Opinion
Supreme Court No. S-12769.
October 1, 2008.
Appeal from the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Fourth Judicial District, Fairbanks, Douglas L. Blankenship, Judge., Superior Court No. 4FA-05-02134 CI.
Appearances: David E. Paxton, pro se, Decorah, Iowa, Appellant. Mary Ann Lundquist, Assistant Attorney General, Fairbanks, and Talis J. Colberg, Attorney General, Juneau, for Appellee.
Before: Fabe, Chief Justice, Matthews, Eastaugh, Carpeneti, and Winfree, Justices.
NOTICE
Memorandum decisions of this court do not create legal precedent. See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d). Accordingly, this memorandum decision may not be cited for any proposition of law or as an example of the proper resolution of any issue.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND JUDGMENT
Entered pursuant to Appellate Rule 214.
I. INTRODUCTION
David Paxton appears before this court for the third time regarding his child support obligations. In this suit Paxton argues that the Child Support Services Division (CSSD) was negligent and denied him due process in its enforcement of the child support order. He also contends that his child support obligation is excessive. The superior court granted CSSD's motion for summary judgment. Because Paxton's suit is prohibited in its entirety by the doctrine of res judicata, we conclude that the superior court properly granted CSSD's motion for summary judgment.
See Paxton v. Gavlak, 100 P.3d 7 (Alaska 2004); Paxton v. Gavlak, Mem. Op. J. No. 1308, 2008 WL 2152059 (Alaska, May 21, 2008).
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
David Paxton and Debra Bates Gavlak were married in 1983 and divorced in 1989. They have one daughter who was born in August 1983. Gavlak was awarded legal and primary physical custody of the child after the divorce, and Paxton was ordered to pay $328 per month in child support. The order also called for increases of $100 per month as of September 1, 1993, and $200 per month as of September 1, 1998. Paxton did not appeal this order.
Paxton, 100 P.3d at 8.
Paxton, 2008 WL 2152059, at *1.
In December 1989 Gavlak applied for assistance from the Child Support Services Division (CSSD) in collecting Paxton's payments. She withdrew from CSSD services in July 1990. In January 1997 CSSD reviewed the child support amount required by the 1989 order. CSSD mailed Paxton and Gavlak a notice of possible modification of the judicial support order and requested that they provide financial information. Paxton responded with affidavits stating that he earned $990 in 1995 and $1,030 in 1996. CSSD sent Paxton a letter dated April 4, 1997 stating that he was not in substantial compliance with his child support order.
Id. The procedural history in this section and in part II.A is recounted in our May 2008 memorandum opinion and judgment. Id. at *1-4.
A. Case No. 4FA-89-00911 CI ( Paxton I )
Between May 1997 and November 1999, Paxton filed several motions for modification of the child support order in superior court. During this period, CSSD sent Paxton contradictory statements about his arrears and case status. In March 2000 the superior court reduced Paxton's obligation to fifty dollars per month effective November 1999, and in March 2001 it entered an order ending his obligation as of January 1, 2001.
In the meantime, Paxton's arrears had grown to substantial proportions. In February 2002 CSSD moved to consolidate the arrears into a single judgment totaling $70,833.04. Paxton then asked the court to modify his support obligation from 1990 to January 2001, arguing that his income had changed and noting that Gavlak had withdrawn from and reapplied for CSSD's services several times. In April 2002 the superior court denied Paxton's motion for adjustment and granted CSSD's motion to consolidate the arrears, which totaled $70,833.04. Paxton filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied, and he appealed to this court.
On appeal, we held that CSSD's failure to send Paxton a closure letter satisfying Alaska Appellate Rule 602 had the consequence of keeping his administrative file open, and we remanded for consideration of Paxton's financial circumstances from January 1997 forward. On remand, the superior court modified Paxton's arrears from January 1997 forward using the following payment schedule: fifty dollars per month from February 1, 1997 to December 31, 1997; fifty dollars per month from January 1, 1998 to December 31, 1998; and $162 per month from January 1, 1999 to November 5, 1999.
