As in Village of Bloomingdale, this matter is a civil action for damages brought against a governmental entity that allegedly breached its duty according to a legislative enactment.¶ 44 Relying on Paulson v. County of De Kalb, 268 Ill.App.3d 78, 80, 205 Ill.Dec. 821, 644 N.E.2d 37 (1994), the Conservation District argues that the penalty prescribed by section 35 of the Withholding Act qualifies as " ‘punitive or exemplary damages' " under section 2–102 of the Tort Immunity Act. In Paulson, the plaintiff sued a county-run nursing home and sought to treble the damages pursuant to section 3–602 of the Nursing Home Care Act ( 210 ILCS 45/3–602 (West 1994) ).
Further, because section 2-204 does not apply, section 2-109 does not apply. ¶ 15 Plaintiff relies on Paulson v. County of De Kalb , 268 Ill. App. 3d 78, 205 Ill.Dec. 821, 644 N.E.2d 37 (1994), a case that the County relied on below and that the trial court found did not support plaintiff's position. In Paulson , the plaintiff sued the County, which operated the De Kalb County Nursing Home, for injuries she sustained while a resident of the home.
When the language is unambiguous, the statute must be applied as written without resort to other aids of construction. Lawrence v. Regent Realty Group, Inc., 197 Ill. 2d 1, 10 (2001). Relying on Paulson v. County of De Kalb, 268 Ill. App. 3d 78, 82 (1994), and Waliczek v. Retirement Board of the Fireman's Annuity Benefit Fund, 318 Ill. App. 3d 32, 36 (2000), the plaintiff argues that, because section 13-202.2 includes the phrase "[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law," the legislature's intent is that section 13-202.2 control over all other statutes. In Paulson, the plaintiff sued a county-run nursing home and sought to treble the damages pursuant to section 3-602 of the Nursing Home Care Act ( 210 ILCS 45/3-602 (West 1994)).
Punitive damages are not awarded as compensation but, rather, serve to punish the offender and to deter the offender and others from committing similar acts of wrongdoing in the future. Murray , 2014 IL App (2d) 121253, ¶ 45, 382 Ill.Dec. 155, 12 N.E.3d 155 (citing Paulson v. County of De Kalb , 268 Ill. App. 3d 78, 80, 205 Ill.Dec. 821, 644 N.E.2d 37 (1994) ).¶ 20 To our knowledge, there are only a few Illinois appellate court cases that have determined whether the statutory penalty under section 35 of the Withholding Act constitutes punitive damages for the purposes of the Tort Immunity Act.
They are inappropriate where a public entity is involved, since they would fall upon the innocent taxpayers." (Recommendation Relating to Sovereign Immunity, at p. 817; cf. Wells v. One2One Learning Foundation (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1164, 1196, fn. 20, 48 Cal.Rptr.3d 108, 141 P.3d 225 ( Wells ) [describing "the purpose behind the statutory ban on punitive damages against public entities" as "to protect their tax-funded revenues from legal judgments in amounts beyond those strictly necessary to recompense the injured party"]; accord, Paulson v. County of De Kalb (1994) 268 Ill.App.3d 78, 205 Ill.Dec. 821, 644 N.E.2d 37, 40 [construing Illinois law as prohibiting the imposition of treble damages on a public entity].)
Feb. 1, 1994), we may modify the circuit court's judgment to reflect the proper amount of damages. Paulson v. County of De Kalb, 268 Ill. App. 3d 78, 83 (1994). Because it is necessary to a just result in this case, we modify the judgment to $50,000.
Id. ¶ 21 In Paulson v. County of De Kalb, 268 Ill. App. 3d 78, 79, 644 N.E.2d 37, 38 (1994), the plaintiff sued the County of De Kalb for injuries she sustained while a resident of a county-run nursing home. A jury awarded her $20,000 in compensatory damages, and the trial court, pursuant to section 3-602 of the Nursing Home Care Act (210 ILCS 45/3-602 (West 1992)), trebled the award.
Id. When "read in a vacuum," section 12-1001(h)(4) of the Code of Civil Procedure shields Thomas's personal injury settlement from attachment or judgment; however, it is clear that the legislature intended section 10-25.5(a) of the Public Aid Code to "impact upon other provisions of law" such as section 12-1001(h)(4) to permit the imposition of a lien for past-due child support. Paulson v. County of De Kalb, 268 Ill. App. 3d 78, 82-83 (1994) (discussing "notwithstanding" language in a section of the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (745 ILCS 10/2-102 (West 1992)) and the treble damages provision in the Nursing Home Care Act (210 ILCS 45/3-602 (West 1992)); court concluded that the statutes "can be construed harmoniously" and that the plaintiff's "interpretation of the provisions at issue would render meaningless the phrase 'notwithstanding any other provision of law' "). ¶ 17 Thomas contends that "[t]he plain language of 305 ILCS 5/10-25.5, even after the 2011 amendment to 5/10-25.5(a), *** includes the fifteen thousand dollars [sic] statutory exemption for the proceeds of personal injury lawsuits" because the 2011 amendment "did not make any change to subsection (d)" of section 10-25.5. Section 10-25.5(d) of the Public Aid Code provides that the Department "shall enforce its lien against the responsible relative's personal property, other than accounts as defined in Section 10-24 in financ
The appellate court may modify the trial court's order to reflect the proper amount of damages. Soto, 313 Ill. App. 3d at 148; Paulson v. County of De Kalb, 268 Ill. App. 3d 78, 83 (1994). ¶ 71 However, a damages award will not be subject to remittitur if it falls within the flexible range of conclusions which can reasonably be supported by the facts, because the assessment of damages is primarily an issue of fact for jury determination. Best, 179 Ill. 2d at 412; Holston, 165 Ill. 2d at 174-75 (our supreme court refused to reduce as excessive a $7.3 million verdict in a wrongful death and survival case where the jury's verdict "could" have been based on reasonable inferences from the evidence).
The appellate court may modify the trial court's order to reflect the proper amount of damages. Paulson v. County of De Kalb, 268 Ill. App.3d 78, 83 (1994). As the defendant notes, the jury returned an itemized verdict form, which indicated an award for future pain and suffering in the amount of $3,200 and an award for past/present pain and suffering in the amount of $5,000. It is clear that the improper testimony comprised the basis of the award for future pain and suffering of $3,200.