The worker's medical evidence is indeed deficient. It does not connect the asserted need for further health care with the prior accidental on-the-job injury.National Zinc Company v. Thomas, Okla., 554 P.2d 1, 3-4 [1976]; Nuway Laundry Company v. Hacker, supra note 10, at 663; Capitol Well Servicing Company v. Levescy, supra note 6 at 909; Payne Drilling Co., v. Shoemake, 186 Okla. 345, 97 P.2d 881, 882 [1940]; Montgomery v. State Industrial Commission, 177 Okla. 586, 61 P.2d 209, 210-211 [1936]; Marlow v. Commerce Mining Royalty Co., 163 Okla. 198, 21 P.2d 746 [1933]. Two doctors submitted letter-reports regarding the worker's heart condition.
'" Claimant cites Capitol Well Servicing Co. v. Levescy, Okla., 371 P.2d 905; Mills v. W.E. Logan Sons, Okla., 281 P.2d 175; White v. Shell Oil Co., 193 Okla. 374, 143 P.2d 825, and Payne Drilling Co. v. Shoemake, 186 Okla. 345, 97 P.2d 881, holding that after the time for appealing an order of the State Industrial Court, as provided in 85 O.S. 1961 §§ 29[ 85-29], 77, has expired, the order becomes final, and the State Industrial Court has no jurisdiction to correct, change, or review the order in subsequent proceedings. Although legally sound, the cases cited are not applicable here.
" Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Clark, 203 Okla. 561, 224 P.2d 597, 598. And again we have used the expression subsequent to the last prior order or award of the Commission. Payne Drilling Co. v. Shoemake, 186 Okla. 345, 97 P.2d 881. We have also on different occasions held that where the State Industrial Commission has awarded compensation and thereafter denies a motion to award further compensation, and thereafter hears a later motion to award further compensation on the ground of change in conditions, and finds a change in conditions, it must fix the date of such change definitely, which must be subsequent to the date of the last order, and the compensation ordered paid cannot begin prior to the date of the change found.
If, therefore, respondent did not receive full compensation to which he was entitled for his injury it was because of error in the judgment of the Commission at the time the original award was entered, and this error cannot now be corrected in this proceeding. See in this connection, Payne Drilling Co. v. Shoemake, 186 Okla. 345, 97 P.2d 881. In the above case we also held:
Sturm Drilling Co. v. Story, supra; Wilcox Oil Gas Co. v. Satterfield, 178 Okla. 418, 63 P.2d 696. Petitioners rely upon Southern Drilling Co. v. Daley, 166 Okla. 33, 25 P.2d 1082; Payne Drilling Co. v. Shoemake, 186 Okla. 345, 97 P.2d 881; Sinclair Prairie Oil Co. v. State Industrial Commission, 178 Okla. 375, 62 P.2d 1027; and Texas Co. v. Atkinson, 178 Okla. 480, 62 P.2d 1204. All these cases involved an attempt to relitigate questions formerly determined or a claim that another disability not determined resulted from a multiple injury.
Smith v. Oklahoma Portland Cement Co. 191 Okla. 12, 126 P.2d 718. And that the State Industrial Commission may not, under the guise of its continuing jurisdiction to reopen a cause on change of condition, change or modify a prior award where the effect is merely to correct an error in the original award. See Payne Drilling Co. v. Shoemake, 186 Okla. 345, 97 P.2d 881. It is likewise settled that where an award for permanent disability has been made that the continuing jurisdiction of the State Industrial Commission thereafter is confined to cases where a change in condition occurs.
The order of April 12, 1939, operated only to partially close the case as of January 8, 1939, the last date for which compensation was paid. In Payne Drilling Co. v. Shoemake, 186 Okla. 345, 97 P.2d 881, the requirement of changed condition is that it must occur "since the last prior order or award. * * *" Herein the changed condition exists and continues subsequent to both the order and award. A liberal construction impels us to hold that the commission may, under all the facts and circumstances, determine that the changed condition occurred after the date for which compensation was paid.