Id. at *2.
Id.
On May 25, 2005, the superior court again consolidated the arrears into a single judgment, this time totaling $59,353.66. Paxton then filed a "Petition for Order Invoking Statute of Limitations," arguing that AS 09.10.040 and AS 09.35.020 barred Gavlak from enforcing the child support judgment. The superior court denied this petition, and Paxton's subsequent motion for reconsideration was also deemed denied. Paxton appealed the denial to this court, and we affirmed the superior court's decision in May 2008. B. Case No. 4FA-99-00619 CI ( Paxton II )
Id. at *3-4.
In 1999 Paxton filed an action for damages against Gavlak and the State of Alaska for the "pain and suffering" and "harassment and trauma" he allegedly suffered as a result of CSSD's actions in his child support case. He requested $1,000,000 in compensatory damages and $6,000,000 more in punitive damages. Superior Court Judge Mary E. Greene granted the State's motion for dismissal from the suit, relying on the State's safe harbor for good faith child support collection provided in AS 09.65.250, on the State's immunity from punitive damages provided in AS 09.50.280, and on the principles of immunity described in Lythgoe v. Guinn. Paxton did not appeal this dismissal. According to Paxton, Gavlak was dismissed with prejudice from the suit "due to her going bankrupt."
AS 09.65.250(2) provides that the State "may not be held liable for good faith . . . collection of child support."
Under AS 09.50.280, the State cannot be liable for punitive damages. The chapter provides that "[i]f judgment is rendered for the plaintiff, it shall be for the legal amount found due from the state with interest . . . and without punitive damages."
884 P.2d 1085 (Alaska 1994) (holding that a doctor acting as an independent custody investigator was immune from suit alleging negligent and intentional torts for her investigation and report).
C. Case No. 4FA-05-02134 CI ( Paxton III )
On August 23, 2005, Paxton again sued CSSD, alleging that it violated his right to due process, that it "caused an unreasonable and excessive debt to be established against [him]," that it "willful[ly] neglect[ed] to perform [its] statutory responsibilities," and that its "countless willful mistakes and malicious errors" in his child support case caused him and others "severe mental anguish and needless pain and suffering." Paxton asked that the court "strike down as unconstitutional the Judgment and Order signed by Honorable Richard D. Savell on 5/25/05"; that the court award him $59,845.39; that the court award him $10,500 plus interest for costs incurred in the Paxton I Alaska Supreme Court action; and that the court award him $500,000 in punitive damages.
This judgment is the order on remand in Paxton I.
This amount is essentially the judgment against Paxton in Paxton I, which was $59,353.66 at 6.25% interest.
On March 16, 2007, CSSD moved for summary judgment on a number of grounds. In its motion, CSSD argued that this newest suit ( Paxton III) was barred by (1) AS 09.50.280, which prohibits recovery of punitive damages against the State; (2) AS 09.65.250(2), which shields the State from liability for its good faith child support collection efforts; (3) res judicata, via the State's dismissal on the merits from Paxton II; (4) the statute of limitations; and (5) AS 09.50.250, which shields the State from tort liability for discretionary actions. Paxton opposed the motion on March 21. Superior Court Judge Douglas L. Blankenship granted CSSD's motion for summary judgment on June 5, accepting each of CSSD's arguments.
Paxton also moved for summary judgment almost a year earlier, on June 11, 2006. His motion was denied on September 24, 2006. He does not appeal this denial.
Paxton appeals the grant of summary judgment to CSSD, contending that the superior court "may have improperly weighed and decided conflicting evidence on the issues of subject intent," that it "overlooked material evidence in [ Paxton I]," and that it "may have made an erroneous holding on issues of material fact that are not amenable to summary judgment."
