Opinion
Civil 1:22-CV-217
06-24-2022
JOSHUA ISAAC PAYNE, Plaintiff, v. WALTER FAITH, et al., Defendants.
Mariani Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Martin C. Carlson United States Magistrate Judge
I. Factual Background
This case presents a scenario in which a pro se plaintiff has failed to abide by legally mandated guidelines for prosecuting his legal claims. The plaintiff, Joshua Payne, is an inmate incarcerated in the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections at the State Correctional Institution at Mahanoy. Payne filed the instant civil rights complaint, alleging that the defendants violated his constitutional rights when they interfered with his mail. He asserts claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, in that he claims the defendants conspired and retaliated against him for filing grievances and that he was treated differently than other inmates because he filed grievances.
On April 15, 2022, the defendants moved to dismiss these claims, arguing that Payne has failed to state constitutional claims against them. (Doc. 10). Payne never responded to this motion. Accordingly, on June 6, 2022, we entered an order which directed Payne to respond to this motion by June 20, 2022. (Doc. 15). This order also warned Payne in clear and precise terms that “a failure to comply with this direction may result in the motion being deemed unopposed and granted.” (Id.)
This deadline has now also passed without any action on Payne's part to defend or litigate the claims which he brought in federal court. Accordingly, in the absence of a response, the motion will be deemed ripe for resolution. For the reasons set forth below, it is recommended that the motion be granted, and Payne's complaint be dismissed for failure to prosecute.
II. Discussion
A. Under The Rules of This Court This Motion to Dismiss Should Be Deemed Unopposed and Granted .
At the outset, under the Local Rules of this Court, the plaintiff should be deemed to concur in this motion, since the plaintiff has failed to timely oppose the motion or otherwise litigate this case. This procedural default completely frustrates and impedes efforts to resolve this matter in a timely and fair fashion, and under the rules of this court warrants dismissal of the action, since Local Rule 7.6 of the Rules of this Court imposes an affirmative duty on the plaintiff to respond to motions and provides that
Any party opposing any motion, other than a motion for summary judgment, shall file a brief in opposition within fourteen (14) days after service of the movant's brief, or, if a brief in support of the motion is not required under these rules, within seven (7) days after service of the motion. Any party who fails to comply with this rule shall be deemed not to oppose such motion. Nothing in this rule shall be construed to limit the authority of the court to grant any motion before expiration of the prescribed period for filing a brief in opposition. A brief in opposition to a
motion for summary judgment and LR 56.1 responsive statement, together with any transcripts, affidavits or other relevant documentation, shall be filed within twenty-one (21) days after service of the movant's brief.Local Rule 7.6 (emphasis added).
Payne was notified of this provision of the local rules by this court in our order directing him to respond to this motion. However, despite receiving this notice, he has never responded to this motion to dismiss. This is a fatal error since it is now well settled that “Local Rule 7.6 can be applied to grant a motion to dismiss without analysis of the complaint's sufficiency ‘if a party fails to comply with the [R]ule after a specific direction to comply from the court.'” Williams v. Lebanon Farms Disposal, Inc., No. 09-1704, 2010 WL 3703808, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 26, 2010) (quoting Stackhouse v. Mazurkiewicz, 951 F.2d 29, 30 (3d Cir. 1991)). In this case, the plaintiff has not complied with the local rules, or this Court's order, by filing a timely response to this motion. Therefore, these procedural defaults by the plaintiff compel the court to consider:
[A] basic truth: we must remain mindful of the fact that “the Federal Rules are meant to be applied in such a way as to promote justice. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 1. Often that will mean that courts should strive to resolve cases on their merits whenever possible. However, justice also requires that the merits of a particular dispute be placed before the court in a timely fashion ....” McCurdy v. American Bd. of Plastic Surgery, 157 F.3d 191, 197 (3d Cir.1998).Lease v. Fishel, 712 F.Supp.2d 359, 371 (M.D. Pa. 2010).
With this basic truth in mind, we acknowledge a fundamental guiding tenet of our legal system. A failure on our part to enforce compliance with the rules, and impose the sanctions mandated by those rules when the rules are repeatedly breached, “would actually violate the dual mandate which guides this Court and motivates our system of justice: ‘that courts should strive to resolve cases on their merits whenever possible [but that] justice also requires that the merits of a particular dispute be placed before the court in a timely fashion.'” Id. Therefore, we are obliged to ensure that one party's refusal to comply with the rules does not lead to an unjustified prejudice to those parties who follow the rules.
