Paulson v. Black

13 Citing cases

  1. Schone v. Purkett

    15 F.3d 785 (8th Cir. 1994)   Cited 24 times
    Holding that under the totality of circumstances the defendant knowingly and voluntarily entered pleas of guilty

    It is well established, however, that a defendant's own statements need not furnish the factual basis for the plea. Paulson v. Black, 728 F.2d 1164, 1167 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 931, 105 S.Ct. 325, 83 L.Ed.2d 262 (1984). Indeed, "[a]n express admission of guilt is not a constitutional requirement of a guilty plea."

  2. Easter v. Norris

    100 F.3d 523 (8th Cir. 1996)   Cited 19 times
    Holding that terms "enter" and "intent" in context of burglary did not require further explanation at taking of guilty plea

    Ark. Code Ann. Section(s) 5-39-201 (1993). The trial court's recitation of the elements of the crime imparted to Easter adequate information concerning the charge to which he pleaded guilty. Paulson v. Black, 728 F.2d 1164, 1166 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 931 (1984). Easter argues that the trial court's description of burglary, based on the Arkansas statutory definition, was so technical that it did not and could not provide adequate notice of the charge.

  3. Gregory v. Solem

    774 F.2d 309 (8th Cir. 1985)   Cited 23 times
    Denying habeas relief where the record revealed that the petitioner knowingly and voluntarily plead guilty

    Although petitioner argues that it was improper to refer to evidence not explicitly made part of the record to support the finding of a factual basis, we hold it was not impermissible for the trial court to do so. See Paulson v. Black, 728 F.2d 1164, 1167 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 105 S.Ct. 325, 83 L.Ed.2d 262 (1984) (factual basis supported by trial court's access to preliminary hearing transcript); Thunderbird v. Solem, 565 F.2d 1018, 1023 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 954, 98 S.Ct. 1585, 55 L.Ed.2d 805 (1978) (preliminary hearing transcript may support factual basis even if contents not admissible at trial). The purpose of the factual basis requirement is to assure the plea's accuracy through the presence of sufficient evidence at the time of the plea upon which a court may reasonably determine that the defendant likely committed the offense.

  4. United States v. Hutchison

    570 F. App'x 625 (8th Cir. 2014)

    The court also properly considered the prejudice that withdrawal would cause the government, and the strength of the prosecution's case. See United States v. Abdullah, 947 F.2d 306, 311 (8th Cir. 1991) (considerations for motion to withdraw); cf. Paulson v. Black, 728 F.2d 1164, 1167 (8th Cir. 1984) (where there was strong factual basis for guilty plea and it was otherwise valid, even clear protestations of innocence would not invalidate plea). To the extent Hutchison wishes to raise claims of ineffective assistance outside the context of his decision to plead guilty, we defer those matters to collateral proceedings.

  5. U.S. v. Fabela

    256 F. App'x 12 (8th Cir. 2007)   Cited 1 times

    We also note that our rejection of Fabela's position is consistent with the law of this circuit. See, e.g., Schone v. Purkett, 15 F.3d 785, 789 (8th Cir. 1994) ("Schone's argument that the trial court sua sponte should have given him an opportunity to withdraw his pleas is without merit."); Paulson v. Black, 728 F.2d 1164, 1167 (8th Cir. 1984) ("We also reject Paulson's argument that on its own motion the trial court should have offered him the opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea."). We also reject out of hand Fabela's pure policy claim that "District Courts should require U.S. Attorneys to reasonably translate indictments and documents into Spanish."

  6. Cranford v. Lockhart

    975 F.2d 1347 (8th Cir. 1992)   Cited 12 times
    Holding that state court's failure to comply with a state rule of criminal procedure requiring a factual basis for a guilty plea did not warrant habeas relief

    The court found a factual basis for Cranford's pleas after reviewing the prosecutor's file. See Paulson v. Black, 728 F.2d 1164, 1167 (8th Cir.) (Constitution does not require that defendant's statements furnish factual basis for guilty plea), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 931, 105 S.Ct. 325, 83 L.Ed.2d 262 (1984). Moreover, the record before the trial court contained, strong evidence of Cranford's guilt.

  7. Gaddy v. Linahan

    780 F.2d 935 (11th Cir. 1986)   Cited 48 times
    Holding that a one-sentence indictment that used legal terms of art, such as "murder" and "malice aforethought," was insufficient to show that the petitioner understood the elements of malice murder

    See Nash v. Israel, 707 F.2d 298, 302 n. 6 (7th Cir. 1983). Though a rote reading of the indictment or charging document may be sufficient to put a defendant on notice of the elements of the charge in some circumstances, see Paulson v. Black, 728 F.2d 1164, 1166 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 105 S.Ct. 325, 83 L.Ed.2d 262 (1984), it is inadequate when the defendant has minimal intelligence, the charge is complex, and the sentence to be imposed is substantial. See Alessi v. United States, 593 F.2d 476, 480 (2d Cir. 1979) ("[e]ven if we assume that the indictment was legally sufficient, this does not eliminate the need for making sure the defendant understands it").

  8. Brown v. Suter

    No. 22-CV-934-JPS (E.D. Wis. Mar. 18, 2024)

    Outside of these circumstances, “a rote reading of the indictment or charging document may be sufficient to put a defendant on notice of the elements of the charge ....” Id. (citing Paulson v. Black, 728 F.2d 1164, 1166 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 931 (1984)).

  9. Anderson v. Hobbs

    NO. 5:14-cv-00169-DPM/HDY (E.D. Ark. Aug. 11, 2014)

    "A state court may not accept a guilty plea unless the defendant enters it voluntarily and with sufficient understanding of the charge[s] and the likely consequences of the plea." See Paulson v. Black, 728 F.2d 1164, 1165-1166 (8th Cir. 1984). The question of whether a guilty plea was voluntarily and intelligently entered is answered by examining the "totality of the circumstances."

  10. State v. Jacobson

    491 N.W.2d 455 (S.D. 1992)   Cited 6 times
    Remanding to the trial court for a determination of the factual question of whether the arresting officer had information prior to administration of Defendant's blood test that the arrest was his third DUI offense

    See, Willbright v. Smith, 745 F.2d 779 (2d Cir. 1984) (factual basis inquiry not mandated in order to sustain guilty plea where plea was entered voluntarily, in open court, with the assistance of counsel, and judge who accepted plea had himself conducted co-defendants' trials and, thus, had knowledge of the underlying facts). See also Paulson v. Black, 728 F.2d 1164 (8th Cir. 1984) (factual basis supported by plea-taking court's access to preliminary hearing transcript). Jacobson relies on Carreon v. United States, 578 F.2d 176 (7th Cir. 1978), to support his argument on the invalidity of his 1987 conviction.