sentences which he was then imposing were to run consecutively to or concurrently with the sentence which the defendant was then serving.

    F.R.Crim.P. 32(b), 43. Henley v. Heritage, 337 F.2d 847, 848 (5th Cir. 1964); Cuozzo v. United States, 340 F.2d 303, 304 (5th Cir. 1965); Payne v. Madigan, 274 F.2d 702, 704 (9th Cir. 1960), aff'd by an equally divided court 366 U.S. 761, 81 S.Ct. 1670, 6 L.Ed.2d 853 (1961). See also Kennedy v. Reid, supra note 28.

  5. United States v. Duckett

    203 F. Supp. 3d 26 (D.D.C. 2016)

    " The idea put forward by the petitioner and adopted by the court, that the use of "with" instead of "to" makes the order ambiguous and renders it ineffective, will not do.Hiatt v. Ellis , 192 F.2d 119, 120 (5th Cir.1951) ; see also Rakes v. United States , 309 F.2d 686, 688 (4th Cir.1962) (holding that, despite the use of the word "with," the sentencing language was not ambiguous); Young v. United States , 274 F.2d 698, 702 (8th Cir.1960), aff'd , Payne v. Madigan , 366 U.S. 761, 81 S.Ct. 1670, 6 L.Ed.2d 853 (1961) (same); Martin v. United States , 285 F.2d 150, 151 (10th Cir.1960) (same). The Court agrees with this reasoning—consecutive means consecutive, and concurrent means concurrent, regardless of which preposition follows.

  6. United States v. Duckett

    203 F. Supp. 3d 26 (D.D.C. 2016)

    " The idea put forward by the petitioner and adopted by the court, that the use of "with" instead of "to" makes the order ambiguous and renders it ineffective, will not do.Hiatt v. Ellis , 192 F.2d 119, 120 (5th Cir.1951) ; see also Rakes v. United States , 309 F.2d 686, 688 (4th Cir.1962) (holding that, despite the use of the word "with," the sentencing language was not ambiguous); Young v. United States , 274 F.2d 698, 702 (8th Cir.1960), aff'd , Payne v. Madigan , 366 U.S. 761, 81 S.Ct. 1670, 6 L.Ed.2d 853 (1961) (same); Martin v. United States , 285 F.2d 150, 151 (10th Cir.1960) (same). The Court agrees with this reasoning—consecutive means consecutive, and concurrent means concurrent, regardless of which preposition follows.

  7. Joost v. Apker

    476 F. Supp. 2d 284 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)   Cited 6 times
    Adopting the view that "§ 2255 is an available vehicle for the petitioner's challenge to any variation between the sentencing court's signed J & C and the sentence that was orally pronounced"

    In at least two more recent cases, courts appear to have entertained § 2241 petitions challenging the application of sentences as they were orally pronounced. In Payne v. Madigan, 274 F.2d 702 (9th Cir. 1960), aff'd by equally divided Court, 366 U.S. 761 (1961) (per curiam), a defendant convicted in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee and imprisoned in California sought habeas relief by arguing that the J Cs imposing seven consecutive prison terms were not supported by an unambiguous explanation during the oral pronouncement of his sentence. Id. at 703-04.

  8. Young v. United States

    300 F. Supp. 373 (D.N.D. 1969)   Cited 1 times

    For the chronology and results of the prior attacks see Young v. United States, 228 F.2d 693 (8th Cir. 1956), cert. denied 351 U.S. 913, 76 S.Ct. 704, 100 L.Ed. 1447; 246 F.2d 901 (8th Cir. 1957), cert. denied 355 U.S. 917, 78 S.Ct. 348, 2 L.Ed.2d 277; 259 F.2d 641 (8th Cir. 1958), cert. denied 359 U.S. 917, 79 S.Ct. 595, 3 L.Ed.2d 579; 274 F.2d 698 (8th Cir. 1960), aff. Payne v. Madigan, 366 U.S. 761, 81 S.Ct. 1670, 6 L.Ed.2d 853. In his present motion, filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255, petitioner contends:

  9. State v. Jenkins

    411 S.W.2d 441 (Mo. 1967)   Cited 5 times

    See 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1581, and cases there cited. Neither does it prevent the prisoner from being required to serve the second sentence after the termination of the first sentence. Young v. United States, 8 Cir., 274 F.2d 698, affm'd Payne v. Madigan, 366 U.S. 761, 81 S.Ct. 1670, 6 L.Ed.2d 853; Bledsoe v. Johnston, 9 Cir., 154 F.2d 458, certiorari denied, 328 U.S. 872, 66 S.Ct. 1367, 90 L.Ed. 1642; Martini v. Johnston, 9 Cir., 103 F.2d 597, certiorari denied, 307 U.S. 642, 59 S.Ct. 1045, 83 L.Ed. 1522. The judgments entered in this case clearly reveal the intent of the court to impose cumulative sentences to be served consecutively and not concurrently. Defendant's contention that the ten year sentence "is in excess of the maximum term under Missouri law" is also without merit.

  10. State v. Brown

    150 Wis. 2d 636 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989)   Cited 16 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Holding that when there is an ambiguity in the oral sentencing, as opposed to a conflict between the oral pronouncement and the written judgment, it is proper to look to the written judgment to ascertain the trial court's intention

    ral statement is itself plain and unambiguous and where it conflicts with an equally plain written judgment or commitment. See, e.g., U.S. v. Villano, 816 F.2d 1448, 1450-51 (10th Cir. 1987), where the court upheld the established rule that an unambiguous oral pronouncement of sentence controls when there is a conflict between it and a written order of commitment. Other cases recognizing the rule include: United States v. Pagan, 785 F.2d 378, 380 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1017 (1986); United States v. Moyles, 724 F.2d 29, 30 (2d Cir. 1983); Schurmann v. United States, 658 F.2d 389, 391 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Mason, 440 F.2d 1293, 1299-1300 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied sub nom. Edwards v. United States, 404 U.S. 883 (1971); Scott v. United States, 434 F.2d 11, 20 (5th Cir. 1970); Baca v. United States, 383 F.2d 154, 157 (10th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 929 (1968); Payne v. Madigan, 274 F.2d 702, 704 (9th Cir. 1960), aff'd by an equally divided court, 366 U.S. 761 (1961); Watkins v. Merry, 106 F.2d 360, 361 (10th Cir. 1939). When the oral pronouncement is ambiguous, however, the result is just the opposite.