These basic tenets of fairness apply here. In this case, the plaintiff has failed to comply with Local Rule 7.6 by filing a timely response to this motion. This failure now compels us to apply the sanction called for under Rule 7.6 and deem the motion unopposed.
B. Dismissal of this Case Is Warranted Under Rule 41.
Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a court to dismiss a civil action for failure to prosecute, stating that: “If the plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply with these rules or a court order, a defendant may move to dismiss the action or any claim against it.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b). Decisions regarding dismissal of actions for failure to prosecute rest in the sound discretion of the Court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion. Emerson v. Thiel College, 296 F.3d 184, 190 (3d Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). That discretion, however, while broad is governed by certain factors, commonly referred to as Poulis factors. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has noted:
To determine whether the District Court abused its discretion [in dismissing a case for failure to prosecute], we evaluate its balancing of the following factors: (1) the extent of the party's personal responsibility; (2) the prejudice to the adversary caused by the failure to meet scheduling orders and respond to discovery; (3) a history of dilatoriness; (4) whether the conduct of the party or the attorney was willful or in bad faith; (5) the effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal, which entails an analysis of alternative sanctions; and (6) the meritoriousness of the claim or defense. Poulis v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863, 868 (3d Cir. 1984).Emerson, 296 F.3d at 190.
In exercising this discretion, “there is no ‘magic formula' that we apply to determine whether a District Court has abused its discretion in dismissing for failure to prosecute.” Lopez v. Cousins, 435 Fed.Appx. 113, 116 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Briscoe v. Klaus, 538 F.3d 252 (3d Cir. 2008)). Therefore, “[i]n balancing the Poulis factors, [courts] do not [employ] a . . . ‘mechanical calculation' to determine whether a District Court abused its discretion in dismissing a plaintiff's case.” Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 263 (quoting Mindek v. Rigatti, 964 F.2d 1369, 1373 (3d Cir. 1992). Consistent with this view, it is well settled that “ ‘no single Poulis factor is dispositive,' [and it is] clear that‘not all of the Poulis factors need be satisfied in order to dismiss a complaint.'” Id. (quoting Ware v. Rodale Press, Inc., 322 F.3d 218, 222 (3d Cir. 2003); Mindek, 964 F.2d at 1373)). Moreover, recognizing the broad discretion conferred upon the district court in making judgments weighing these six factors, the Court of Appeals has frequently sustained such dismissal orders where there has been a pattern of dilatory conduct by a pro se litigant who is not amenable to any lesser sanction. See, e.g., Emerson, 296 F.3d 184; Tillio v. Mendelsohn, 256 Fed.Appx. 509 (3d Cir. 2007); Reshard v. Lankenau Hospital, 256 Fed.Appx. 506 (3d Cir. 2007); Azubuko v. Bell National Organization, 243 Fed.Appx. 728 (3d Cir. 2007).
In this case, a dispassionate assessment of the Poulis factors weighs heavily in favor of dismissing this action. At the outset, a consideration of the first Poulis factor, the extent of the party's personal responsibility, shows that the failure to respond to this motion is entirely attributable to the plaintiff, who has failed to respond to this dispositive motion and has neglected to communicate with the court or opposing counsel in any meaningful way for the past several months.
Similarly, the second Poulis factor-the prejudice to the adversary caused by the failure to abide by court orders-also calls for dismissal of this action. Indeed, this factor-the prejudice suffered by the party seeking sanctions-is entitled to great weight and careful consideration. As the Third Circuit has observed:
“Evidence of prejudice to an adversary would bear substantial weight in support of a dismissal or default judgment.” Adams v. Trustees of N.J. Brewery Employees' Pension Trust Fund, 29 F.3d 863, 873-74 (3d Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Generally, prejudice includes “the irretrievable loss of evidence, the inevitable
dimming of witnesses' memories, or the excessive and possibly irremediable burdens or costs imposed on the opposing party.” Id. at 874 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). . . . However, prejudice is not limited to “irremediable” or “irreparable” harm. Id.; see also Ware v. Rodale Press, Inc., 322 F.3d 218, 222 (3d Cir. 2003); Curtis T. Bedwell & Sons, Inc. v. Int'l Fidelity Ins. Co., 843 F.2d 683, 693-94 (3d Cir. 1988). It also includes “the burden imposed by impeding a party's ability to prepare effectively a full and complete trial strategy.” Ware, 322 F.3d at 222.Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 259-60.
