Payne v. Goodyear Tire Rubber Co.

30 Citing cases

  1. Southern States Police v. First Choice Armor

    241 F.R.D. 85 (D. Mass. 2007)   Cited 27 times
    Finding that plaintiffs in federal litigation complied with procedural requirements of Chapter 93A where demand letters satisfied the purpose of the demand requirement despite having been filed in an earlier state court action

    Smilow, 323 F.3d at 41. Moreover, the intent of this particular provision is to " enabl[e] consumers to pursue, inter alia, defective product claims" . Payne v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 216 F.R.D. 21, 26 (D.Mass.2003)(citing Smilow, 323 F.3d at 41).          1.

  2. Gonzalez v. Corning

    317 F.R.D. 443 (W.D. Pa. 2016)   Cited 27 times
    Finding that a class action was not a superior method and noting that the claims were not financially insignificant because they ranged from $5,000 to $22,000 which was in contrast to the harm in some class action cases that involved minor consumer transactions amounting to approximately $30 each claim

    ardless of model or size, are substantially similar in construction and all tires manifest the same defective characteristic, i.e., extra stiffness); Wolin v. Jaguar Land Rover N. Am., LLC, 617 F.3d 1168, 1172 (9th Cir. 2010) (same design defect, i.e., a geometry defect in vehicle's alignment, was present in each class member's car); Pella Corp. v. Saltzman, 606 F.3d 391, 391 (7th Cir. 2010) (all ProLine casement windows were designed to allow water to seep behind aluminum casing, which accelerated wood rot); Martin v. Ford Motor Co., 292 F.R.D. 252, 256-59, 267 (E.D. Pa. 2013) (class action involved only " second generation" " rear twist beam axle," which was manufactured by one company for fewer than five years); Brunson v. Louisiana-Pacific Corp., 266 F.R.D. 112, 114, 119 (D.S.C. 2010) (all trimboard suffered from same manufacturing defects that made it rot, warp, and crack prematurely); Payne v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 216 F.R.D. 21, 23, 28 (D. Mass. 2003) (hosing used in radiant floor heating system was defectively designed causing oxidation, hardening, cracks, and eventually, leaks; testing and other evidence confirmed presence of defect in all hosing). (a) Design Defect #1 -- Insufficient Quantity of Asphalt

  3. Donovan v. Philip Morris USA, Inc.

    268 F.R.D. 1 (D. Mass. 2010)   Cited 38 times
    Noting that "Philip Morris argues that the medical monitoring claim is a 'thinly-disguised request for money damages,' [D. 72] at 29[], and emphasizes that a plaintiff cannot convert a legal action into an equitable one by asking for an injunction ordering the payment of money. The plaintiffs, however, are not asking for an injunction that orders the payment of money. They are seeking a specific, equitable remedy. Simply because an injunction requires the defendant to pay money does not convert it into a monetary action"

    Kent, 190 F.R.D. at 278. While the four traditional 23(a) factors embrace this appraisal (and most courts do not independently address " administrative feasibility" or " ascertainability," see, e.g.,In re Credit Suisse-AOL Securities Litig., 253 F.R.D. 17, 22 (D.Mass.2008); Southern States Police Benevolent Ass'n, Inc. v. First Choice Armor & Equipment, Inc., 241 F.R.D. 85, 87 (D.Mass.2007); Payne v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 216 F.R.D. 21 (D.Mass.2003)), for the sake of thoroughness, I will address the proposed class' ascertainability here.          Philip Morris asserts that two requirements of the plaintiffs' described class are subjective and will prevent the court from determining who its members are: first, the requirement that a member have a smoking history of at least twenty pack-years, and second, that a member is not under a physician's care for lung cancer.

  4. Swack v. Credit Suisse First Bos.

    230 F.R.D. 250 (D. Mass. 2005)   Cited 50 times
    Adopting analytical approach taken in a Southern District of New York case which required a plaintiff to present admissible evidence for class certification

    In re Polymedica Corp. Securities Litig., 224 F.R.D. 27, 35 (D.Mass.2004). But see Payne v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 216 F.R.D. 21, 24 (D.Mass.2003) (citing Eisen v. Carlisle, 417 U.S. 156, 177, 94 S.Ct. 2140, 40 L.Ed.2d 732 (1974) for the proposition that the class certification decision " ‘ does not involve an examination of the merits of the underlying dispute’ and, therefore, that the allegations of the plaintiff would be treated as true for purposes of the certification analysis.)" . Linda S. Mullenix, Taking Adequacy Seriously: The Inadequate Assessment of Adequacy in Litigation and Settlement Classes, Vanderbilt L.Rev. 1687 (2004).

