Paul v. Paul

18 Citing cases

  1. Forney v. Minard

    849 P.2d 724 (Wyo. 1993)   Cited 13 times
    In Forney v. Minard, 849 P.2d 724, 728 (Wyo. 1993) and Dice v. Dice, 742 P.2d 205, 206-07 (Wyo. 1987), this court acknowledged that a district court possesses the power to amend a judgment to reflect the proper value of an asset and the subsequent distribution of the property.

    (b) Other reasons. — On motion, and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or a party's legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: * * * (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; * * * or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. Rule 60(b) should not be used as a substitute for appeal. Paul v. Paul, 631 P.2d 1060, 1066 (Wyo. 1981). However, an order denying relief under Rule 60(b) may be appealed.

  2. Broadhead v. Broadhead

    737 P.2d 731 (Wyo. 1987)   Cited 45 times
    In Broadhead v. Broadhead, 737 P.2d 731, 737 (Wyo. 1987), this Court determined that retirement benefits which would vest in the future were subject to property division in a divorce action.

    "[o]nce a court has entered a decree dividing the marital property, the order is final and not subject to revision because of a change in circumstances." Barnett v. Barnett, Wyo., 704 P.2d 1308, 1309 (1985), citing Paul v. Paul, Wyo., 631 P.2d 1060 (1981), it is apparent that a final order was only then entered by filing the March 25, 1986 decree of divorce.

  3. Barnett v. Barnett

    704 P.2d 1308 (Wyo. 1985)   Cited 5 times
    In Barnett, the petitioner was successful in having a divorce decree modified three years after entry of the divorce because the parties had mutually omitted a marital debt in the property division.

    He argues that appellee's failure to cite proper authority for the modification request prevented jurisdiction from attaching. He relies principally upon Paul v. Paul, Wyo., 631 P.2d 1060 (1981). In that case we recognized that a district court has continuing jurisdiction in divorce cases over child custody, child support, and alimony.

  4. McMillan v. McMillan

    702 P.2d 1279 (Wyo. 1985)   Cited 5 times

    POINT I DECIDED We will hold in deciding the second issue, that the payments ordered by the trial court were a part of the property-settlement provisions of the decree following the entry of which the court loses jurisdiction, Paul v. Paul, Wyo., 631 P.2d 1060, 1064 (1981); but we would not have found an abuse of the trial court's discretion even if the payments were considered to be alimony. We have held on countless occasions that the district court's decision regarding the modification of alimony and support-payment provisions contained in divorce decrees will not be disturbed unless there is a clear abuse of discretion. Heyl v. Heyl, Wyo., 518 P.2d 28 (1974); Tanner v. Tanner, Wyo., 482 P.2d 443 (1971); Salmeri v. Salmeri, Wyo., 554 P.2d 1244 (1976); Rubeling v. Rubeling, Wyo., 406 P.2d 283 (1965); Lonabaugh v. Lonabaugh, 46 Wyo. 23, 22 P.2d 199 (1933).

  5. Meiners v. Meiners

    2016 WY 74 (Wyo. 2016)   Cited 5 times
    In Meiners v. Meiners, 2016 WY 74, ¶ 24, 376 P.3d 493, 498 (Wyo. 2016), we held that a settlement agreement is "presumed to merge into the divorce decree and will no longer be in effect."

    Our decision does not affect a trial court's authority to revise a divorce decree concerning the care, custody, or maintenance of children or alimony, nor does our decision affect a trial court's lack of authority to modify a divorce decree concerning property division. Paul v. Paul , 631 P.2d 1060 (Wyo.1981) ; Pavlica v. Pavlica , 587 P.2d 639 (Wyo.1978) (per curiam).In the present case, we discern no clear and convincing evidence from the record of the parties' intent to make their agreement survive the trial court's divorce decree.

  6. McAdam v. McAdam

    2014 WY 123 (Wyo. 2014)   Cited 14 times
    Finding both parties in contempt and modifying the division of property in the divorce decree to require the parties to split the mortgage until the house was sold

    [¶ 13] This Court has said that upon entry of a decree dividing marital property the division is final and not subject to revision because of a change in circumstances. Broadhead v. Broadhead, 737 P.2d 731, 733 (Wyo.1987), citing Barnett v. Barnett, 704 P.2d 1308, 1309 (Wyo.1985) and Paul v. Paul, 631 P.2d 1060 (Wyo.1981). We have also said, however, that district courts have jurisdiction to modify a judgment resulting from a property division when the facts in a particular case establish the requisite circumstances to permit modification.

  7. Tegeler v. State

    298 P.3d 173 (Wyo. 2013)   Cited 1 times

    See, e.g., Carson v. Wyoming State Penitentiary, 735 P.2d 424 (Wyo.1987); McBride v. McBride, 598 P.2d 814 (Wyo.1979) (noting that a trial court should consider the principle of finality of judgments in exercising its discretion to grant relief under Rule 60(b)). [¶ 11] With regard to motions for relief from a final judgment under Rule 60(b), we have stated that the Rule “is not to be used as a substitute for appeal. The rule is applicable only to special situations justifying extraordinary relief, and a showing of exceptional circumstances must be made.” Paul v. Paul, 631 P.2d 1060, 1066 (Wyo.1981) (citations omitted); see also Hochhalter v. Great W. Enters., 708 P.2d 666, 670 (Wyo.1985) (“[A] litigant is not necessarily entitled to relief under Rule 60(b)(6) solely because his counsel was grossly negligent. To hold otherwise would be inconsistent with holding each party ‘bound by the acts of his lawyer-agent.’

  8. MAM v. State, Department of Family Services

    2004 WY 127 (Wyo. 2004)   Cited 9 times
    Holding that the court abused its discretion in denying the appellant's motion to set aside a stipulated paternity order where the appellant proved, among other facts, that he was not the child's biological father and that he did not have a relationship with the child

    Nevertheless, the "rule is applicable only to special situations justifying extraordinary relief, and a showing of exceptional circumstances must be made." Paul v. Paul, 631 P.2d 1060, 1066 (Wyo. 1981). DISCUSSION

  9. Vanasse v. Ramsay

    847 P.2d 993 (Wyo. 1993)   Cited 78 times
    In Vanasse v. Ramsay, 847 P.2d 993, 997–98 (Wyo.1993), this Court reversed a trial court decision setting aside entry of default where the defaulted party had relied upon its insurance company to answer the complaint after service and had not ensured that a response was timely filed.

    In that regard, I agree with the majority decision and, in other respects, with the opinion and disposition of the case. Matter of Injury to Seevers, 720 P.2d 899 (Wyo. 1986); Paul v. Paul, 631 P.2d 1060 (Wyo. 1981). Consequently, I concur in the decision.

  10. Pauling v. Pauling

    837 P.2d 1073 (Wyo. 1992)   Cited 25 times
    In Pauling, we rejected an argument that the statute requires modification of child support upon a finding there would be a twenty percent change by application of the guidelines.

    Our decision does not affect a trial court's authority to revise a divorce decree concerning the care, custody, or maintenance of children or alimony, nor does our decision affect a trial court's lack of authority to modify a divorce decree concerning property division. Paul v. Paul, 631 P.2d 1060 (Wyo. 1981); Pavlica v. Pavlica, 587 P.2d 639 (Wyo. 1978) (per curiam). In the present case, we discern no clear and convincing evidence from the record of the parties' intent to make their agreement survive the trial court's divorce decree.