It is well established, however, that a defendant's own statements need not furnish the factual basis for the plea. Paulson v. Black, 728 F.2d 1164, 1167 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 931, 105 S.Ct. 325, 83 L.Ed.2d 262 (1984). Indeed, "[a]n express admission of guilt is not a constitutional requirement of a guilty plea."
Ark. Code Ann. Section(s) 5-39-201 (1993). The trial court's recitation of the elements of the crime imparted to Easter adequate information concerning the charge to which he pleaded guilty. Paulson v. Black, 728 F.2d 1164, 1166 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 931 (1984). Easter argues that the trial court's description of burglary, based on the Arkansas statutory definition, was so technical that it did not and could not provide adequate notice of the charge.
Although petitioner argues that it was improper to refer to evidence not explicitly made part of the record to support the finding of a factual basis, we hold it was not impermissible for the trial court to do so. See Paulson v. Black, 728 F.2d 1164, 1167 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 105 S.Ct. 325, 83 L.Ed.2d 262 (1984) (factual basis supported by trial court's access to preliminary hearing transcript); Thunderbird v. Solem, 565 F.2d 1018, 1023 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 954, 98 S.Ct. 1585, 55 L.Ed.2d 805 (1978) (preliminary hearing transcript may support factual basis even if contents not admissible at trial). The purpose of the factual basis requirement is to assure the plea's accuracy through the presence of sufficient evidence at the time of the plea upon which a court may reasonably determine that the defendant likely committed the offense.
The court also properly considered the prejudice that withdrawal would cause the government, and the strength of the prosecution's case. See United States v. Abdullah, 947 F.2d 306, 311 (8th Cir. 1991) (considerations for motion to withdraw); cf. Paulson v. Black, 728 F.2d 1164, 1167 (8th Cir. 1984) (where there was strong factual basis for guilty plea and it was otherwise valid, even clear protestations of innocence would not invalidate plea). To the extent Hutchison wishes to raise claims of ineffective assistance outside the context of his decision to plead guilty, we defer those matters to collateral proceedings.
We also note that our rejection of Fabela's position is consistent with the law of this circuit. See, e.g., Schone v. Purkett, 15 F.3d 785, 789 (8th Cir. 1994) ("Schone's argument that the trial court sua sponte should have given him an opportunity to withdraw his pleas is without merit."); Paulson v. Black, 728 F.2d 1164, 1167 (8th Cir. 1984) ("We also reject Paulson's argument that on its own motion the trial court should have offered him the opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea."). We also reject out of hand Fabela's pure policy claim that "District Courts should require U.S. Attorneys to reasonably translate indictments and documents into Spanish."
The court found a factual basis for Cranford's pleas after reviewing the prosecutor's file. See Paulson v. Black, 728 F.2d 1164, 1167 (8th Cir.) (Constitution does not require that defendant's statements furnish factual basis for guilty plea), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 931, 105 S.Ct. 325, 83 L.Ed.2d 262 (1984). Moreover, the record before the trial court contained, strong evidence of Cranford's guilt.
See Nash v. Israel, 707 F.2d 298, 302 n. 6 (7th Cir. 1983). Though a rote reading of the indictment or charging document may be sufficient to put a defendant on notice of the elements of the charge in some circumstances, see Paulson v. Black, 728 F.2d 1164, 1166 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 105 S.Ct. 325, 83 L.Ed.2d 262 (1984), it is inadequate when the defendant has minimal intelligence, the charge is complex, and the sentence to be imposed is substantial. See Alessi v. United States, 593 F.2d 476, 480 (2d Cir. 1979) ("[e]ven if we assume that the indictment was legally sufficient, this does not eliminate the need for making sure the defendant understands it").
Outside of these circumstances, “a rote reading of the indictment or charging document may be sufficient to put a defendant on notice of the elements of the charge ....” Id. (citing Paulson v. Black, 728 F.2d 1164, 1166 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 931 (1984)).
"A state court may not accept a guilty plea unless the defendant enters it voluntarily and with sufficient understanding of the charge[s] and the likely consequences of the plea." See Paulson v. Black, 728 F.2d 1164, 1165-1166 (8th Cir. 1984). The question of whether a guilty plea was voluntarily and intelligently entered is answered by examining the "totality of the circumstances."
See, Willbright v. Smith, 745 F.2d 779 (2d Cir. 1984) (factual basis inquiry not mandated in order to sustain guilty plea where plea was entered voluntarily, in open court, with the assistance of counsel, and judge who accepted plea had himself conducted co-defendants' trials and, thus, had knowledge of the underlying facts). See also Paulson v. Black, 728 F.2d 1164 (8th Cir. 1984) (factual basis supported by plea-taking court's access to preliminary hearing transcript). Jacobson relies on Carreon v. United States, 578 F.2d 176 (7th Cir. 1978), to support his argument on the invalidity of his 1987 conviction.