(b) Other reasons. — On motion, and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or a party's legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: * * * (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; * * * or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. Rule 60(b) should not be used as a substitute for appeal. Paul v. Paul, 631 P.2d 1060, 1066 (Wyo. 1981). However, an order denying relief under Rule 60(b) may be appealed.
"[o]nce a court has entered a decree dividing the marital property, the order is final and not subject to revision because of a change in circumstances." Barnett v. Barnett, Wyo., 704 P.2d 1308, 1309 (1985), citing Paul v. Paul, Wyo., 631 P.2d 1060 (1981), it is apparent that a final order was only then entered by filing the March 25, 1986 decree of divorce.
He argues that appellee's failure to cite proper authority for the modification request prevented jurisdiction from attaching. He relies principally upon Paul v. Paul, Wyo., 631 P.2d 1060 (1981). In that case we recognized that a district court has continuing jurisdiction in divorce cases over child custody, child support, and alimony.
POINT I DECIDED We will hold in deciding the second issue, that the payments ordered by the trial court were a part of the property-settlement provisions of the decree following the entry of which the court loses jurisdiction, Paul v. Paul, Wyo., 631 P.2d 1060, 1064 (1981); but we would not have found an abuse of the trial court's discretion even if the payments were considered to be alimony. We have held on countless occasions that the district court's decision regarding the modification of alimony and support-payment provisions contained in divorce decrees will not be disturbed unless there is a clear abuse of discretion. Heyl v. Heyl, Wyo., 518 P.2d 28 (1974); Tanner v. Tanner, Wyo., 482 P.2d 443 (1971); Salmeri v. Salmeri, Wyo., 554 P.2d 1244 (1976); Rubeling v. Rubeling, Wyo., 406 P.2d 283 (1965); Lonabaugh v. Lonabaugh, 46 Wyo. 23, 22 P.2d 199 (1933).
Our decision does not affect a trial court's authority to revise a divorce decree concerning the care, custody, or maintenance of children or alimony, nor does our decision affect a trial court's lack of authority to modify a divorce decree concerning property division. Paul v. Paul , 631 P.2d 1060 (Wyo.1981) ; Pavlica v. Pavlica , 587 P.2d 639 (Wyo.1978) (per curiam).In the present case, we discern no clear and convincing evidence from the record of the parties' intent to make their agreement survive the trial court's divorce decree.
[¶ 13] This Court has said that upon entry of a decree dividing marital property the division is final and not subject to revision because of a change in circumstances. Broadhead v. Broadhead, 737 P.2d 731, 733 (Wyo.1987), citing Barnett v. Barnett, 704 P.2d 1308, 1309 (Wyo.1985) and Paul v. Paul, 631 P.2d 1060 (Wyo.1981). We have also said, however, that district courts have jurisdiction to modify a judgment resulting from a property division when the facts in a particular case establish the requisite circumstances to permit modification.
See, e.g., Carson v. Wyoming State Penitentiary, 735 P.2d 424 (Wyo.1987); McBride v. McBride, 598 P.2d 814 (Wyo.1979) (noting that a trial court should consider the principle of finality of judgments in exercising its discretion to grant relief under Rule 60(b)). [¶ 11] With regard to motions for relief from a final judgment under Rule 60(b), we have stated that the Rule “is not to be used as a substitute for appeal. The rule is applicable only to special situations justifying extraordinary relief, and a showing of exceptional circumstances must be made.” Paul v. Paul, 631 P.2d 1060, 1066 (Wyo.1981) (citations omitted); see also Hochhalter v. Great W. Enters., 708 P.2d 666, 670 (Wyo.1985) (“[A] litigant is not necessarily entitled to relief under Rule 60(b)(6) solely because his counsel was grossly negligent. To hold otherwise would be inconsistent with holding each party ‘bound by the acts of his lawyer-agent.’
Nevertheless, the "rule is applicable only to special situations justifying extraordinary relief, and a showing of exceptional circumstances must be made." Paul v. Paul, 631 P.2d 1060, 1066 (Wyo. 1981). DISCUSSION
In that regard, I agree with the majority decision and, in other respects, with the opinion and disposition of the case. Matter of Injury to Seevers, 720 P.2d 899 (Wyo. 1986); Paul v. Paul, 631 P.2d 1060 (Wyo. 1981). Consequently, I concur in the decision.
Our decision does not affect a trial court's authority to revise a divorce decree concerning the care, custody, or maintenance of children or alimony, nor does our decision affect a trial court's lack of authority to modify a divorce decree concerning property division. Paul v. Paul, 631 P.2d 1060 (Wyo. 1981); Pavlica v. Pavlica, 587 P.2d 639 (Wyo. 1978) (per curiam). In the present case, we discern no clear and convincing evidence from the record of the parties' intent to make their agreement survive the trial court's divorce decree.