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Paulson v. Meinke

352 N.W.2d 191 (N.D. 1984)
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Paulson v. Meinke

4 Citing cases

  1. Blanchard v. N. Dak. Workers Comp. Bureau

    1997 N.D. 118 (N.D. 1997)   Cited 19 times
    Providing "[w]hen read as a whole, the statutory scheme for decisions by an ALJ manifests a legislative intent that an ALJ's decision is a final order when the Legislature has authorized the ALJ to issue a final order, or when the requesting agency has authorized the ALJ to issue a final order"

    In Schultz, 372 N.W.2d at 892, we also said an agency may even reject a hearing officer's recommendation on findings of the credibility of contradictory witnesses. Compare Paulson v. Meinke, 352 N.W.2d 191, 193-94 (N.D. 1984) (under NDRCivP 63, if successor judge is not satisfied with findings, conclusions and decision of predecessor judge, successor judge is limited to granting new trial); Holzer v. Jochim, 557 N.W.2d 57, 58-59 (N.D. 1996) (successor judge abused discretion in redeciding the merits of case tried before predecessor judge without affording the parties an opportunity to retry case). As Holzer at 59 explained, a major tenet of due process anticipates that a party receive adequate notice and fair opportunity to be heard by the decision maker.

  2. Birmingham Retail v. Eastwood Festival

    608 So. 2d 340 (Ala. 1992)   Cited 2 times
    In Birmingham Retail Center Associates, Ltd. v. Eastwood Festival Associates, 608 So.2d 340 (Ala.1992), our supreme court, citing Trail Pontiac–GMC Truck, Inc. v. Evans, 540 So.2d 645 (Ala.1988), and Hall v. Hall, 445 So.2d 304 (Ala.Civ.App.1984), construed the former version of Rule 63 as investing a successor judge, who has reviewed a transcript, with the authority to order a new trial based on substantive grounds.

    E.g., Faris v. Rothenberg, 648 P.2d 1089, 1092 (Colo. 1982); Paulson v. Meinke, 352 N.W.2d 191, 193-94 (N.D. 1984). One commentator has suggested that a successor judge consider four factors: 1) the point to which the trial has proceeded; 2) the complexity of the trial; 3) the importance of witness credibility; and 4) the parties' good faith.

  3. Jones v. Ahlberg

    489 N.W.2d 576 (N.D. 1992)   Cited 27 times
    Reversing and remanding case where "the trial court did not clearly enunciate the standard of liability . . .[s]ome of the court's statements indicate that the court may have been using" the wrong standard

    Because the case is being remanded for a retrial of all factual issues, we deem it appropriate to grant the request. See Paulson v. Meinke, 352 N.W.2d 191 (N.D. 1984). Therefore, we remand the case for a new trial before a judge appointed under Administrative Rule 15.

  4. Hanson v. Williams County

    452 N.W.2d 313 (N.D. 1990)   Cited 13 times
    Noting that the "`denial of the motion must be sustained on appeal unless it is shown that the trial court abused its discretion.'"

    Later, we limited our holding in Krohnke to situations where all of the evidence was documentary in nature. In Paulson v. Meinke, 352 N.W.2d 191 (N.D. 1984), and McCroskey v. Fettes, 336 N.W.2d 645 (N.D. 1983), we held that, where some witnesses testified in court and other testimony was admitted by deposition, the trial court's ability to observe the demeanor of the witnesses who testified in person called for application of the "clearly erroneous" standard. Any possible doubt about application of the "clearly erroneous" standard in this case has been clarified by the amendment to the Explanatory Note for NDRCivP 52, effective January 1, 1986.