Opinion
Nos. 05-02-01893-CR, 05-02-01894-CR, 05-02-01895-CR, 05-02-01892-CR
Opinion Filed August 18, 2003. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex.R.App.P. 47.
On Appeal from the 292nd Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause Nos. F02-22968-V, F02-51055-V, F01-60049-V, F01-60050-V. AFFIRM
Before Chief Justice THOMAS AND Justices WHITTINGTON and RICHTER.
OPINION
Johnny Patton appeals his convictions, on nonnegotiated guilty pleas, of assault on a public servant and three burglary of a habitation offenses. In his sole point of error, appellant contends the evidence was insufficient to support his guilty pleas. We disagree, and thus affirm the trial court's judgments. On October 16, 2002, the trial court conducted a hearing on appellant's pleas to the burglary offenses. After the trial court orally admonished appellant on the punishment range and the consequences of his pleas, appellant entered pleas of guilty to the offenses and true to two enhancement paragraphs. The State then admitted into evidence in each case, without objection, (1) appellant's written judicial confession and stipulation of evidence and (2) his plea of true to the enhancement paragraphs. Appellant took the stand and affirmed he was pleading guilty because he was guilty and for no other reason. The trial court then recessed the hearing. On November 15, 2003, the trial court heard appellant's plea on the assault charge and conducted a sentencing hearing for all four cases. After inquiring about the voluntariness of appellant's plea and explaining the court's sentencing options, the trial court accepted appellant's plea and asked the prosecutor if the State had any additional evidence. The prosecutor replied that the State would "rest on punishment." Appellant and two other witnesses testified for the defense. During his testimony, appellant affirmed he was pleading guilty to the indictments because he was guilty and for no other reasons. Appellant admitted committing the three burglaries to support his drug habit. Appellant also admitted he assaulted a Duncanville police officer while trying to avoid arrest. After hearing the evidence and counsels' arguments, the trial court found appellant guilty and the enhancement paragraphs true. The trial court assessed punishment at forty-five years confinement in each case. After a break, the trial court announced it had been advised that the State did not offer any evidence on the assault case. The trial court then reopened that case and allowed the State to admit into evidence appellant's judicial confession and his plea of true to the enhancement paragraphs. After remarking that the State's evidence had been in the trial court's file, the judge again pronounced appellant guilty and reassessed the forty-five year sentence in the assault case. Appellant did not object to the offer of additional evidence or the resentencing. When a defendant waives his right to a jury and pleads guilty to a felony, the State must "introduce evidence into the record showing the guilt of the defendant" to serve as the basis for the trial court's judgment. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 1.15 (Vernon Supp. 2003). A judicial confession, standing alone, constitutes sufficient evidence to support a guilty plea. See Dinnery v. State, 592 S.W.2d 343, 353 (Tex.Crim.App. 1980) (op. on reh'g); Ross v. State, 931 S.W.2d 633, 635 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1996, no pet.). In arguing the insufficiency of the evidence, appellant first contends the trial court could not reopen the evidence to admit the State's exhibits because it would constitute the granting of a new trial. Without the judicial confession, appellant contends, the evidence was insufficient to support his guilty plea for assaulting a police officer. We will assume, without deciding, the trial court erred in "reopening" the evidence to allow the State to present more evidence. See Freeman v. State, 917 S.W.2d 512, 514 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1996, no pet.). However, as the State points out, even without the confession, appellant orally confessed to committing the assault offense and affirmed his counsel's description and explanation of how it occurred. We conclude that appellant's oral confession to the offense constitutes sufficient evidence to support his guilty plea to the offense of assault on a public servant. See Dinnery, 592 S.W.2d at 353; McFarland v. State, 644 S.W.2d 17, 18 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1982, no pet.). Therefore, in the assault on a public servant case, cause no. 05-02-01892-CR, we overrule appellant's sole point of error. In the burglary cases, appellant contends his judicial confessions, although admitted into evidence, were rendered ineffective because they are found in the clerk's record rather than the reporter's record. Appellant concedes that judicial confessions included in the clerk's record may be considered as evidence before the trial court. See Pitts v. State, 916 S.W.2d 507, 509 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996). Appellant contends, however, that his judicial confessions should be viewed differently from the judicial confession approved in Pitts because his judicial confessions are not clearly marked as State's exhibits, are not sworn or signed by the clerk of the court, and are not file-marked. In examining the State's exhibits, we note that each judicial confession bears a circled, handwritten notation "SE#1." Appellant cites no authority setting forth minimum standards for identifying a document as a State's exhibit. In the absence of any cited authority, we conclude the State's exhibits are sufficiently marked. Regarding the omission of the clerk's signature, appellant concedes the existence of authority discounting the importance of the clerk's signature on a judicial confession. See Ybarra v. State, 93 S.W.3d 922, 927 n. 4 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.) (noting judicial confession is valid and admissible even though not sworn or signed by the clerk of court or the trial judge). Appellant's judicial confessions bear the signatures of appellant, trial counsel, the prosecutor, and the trial judge. Thus, we conclude appellant has not shown error. Moreover, without considering the written confessions, the record shows sufficient evidence to support appellant's pleas. Appellant testified he committed the burglaries and admitted he was pleading guilty because he was guilty. See Dinnery, 592 S.W.2d at 353. Thus, we overrule appellant's sole point of error in the burglary cases. We affirm the trial court's judgments.