In this case, the plaintiff's failure to litigate this claim or respond to defense motions now wholly frustrates and delays the resolution of this action. In such instances, the defendant is plainly prejudiced by the plaintiff's continuing inaction and dismissal of the case clearly rests in the discretion of the trial judge. Tillio, 256 Fed.Appx. 509 (failure to timely serve pleadings compels dismissal); Reshard, 256 Fed.Appx. 506 (failure to comply with discovery compels dismissal); Azubuko, 243 Fed.Appx. 728 (failure to file amended complaint prejudices defense and compels dismissal).
When one considers the third Poulis factor-the history of dilatoriness on the plaintiff's part-it becomes clear that dismissal of this action is now appropriate. In this regard, it is clear that “ ‘[e]xtensive or repeated delay or delinquency constitutes a history of dilatoriness, such as consistent non-response . . ., or consistent tardiness in complying with court orders.'” Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 260-61 (quoting Adams, 29 F.3d at 874) (some citations omitted). Here, the plaintiff has failed to respond to a defense motion or communicate in a meaningful way for the past several months. Thus, the plaintiff's conduct displays “[e]xtensive or repeated delay or delinquency [and conduct which] constitutes a history of dilatoriness, such as consistent non-response . . ., or consistent tardiness in complying with court orders.” Adams, 29 F.3d at 874.
The fourth Poulis factor-whether the conduct of the party or the attorney was willful or in bad faith-also cuts against the plaintiff in this case. In this setting, we must assess whether this conduct reflects mere inadvertence or willful conduct, in that it involved “strategic,” “intentional or self-serving behavior,” and not mere negligence. Adams, 29 F.3d at 875. At this juncture, when the plaintiff has failed to communicate, respond to defense motions, or comply with instructions of the Court, the Court is compelled to conclude that the plaintiff's actions are not isolated, accidental, or inadvertent but instead reflect an ongoing disregard for this case and the Court's instructions.
While Poulis also enjoins us to consider a fifth factor, the effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal, cases construing Poulis agree that in a situation such as this case, where we are confronted by a pro se litigant who will not comply with the rules or court orders, lesser sanctions may not be an effective alternative. See, e.g., Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 262-63; Emerson, 296 F.3d at 191. This case presents such a situation where the plaintiff's status as a pro se litigant severely limits the ability of the court to utilize other lesser sanctions to ensure that this litigation progresses in an orderly fashion. In any event, by entering our prior orders and counseling the plaintiff on his obligations in this case, we have endeavored to use lesser sanctions, but to no avail. The plaintiff still ignores his responsibilities as a litigant. Since lesser sanctions have been tried, and have failed, only the sanction of dismissal remains available to the Court.
Finally, under Poulis, we are cautioned to consider one other factor, the meritoriousness of the plaintiff's claims. In our view, however, consideration of this factor cannot save this particular plaintiff's claims, since the plaintiff is now wholly non-compliant with the court's instructions. The plaintiff cannot refuse to comply with court orders which are necessary to allow resolution of the merits of his claims, and then assert the untested merits of these claims as grounds for denying amotion to dismiss. Furthermore, it is well settled that “ ‘no single Poulis factor is dispositive,' [and it is] clear that ‘not all of the Poulis factors need be satisfied in order to dismiss a complaint.'” Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 263(quoting Ware, 322 F.3d at 222; Mindek, 964 F.2d at 1373). Therefore, the untested merits of the non-compliant plaintiff's claims, standing alone, cannot prevent imposition of sanctions.
In any event, as discussed below, we find that the plaintiff's complaint is subject to dismissal, yet another factor which favors dismissal of this lawsuit.
C. This Complaint is Subject to Dismissal on its Merits.
Finally, a merits analysis of this complaint reveals the plaintiff has brought a number of constitutional claims against these defendants. On this score, Payne has alleged that the defendants conspired and retaliated against him and interfered with his legal paperwork because he had filed grievances against them. He also asserts in a conclusory fashion that he was treated differently than other inmates. However, the complaint contains little more than bare, conclusory allegations that these defendants violated Payne's constitutional rights. Accordingly, we conclude that this complaint is insufficient to state a claim against these defendants and should be dismissed.
