Opinion
No. 5-545 / 04-1321
Filed August 17, 2005
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Artis I. Reis, Judge.
Robert Paulson appeals from the summary dismissal of his application for postconviction relief. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Martha Lucey, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kristin Guddall, Assistant Attorney General, John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, and Steve Foritano, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Huitink, P.J., and Vogel and Zimmer, JJ.
Robert Paulson appeals from the summary dismissal of his application for postconviction relief. We reverse and remand.
I. Background Facts Proceedings
A jury convicted Paulson of second-degree sexual abuse on December 12, 2000, resulting from evidence that he sexually abused his then five-year-old daughter, M.P. Following his conviction, Paulson hired new counsel and filed an amended motion for new trial which was denied by the court. He was sentenced to serve an indeterminate twenty-five-year term of imprisonment. Paulson then appealed from his conviction, arguing there was insufficient evidence of sexual abuse, the court erred in denying his motion for new trial, and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel on several grounds. We affirmed Paulson's conviction and sentence on direct appeal. See State v. Paulson, No. 01-0379 (Iowa Ct.App. Jan. 15, 2003).
The current proceeding commenced with Paulson's application for postconviction relief filed July 8, 2003. In his application, prepared by appellate counsel, Paulson argued trial counsel was ineffective in eighteen separate instances. Postconviction counsel was appointed on July 9, 2003, and filed a report with the court asking for leave to amend the postconviction application. An amended application was never filed. Thereafter, on April 23, 2004, the State filed a motion to dismiss contending Paulson's application raised the same issues as were raised and decided on direct appeal and that Paulson failed to set forth any ground for which relief could be granted. In the resistance, postcoviction counsel acknowledged the issues were the same, but argued the decision on direct appeal "was cursory, vague, and lacked definitive findings of fact," and that Paulson was denied due process by requiring him to raise and argue his ineffective assistance claims on direct appeal. On August 11, 2004, the district court granted the State's motion to dismiss Paulson's postconviction application. Paulson appeals from this dismissal with new counsel from the State Appellate Defender's office.
On appeal, Paulson argues trial, appellate, and postconviction counsels were ineffective in the following:
I. COUNSEL PROVIDED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE BY FAILING TO OBJECT TO THE ADMISSION OF HEARSAY WHICH VIOLATED MR. PAULSON'S RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION.
II. COUNSEL PROVIDED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE BY FAILING TO OBJECT TO EVIDENCE WHICH WAS INADMISSIBLE PURSUANT TO IOWA RULES OF EVIDENCE 5.401, 5.402, 5.403, AND 5.404(b).
III. COUNSEL PROVIDED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE BY FAILING TO OBJECT TO THE ADMISSION OF HEARSAY STATEMENTS OF MP.
IV. COUNSEL PROVIDED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE BY FAILING TO OBJECT TO PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT.II. Standard of Review
Ordinarily postconviction proceedings are law actions. Collins v. State, 588 N.W.2d 399, 401 (Iowa 1998). When a constitutional claim is implicated, like ineffective assistance of counsel, appellate review is de novo. Id. III. The Merits
A court may grant a motion for summary disposition of an application for postconviction relief when it appears from the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions and agreements of fact, together with any affidavits submitted, that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Iowa Code § 822.6 (1999). The key to summary disposition, like summary judgment, is that it applies only when no genuine issue of material fact exists. See Manning v. State, 654 N.W.2d 555, 560 (Iowa 2002).
In the State's motion to dismiss Paulson's application for postconviction relief, it argued Paulson's postconviction issues were barred pursuant to Iowa Code section 822.8 because they were finally adjudicated on direct appeal. The State further alleged that Paulson had failed to set forth any ground for which relief could be granted pursuant to Iowa Code section 822.2. The postconviction court dismissed Paulson's application, "for all the reasons raised in the [State's] Motion."
It appears from Paulson's final and reply direct appeal briefs that he argued counsel was ineffective in failing to challenge the hearsay statements of M.P. and C.P., and also in failing to object to the prior acts evidence he now raises in his postconviction appeal. In disposing of these issues, a three-member panel of the court of appeals held, "We have carefully considered the remainder of Paulson's ineffective assistance claims and find them either too general to consider or to be without merit on their face." See Paulson, No. 01-0379. Under Iowa Code section 822.8:
Any ground finally adjudicated or not raised, or knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived in the proceeding that resulted in the conviction or sentence, or in any other proceeding the applicant has taken to secure relief, may not be the basis for a subsequent application, unless the court finds a ground for relief asserted which for sufficient reason was not asserted or was inadequately raised in the original, supplemental, or amended application.
It is unclear from the court's disposition on direct appeal whether it found Paulson's claims meritless or too general to consider. Therefore, because Paulson argues appellate and postconviction counsels were ineffective by inadequately arguing these issues on appeal, we conclude Paulson has demonstrated a legitimate basis to reassert these issues in his postconviction action as ineffective assistance of counsel claims. See LeGrand v. State, 540 N.W.2d 667, 669 (Iowa 1995) (finding defendant proffered no legitimate basis for reasserting claim already addressed in prior decision). Additionally, we conclude Paulson's prosecutorial misconduct claim may be raised even though he failed to argue it on direct appeal. See Osborn v. State, 573 N.W.2d 917, 921 (Iowa 1998) (concluding ineffective assistance of counsel may provide sufficient reason to permit issue to be raised for first time in postconviction proceeding).
Finally, we must determine whether to proceed to the merits of Paulson's ineffective claims, or remand for a postconviction hearing. An evidentiary hearing on the merits is usually required when an applicant properly raises claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in a postconviction relief application. Manning, 654 N.W.2d at 562. "Such a hearing affords the parties an opportunity to adversarily develop all of the relevant circumstances attending counsel's performance, including those circumstances and considerations which may be pertinent but are not a part of the criminal record. Id. "[Paulson's] claims, even if the district court deems them improbable, require that he be allowed to present whatever proof he may have to support those claims." See id. Moreover, "even a lawyer is entitled to his day in court, especially when his professional reputation is impugned." State v. Coil, 265 N.W.2d 293, 296 (Iowa 1978) (allowing a full evidentiary hearing for counsel to respond to claims of ineffectiveness). Because there are genuine issues of material fact underlying Paulson's various ineffective assistance of counsel claims, we reverse the district court's summary disposition and remand for an evidentiary hearing on his four ineffective assistance claims.