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review a lower court's grant of summary judgment de novo. Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. "Once the moving party establishes by competent evidence the absence of genuine issues of material fact, the non-moving party must clearly and specifically demonstrate that it can produce admissible evidence disputing the moving party's evidence." In the summary judgment context, "all reasonable inferences of fact are drawn in favor of the non-moving party."
Meyer v. State, Dep't of Revenue, Child Support Enforcement Div. ex rel. N.G.T., 994 P.2d 365, 367 (Alaska 1999).
Child Support Recovery Servs., Inc. ex rel. S.C. v. Inn at the Waterfront, Inc., 7 P.3d 63, 66 (Alaska 2000).
Id.
Id.
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Res Judicata Bars this Action.
CSSD argues that its dismissal from Paxton II precludes this action by res judicata. The superior court agreed. Res judicata, or claim preclusion, bars litigation of a claim when (1) a judgment on the merits has already been rendered; (2) the claim arose from the same transaction as the previous claim; (3) the second case is between the same parties; and (4) the claim was, or could have been, decided in the first case.
Calhoun v. State, Dep't of Transp. Pub. Facilities, 857 P.2d 1191, 1194, 1194 n. 3 (Alaska 1993); see also McElroy v. Kennedy, 74 P.3d 903, 906-07 (Alaska 2003).
The superior court concluded that Paxton III was "an almost identical lawsuit" to Paxton II. In Paxton II, Paxton asserted a due process claim against the State: "The defendant, the State of Alaska, denies the plaintiff [Paxton] due process of law." As in Paxton II, Paxton claims here that CSSD denied him due process of law in its enforcement of child support against him. But the State was dismissed from Paxton II in a final judgment on the merits, and Paxton did not appeal that dismissal. Paxton II and Paxton III are both tort actions alleging improprieties in CSSD's child support collection efforts against Paxton. And in both cases, Paxton sued the State of Alaska. Accordingly, each element of the test governing application of res judicata has been met.
Although CSSD failed to submit the entire Paxton II complaint as an attachment in support of its motion to dismiss, pursuant to Alaska Rule of Evidence 201, we take judicial notice of the fact that Paxton filed a "Statement and Memorandum in Support of Suit," which contained his due process challenge. As we have recognized in the past, "courts freely take notice of court records." F.T. v. State, 862 P.2d 857, 864 (Alaska 1993) (noting that "judicial notice of such facts as that a prior suit was filed [and] who the parties were" is appropriate, while judicial notice of facts alleged in court records is suspect).
Judge Greene dismissed the State from Paxton II, citing the safe harbor for good faith child support collection efforts under AS 09.65.250 and the State's immunity from punitive damages under AS 09.50.280. Under Alaska Civil Rule 41(b), any involuntary dismissal "other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, for improper venue, or for failure to join a party under Rule 19, operates as an adjudication upon the merits."
Paxton argues that although the Paxton II and Paxton III lawsuits are similar, they not the same. But the due process arguments raised in the two cases are identical, and while Paxton now advances a negligence claim, that claim is precluded because it arose out of the same transaction and could have been asserted in Paxton II. All of Paxton's claims in Paxton III are based on the child support enforcement efforts by CSSD and are therefore precluded by the final judgment on the merits in Paxton II. Because all elements of the test governing the application of res judicata have been met, Paxton III was properly dismissed by the superior court.
Our cases have clarified that the "could have been asserted" test is limited to claims against a party arising out of the same transaction being litigated. "The rule against claim splitting provides that `all claims arising out of a single transaction must be brought in a single suit, and those that are not become extinguished by the judgment in the suit in which some of the claims were brought.'" Robertson v. Am. Mech., Inc., 54 P.3d 777, 780 (Alaska 2002) (quoting Osborne v. Buckman, 993 P.2d 409, 412 (Alaska 1999)).
V. CONCLUSION
We AFFIRM the superior court's grant of summary judgment to CSSD.
Because we affirm the superior court's grant of summary judgment under res judicata, we need not reach its alternative grounds for dismissal.