In Schultz, 372 N.W.2d at 892, we also said an agency may even reject a hearing officer's recommendation on findings of the credibility of contradictory witnesses. Compare Paulson v. Meinke, 352 N.W.2d 191, 193-94 (N.D. 1984) (under NDRCivP 63, if successor judge is not satisfied with findings, conclusions and decision of predecessor judge, successor judge is limited to granting new trial); Holzer v. Jochim, 557 N.W.2d 57, 58-59 (N.D. 1996) (successor judge abused discretion in redeciding the merits of case tried before predecessor judge without affording the parties an opportunity to retry case). As Holzer at 59 explained, a major tenet of due process anticipates that a party receive adequate notice and fair opportunity to be heard by the decision maker.
E.g., Faris v. Rothenberg, 648 P.2d 1089, 1092 (Colo. 1982); Paulson v. Meinke, 352 N.W.2d 191, 193-94 (N.D. 1984). One commentator has suggested that a successor judge consider four factors: 1) the point to which the trial has proceeded; 2) the complexity of the trial; 3) the importance of witness credibility; and 4) the parties' good faith.
Therefore, this court reversed and remanded for a new trial before a different judge. Paulson v. Meinke, 352 N.W.2d 191 (N.D. 1984). Following a second trial, Judge Eckert denied Oscar and June any recovery. Oscar appeals, for himself and as personal representative of the estate of June (who has died since this action was commenced), contending that certain findings were clearly erroneous and that Oscar was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.