Opinion
No. CV 04 4001356-S
January 4, 2006
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION #109 TO STRIKE
The defendant has moved to strike the sixth count of the plaintiff's complaint on the ground that it does not allege facts sufficient to support a common-law cause of action for parental liability. For reasons more fully set forth in this decision, the motion is granted.
I. FACTS
The plaintiff, Daniel Pavelko, Jr., by his father, Daniel Pavelko, Sr., filed an eight-count amended complaint on March 18, 2005, against the defendants, Roland Goodrich; Roland and Nancy Goodrich, parents of Roland Goodrich, Jr.; Benjamin Delmonico; and Stephen and Kathryn Delmonico, parents of Benjamin Delmonico. This action arises out of injuries allegedly sustained by the plaintiff on April 29, 2004, at Cheshire High School. The plaintiff alleges that Roland Goodrich and Benjamin Delmonico negligently or intentionally struck the plaintiff in the head and face causing him severe physical and emotional injuries. In separate counts, the plaintiff alleges negligent assault and intentional assault against Roland Goodrich and Benjamin Delmonico, as well as statutory parental liability and common-law parental liability on the part of Roland and Nancy Goodrich and Stephen and Kathryn Delmonico.
On June 13, 2005, the defendants filed a motion to strike the sixth count of the complaint for common-law parental liability, accompanied by a memorandum of law in support thereof. The plaintiff filed a memorandum of law in opposition to the motion to strike on July 18, 2005. The defendants filed a reply memorandum on September 9, 2005.
Hereinafter, "defendants" refer to Roland and Nancy Goodrich. Stephen and Kathryn Delmonico were not a party to the motion to strike.
II. DISCUSSION CT Page 234
"The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest . . . the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint . . . to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003). "A motion to strike admits all facts well pleaded; it does not admit legal conclusions or the truth or accuracy of opinions stated in the pleadings." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Faulkner v. United Technologies Corp., 240 Conn. 576, 588, 693 A.2d 293 (1997). "A motion to strike is properly granted if the complaint alleges mere conclusions of law that are unsupported by the facts alleged." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, supra, 498.
In support of their motion to strike count six of the amended complaint, the defendants argue that the plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to state a common-law action for parental liability. Specifically, the defendants contend that the facts alleged by the plaintiff do not support that they knew or should have known of the necessity of exercising control over their son so as to prevent his alleged conduct. The plaintiff responds by arguing that the motion should be denied because the allegation set forth in paragraph fifteen of count six, that the defendants "knew or had reason to know that their son, Roland Goodrich, had dangerous tendencies," is sufficient for common-law parental negligence.
"At common law, the torts of children do not impose vicarious liability upon parents qua parent, although parental liability may be created by statute . . . or by independently negligent behavior on the part of parents." (Citation omitted.) Kaminski v. Fairfield, 216 Conn. 29, 34, 578 A.2d 1048 (1990). "In recognizing a cause of action for negligent supervision of a minor child by the child's parents, Connecticut trial courts follow the 2 Restatement (Second), Torts, Standard of Conduct §§ 316, p. 123 (1965), whereby: A parent is under a duty to exercise reasonable care so to control his minor child as to prevent it from intentionally harming others or from so conducting itself as to create an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to them, if the parent (a) knows or has reason to know that he has the ability to control his child, and (b) knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity for exercising such control." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Diorio v. Martorelli, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. CV 040184342 (April 29, 2005, Gallagher, J.) ( 39 Conn. L. Rptr. 229, 230). "Accordingly, [t]o allege a common law claim [for parental liability], a plaintiff would need to allege that the parent failed to restrain a child they knew or should have known had dangerous propensities, or that the parent negligently entrusted a dangerous instrumentality to the child. Without such an allegation, the complaint would be open to a motion to strike." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Doe v. Favreau, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV 02 0393019 (March 7, 2003, Thim, J.) ( 34 Conn. L. Rptr. 276, 277).