At the outset, we note that to the extent that the gravamen of the plaintiff's complaint is that the defendants' responses to his grievances were unsatisfactory, it is well settled that inmates do not have a constitutional right to a prison grievance system. Speight v. Sims, 283 Fed.Appx. 880 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Massey v. Helman, 259 F.3d 641, 647 (7th Cir. 2001)) (“[T]he existence of a prison grievance procedure confers no liberty interest on a prisoner”). Consequently, dissatisfaction with a response to an inmate's grievances does not support a constitutional claim. See Alexander v. Gennarini, 144 Fed.Appx. 924 (3d Cir. 2005) (involvement in post-incident grievance process not a basis for § 1983 liability); Pryor-El v. Kelly, 892 F.Supp. 261, 275 (D. D.C. 1995) (because prison grievance procedure does not confer any substantive constitutional rights upon prison inmates, the prison officials' failure to comply with grievance procedure is not actionable); see also Cole v. Sobina, No. 04-99J, 2007 WL 4460617, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 19, 2007) (“[M]ere concurrence in a prison administrative appeal process does not implicate a constitutional concern”). Moreover, the Third Circuit has held that summary dismissal of these types of claims are appropriate “because there is no apparent obligation for prison officials to investigate prison grievances.” Paluch v. Sec'y Pennsylvania Dept. Corr., 442 Fed.Appx. 690, 695 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Inmates of Attica Corr. Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375, 382 (2d Cir. 1973)). Accordingly, to the extent that Payne alleges that some of the defendants failed to respond favorably to his grievances these allegations do not amount to a constitutional violation.
Further, to the extent that Payne asserts that several defendants interfered with his mail in retaliation for his prior grievances filed against them, we conclude that Payne has not stated sufficient well-pleaded facts to make out a constitutional claim. On this score, Payne's complaint asserts that at some point in time, which is entirely unclear from the complaint, he filed grievances against Defendants Walter and White. At some other point in time, he alleges that his mail was withheld in retaliation for his grievances, which caused his state court filings to be untimely. However, the plaintiff's allegations undercut his own assertion of retaliation, as Payne's complaint indicates that his mail was sent out late due to Covid-19 restrictions within the prison. Accordingly, Payne has failed to show a retaliatory motive on the part of the defendants; rather, it appears that Payne's mail was delayed due to the Covid-19 pandemic.
As to his claim that he was treated differently by the defendants because he was essentially a frequent filer of grievances, Payne has failed to allege even the most basic element of an equal protection claim-that he belonged to a protected class. Prisoners are not considered to be a protected class. Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie, 239 F.3d 307, 317 (3d Cir. 2001); Picarella v. Brouse, 2017 WL 818880, at *5 (M.D. Pa. March 2, 2017). Additionally, the Supreme Court has recognized that “equal protection claims can be brought by a ‘class of one,' where the plaintiff alleges that she has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is not rational basis for the difference in treatment.” Vill. Of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000); Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Comm'n of Webster Cty., 488 U.S. 336 (1989); Jean-Pierre v. Bureau of Prisons, 497 Fed.Appx. 164, 168 (3d Cir. 2012). However, Payne does not allege he has been treated differently from similarly situated prisoners.
Finally, to the extent that Payne alleges a conspiracy claim under § 1983, this claim is fundamentally flawed, as we have concluded that Payne has not alleged a constitutional violation. On this score, it is well established that in order to establish a conspiracy under § 1983 for a violation of his constitutional rights, the plaintiff must prove the underlying constitutional violations. See White v. Brown, 408 Fed.Appx. 585, 599 (3d Cir. 2010) (affirming the dismissal of a § 1983 conspiracy claim because the plaintiff could not establish the underlying constitutional violations). Here, as we have explained, Payne has failed to allege facts sufficient to state a claim for a violation of his constitutional rights, both under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Thus, because we have concluded that Payne's claims alleging constitutional violations should be dismissed, as these claims fail as a matter of law, it follows that Payne's conspiracy claim should also be dismissed.
In sum, a dispassionate assessment of all of the Poulis factors reveals that they all now favor dismissal of this case. Therefore, it is recommended that the motion to dismiss this complaint be dismissed.
III. Recommendation
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT the defendants' motion to dismiss, (Doc. 10), be GRANTED and this case be DISMISSED.
The Parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2
shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.