To the extent Fulton v. Pilon and other cases have required otherwise, those cases are overruled. See also Payless Car Rental Sys., Inc. v. Elkik, 306 Ga.App. 389, 390, n. 2, 702 S.E.2d 697 (2010) (appellants could challenge non-final order denying summary judgment as to certain defendants because order was “tied to” directly appealable order granting summary judgment to another defendant); Green v. Sams, 209 Ga.App. 491, 495, n. 1, 433 S.E.2d 678 (1993) (non-directly appealable orders could be appealed where “tied to the direct appeal”); Rolleston v. Huie, 198 Ga.App. 49(1), 400 S.E.2d 349 (1990) (dismissing that portion of appeal seeking to challenge non-final ruling on plaintiff's contract claim against one defendant because it was not “tied to” the appealable order on his tort claim against other defendants); Dairyland Ins. Co. v. McIntosh, 171 Ga.App. 782(1), 321 S.E.2d 110 (1984) (noting that denial of motion for summary judgment may be appealed without application where it is “tied to” appeal of appealable order). Though not involving cross-appeals, we question the continued viability of the holdings in these cases in light of our conclusion
See In re Johns-Manville Corp. , 31 BR 965, 969-970 (II) (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (action for declaratory relief against the debtor was subject to the automatic stay). Furthermore, while the automatic stay provisions "do not ordinarily extend to a third party," Payless Car Rental System v. Elkik , 306 Ga. App. 389, 389 n.1, 702 S.E.2d 697 (2010), we conclude that any action for declaratory relief against Shapiro is inextricably intertwined with the action for declaratory relief against the other co-defendants such that we cannot resolve any of the enumerations of error regarding the declaratory judgment with the automatic stay in place. The declaratory judgment claim is essentially indivisible, and there is nothing that is specific to Shapiro that we can separate out–either the trial court declares that Jones is eligible for indemnification or it does not.
McKinney did not file a responsive brief in this appeal; therefore, she is deemed to have admitted the statement of facts as set out by Moore in his brief, to the extent that the statement of facts is supported by the record. See, e.g., Payless Car Rental System, Inc. v. Elkik, 306 Ga.App. 389, 390 n. 4, 702 S.E.2d 697 (2010); see also Court of Appeals Rule 25(b)(1).In January 2014, after McKinney physically abused the children, the children moved out of their mother's house, filed and obtained temporary protective orders, and moved in with Moore.
Breeden did not file a responsive brief in this appeal. Accordingly, Breeden is deemed to have admitted the statement of facts as set out by Roach in his brief, to the extent that statement of facts is supported by the record. See, e.g., Payless Car Rental System, Inc. v. Elkik, 306 Ga.App. 389, 390, n. 4, 702 S.E.2d 697 (2010) ; see also Court of Appeals Rule 25(b)(1).In April 2014, Breeden filed a petition for contempt of court in the Tennessee Juvenile Court, alleging that Roach violated the parenting agreement by refusing to return I.R. to her care after Roach's designated week, and asking the court to order Roach to return the child to her.
Thus, as it pertains to him, we hereby remand this appeal to the trial court, with leave to Lorenzetti to re-instate this appeal by filing another notice of appeal within 30 days after the lifting of the stay, if that occurs. E.g., Payless Car Rental System v. Elkik, 306 Ga.App. 389, 390 n. 1, 702 S.E.2d 697 (2010). However, because the other guarantors have not suggested that the protection of the stay extends to them, we will address the issues raised in this appeal as those issues pertain to the remaining parties.
Neither the Department nor PCSA filed a responsive brief in this appeal. Accordingly, they are deemed to have admitted the statement of facts as set out by McCauley in her brief, to the extent such facts are supported by the record. See Court of Appeals Rule 25(b)(1); Payless Car Rental System v. Elkik, 306 Ga.App. 389, 390, n. 4, 702 S.E.2d 697 (2010). On November 23, 2009, McCauley learned that she had tested positive for influenza, and that she would have to remain in quarantine for five days.