Connecticut courts have denied a motion to strike a parental liability cause of action when the plaintiff has alleged facts that support the applicable legal standard for parental liability. For example, in Doe v. Favreau, supra, the court denied the motion where the plaintiff alleged that the minor's parents "created and fostered a home environment which included highly pornographic materials in their children's bedrooms and in common spaces in the home, which they knew was likely to instill sexually deviant behavior in their son; they were aware that their son had previously demonstrated sexually deviant behavior and failed to take action to prevent him from harming others; and they recklessly failed to restrain or control their son, although they knew that he had exhibited deviant behavior and had a propensity to commit sexual assault." Doe v. Favreau, supra, 34 Conn. L. Rptr. 278. In Murphy v. LaChapell, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. CV 970142410 (May 23, 1999, Pellegrino, J.) ( 24 Conn. L. Rptr. 567, 568), the court also denied a motion to strike based on the plaintiff's allegations that the defendants knew or should have known that their daughter would hold a party where alcohol would be served and then failed to supervise the party.
On the other hand, the courts have granted motions to strike a parental liability cause of action when the plaintiff has failed to plead sufficient facts to support the claim. In Morrocco v. Michaud, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV 03 0522410 (June 15, 2004, Robinson, J.), the court granted the defendant's motion on the ground that the plaintiff "has not alleged that the defendants failed to restrain a child that they knew or should have known had dangerous propensities, or that the defendants negligently entrusted a dangerous instrument to their child. [The plaintiff] merely alleges that the defendants were responsible for the child's conduct and the conduct caused said damage." In Andrews v. Bonaminio, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven at Meriden, Docket No. 03 0282975 (November 4, 2003, Wiese, J.), the court also granted the defendant's motion on the basis that the plaintiff merely alleged in his complaint that "[t]he conduct as aforedescribed of the defendant . . . was caused, in substantial part, by the negligent parental supervision of his parent and guardian . . . Had [the parent] exercised a reasonable measure of parental supervision over her son, the injuries and damages sustained by the plaintiff would not have occurred."
In the present case, the plaintiff alleges in paragraph fifteen of the sixth count that "[t]he defendants, Roland and Nancy Goodrich, are liable for the malicious injury caused to the plaintiff Daniel Pavelko, Jr., and that they knew or had reason to know that their son, Roland Goodrich, had dangerous tendencies; they had the ability to oversee and control their son when they knew or should have known that it was necessary to do so; that they had the opportunity to exercise such control over their son; and nevertheless, despite his aggressive and dangerous propensities, the defendant parents failed to exercise proper parental supervision and restrain their son, Roland Goodrich, thereby allowing him to cause serious injury to the plaintiff, Daniel Pavelko, Jr." Therefore, the court grants the defendants' motion to strike. First, these allegations by the plaintiff are merely a restatement of the legal standard set forth in Diorio v. Martorelli, supra, 39 Conn. L. Rptr. 229; and as such are legal conclusions, not facts sufficient to support a claim of parental liability. "Courts are not bound by the legal conclusions of pleaders, even where they are pleaded as if they were facts in consecutively numbered paragraphs of the complaint . . . To the contrary, a court must ignore a pleader's legal conclusions when assessing the sufficiency of his challenged pleading:" (Citation omitted.) ShareAmerica, Inc. v. Ernst Young, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. CV 0150132 (July 2, 1999, Sheldon, J.) ( 25 Conn. L. Rptr. 160). The court is not bound to accept the allegations in count six as statements of fact even though the plaintiff has classified them as such. See id.
Second, similar to the plaintiffs in Morrocco and Andrews, the plaintiff has not alleged any facts, such as past conduct, to show that the defendants knew or had reason to know of the necessity of exercising control over their son, as the plaintiffs did in Doe v. Favreau, supra, 34 Conn. L. Rptr 276 and Murphy v. LaChapell, supra, 24 Conn. L. Rptr. 567. Notwithstanding the plaintiff's allegation that the defendants had the ability to oversee and restrain their son and despite this ability failed to do so, the plaintiff's conduct took place at school where the parents were not present and, consequently, did not have the ability to oversee his conduct.
III. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the motion to strike count six of the complaint is granted.