  5. Donovan v. Philip Morris USA, Inc.

    Civil Action No. 06-12234-DJC (D. Mass. Mar. 21, 2012)   Cited 18 times

    First, as to the commonality requirement set forth in Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2), the Court noted that "[c]ommonality is a 'low hurdle,'" Donovan II, 268 F.R.D. at 10 (quoting S. States Police Benevolent Ass'n v. First Choice Armor & Equip., Inc., 241 F.R.D. 85, 87 (D. Mass. 2007)), because "a single factual issue can suffice." Id. (citing Payne v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 216 F.R.D. 21, 25 (D. Mass. 2003)). Applying that standard, the Court identified both a common issue of fact in that the "case involves one manufacturer of one brand of cigarettes" and "[c]ommon questions of law includ[ing] proximate causation and breach of warranty deriving from that one brand," and concluded that the plaintiffs "have met the commonality requirement."

  6. Rodrigues v. Members Mortg. Co., Inc.

    226 F.R.D. 147 (D. Mass. 2005)   Cited 6 times
    Noting that a class of 40 has been deemed sufficient to satisfy this requirement

    Plaintiffs have met the commonality, typicality, and adequacy requirements. SeePayne v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 216 F.R.D. 21, 25 (D.Mass.2003) (" The ‘ commonality’ requirement is satisfied if ‘ common questions of law or fact exist’ and ‘ class members' claims are not in conflict with one another." ) (quoting Mack v. Suffolk County, 191 F.R.D. 16, 23 (D.Mass.2000)); see alsoGen.

  7. Okla. Firefighters Pension & Ret. Sys. v. Biogen Inc.

    Civil Action 22-10200-WGY (D. Mass. Feb. 4, 2025)

    Typicality is met whenever there is “congruence between particular claims of the named class representatives and the generalized claims that are common to the class.” Payne v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 216 F.R.D. 21, 26 (D. Mass. 2003) (Gertner, J.); see also In re Suffolk Univ. Covid Refund Litig., No. 20-10985, 2022 WL 6819485, at *1 (D. Mass. Oct. 11, 2022). “[C]lass representatives' claims can be considered typical even where there is some factual variation among the claims of different class members.” In re Evergreen, 275 F.R.D. at 390.

  8. Ortiz v. Saba Univ. Sch. of Med.

    Civil Action 23-12002-WGY (D. Mass. Nov. 26, 2024)

    In re Boston Sci. Corp. Sec. Litig., 604 F.Supp.2d 275, 282 (D. Mass. 2009) (Woodlock, J.). Moreover, typicality is not a highly demanding requirement, and is met when there is "congruence between particular claims of the named class representatives and the generalized claims that are common to the class." Payne v.Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 216 F.R.D. 21, 26 (D. Mass. 2003) (Gertner, J.); see also In re Suffolk Univ. Covid Refund Litig., No. 20-10985, 2022 WL 6819485, at *1 (D. Mass. Oct. 11, 2022). Saba's arguments against typicality repeat the same arguments it makes regarding commonality.

  9. Diggs v. Mici

    Civil Action 22-40003-MRG (D. Mass. Sep. 30, 2024)

    In re Credit Suisse-AOL Sec. Litig., 253 F.R.D. 17, 23 (D.Mass. 2008). The typicality requirement, which tends to merge with the commonality requirement, see Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 349 n.5, is “not highly demanding because the claims only need to share the same essential characteristics, and need not be identical.” Payne v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 216 F.R.D. 21, 24-25 (D.Mass. 2003).

  10. Fitzmorris v. N.H. Dep't of Health & Human Servs.

    21-cv-25-PB (D.N.H. Nov. 27, 2023)

    It is not necessary that the named plaintiffs' claims be identical to the class member's claims, so long as they “share the same essential characteristics.” Payne v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 216 F.R.D. 21, 26 (D. Mass. 2003) (quoting 5 Moore's Federal Practice § 23:24[4]); see alsoGonzalez v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enft, 975 F.3d 788, 809 (9th Cir. 2020) (noting that typicality only requires that “a class plaintiff's claims be reasonably coextensive with those of absent class members”) (cleaned up).