Opinion
23-CV-209-DC-RCG
06-25-2024
JOR'DEA-DRAEL PATTERSON, Plaintiff, v. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL CHILD SUPPORT DIVISION, et al., Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
RONALD C. GRIFFIN, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
BEFORE THE COURT is Defendants the Attorney General Child Support Division, Donna Howarton, Jessica Magnus, Chris Cromwell, Amber Ortiz, Estela Castillo, and Veronica Tavarez's Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 8). This case is before the Court through a Standing Order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Appendix C of the Local Court Rules for the Assignment of Duties to United States Magistrate Judges. After due consideration, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants the Attorney General Child Support Division, Donna Howarton, Jessica Magnus, Chris Cromwell, Amber Ortiz, Estela Castillo, and Veronica Tavarez's Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED. (Doc. 8).
All page number citations are to CM/ECF generated pagination unless otherwise noted.
I. Background
On December 27, 2023, Plaintiff Jor'Dea-Drael Patterson (“Plaintiff”) filed his Original Complaint against the Office of the Attorney General Child Support Division (“OAG”), Donna Howarton, Jessica Magnus, Chris Cromwell, Amber Ortiz, Estela Castillo, and Veronica Tavarez (collectively, “Defendants”). (Doc. 1). Plaintiff then filed an Amended Complaint on January 5, 2024. (Doc. 4).
Plaintiff asserts causes of action for: (1) Coercion under 42 U.S.C. § 3617 Coercion; (2) Fraud under 18 U.S.C. Chapter 47; (3) Copyright Infringement under 17 U.S.C. § 501; (4) False or Misleading Representations under 15 U.S.C. § 1692e; (5) Malfeasance in Office under 18 U.S.C. § 33; (6) Embezzlement and Theft under 18 U.S.C. § 641; (7) Conspiracy to Commit Fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 371; and (8) Violations of Oaths of Office under 18 U.S.C. § 1918. Id. at 2. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint then concludes by requesting relief in the form of $717,240,000.00 in damages. Id.
On February 8, 2024, Defendants filed the instant Motion to Dismiss arguing dismissal of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint is proper on the basis of insufficient service of process, sovereign immunity, Plaintiff's lack of standing, and Plaintiff's failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. (Doc. 8). Plaintiff filed his Response in Opposition on February 14, 2024. (Doc. 11). Defendants filed their Reply on February 21, 2024. (Doc. 14). Thus, the instant Motion is fully briefed and ripe for disposition.
II. Standard of Review
A. Rule 12(b)(1)
Dismissal is proper under Rule 12(b)(1) “when the court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case.” Home Builders Ass'n of Miss., Inc. v. City of Madison, 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1998). Typically, in determining whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, “[c]ourts must strictly construe all waivers of the federal government's sovereign immunity, [resolving] all ambiguities in favor of the sovereign.” Linkous v. United States, 142 F.3d 271, 275 (5th Cir. 1998).
In ruling on a motion under Rule 12(b)(1), the Court “has the power to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on any one of three separate bases: (1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed facts.” Freeman v. United States, 556 F.3d 326, 334 (5th Cir. 2009). “Because at issue in a factual 12(b)(1) motion is the trial court's jurisdiction-its very power to hear the case-there is substantial authority that the trial court is free to weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as to the existence of its power to hear the case.” Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 412-13 (5th Cir. 1981). In short, no presumptive truthfulness attaches to a plaintiff's allegations, and the existence of disputed material facts will not preclude the trial court from evaluating for itself the merits of jurisdictional claims. Id. at 413.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) authorizes dismissal of a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a court must “accept the complaint's well-pleaded facts as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Johnson v. Johnson, 385 F.3d 503, 529 (5th Cir. 2004). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 requires that a pleading contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). Thus, to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A complaint need not include detailed facts to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-56. However, a plaintiff must do more than recite the formulaic elements of a cause of action. See id. at 556-57. Additionally, the Court is not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation in the complaint. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Thus, although all reasonable inferences will be resolved in favor of the plaintiff, the plaintiff must plead “specific facts, not mere conclusory allegations.” Tuchman v. DSC Commc'ns Corp., 14 F.3d 1061, 1067 (5th Cir. 1994).
III. Discussion
Here, Defendants advance four arguments for dismissing Plaintiff's claims: (1) Plaintiff failed to sufficiently serve any Defendant; (2) Plaintiff's claims are barred by sovereign immunity; (3) Plaintiff lacks standing; and (4) Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. (Doc. 8 at 3-10). The Court addresses Defendants' arguments below, as necessary.
A. Sovereign Immunity Bars Plaintiff's Claims
Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), Defendants argue Plaintiff's claims against OAG and the Individual Defendants in their official capacities are barred by sovereign immunity. As for OAG, “The Office of the Attorney General is an arm of the state entitled to sovereign immunity.” (Doc. 8 at 5) (quoting Walker v. Texas, Off. of Atty. Gen., 217 F.Supp.2d 776, 779 (E.D. Tex. 2002). Then, as to the Individual Defendants, because they are undisputedly employees of OAG, they are “entitled to sovereign immunity in their official capacities.” Id. The Court agrees.
It is unclear whether the Individual Defendants are sued in their individual or official capacities, but as Plaintiff is pro se, the Court analyzes both.
“When a Rule 12(b)(1) motion is filed in conjunction with other Rule 12 motions, the court should consider the Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack before addressing any attack on the merits.” Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001). Dismissal is appropriate when a plaintiff fails to establish subject matter jurisdiction. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1).
“The Eleventh Amendment declares there is no ‘Judicial power of the United States' over a suit ‘against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.' ” Duncan v. Univ. of Tex. Health Science Ctr. at Hous., 469 Fed.Appx. 364, 366 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting U.S. CONST. AMEND. XI). “Accordingly, absent a waiver or valid abrogation, ‘federal courts may not entertain a private person's suit against a State.' ” Chhim v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 2016 WL 154142, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 11, 2016) (quoting Va. Off. for Prot. & Advoc. v. Stewart, 563 U.S. 247, 248 (2011)). “It is well-established that sovereign immunity applies not only to actions where a state is actually named as a defendant, but also to ‘certain actions against state agents and state instrumentalities.' ” Id. (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429 (1997)). As acknowledged above, “[t]he Office of the Attorney General is an arm of the state entitled to sovereign immunity.” Walker, 217 F.Supp.2d at 779; see also Gordon v. Tex. Off. of Att'y Gen. Child Support Div., No. 3:23-CV-2088-L-BK, 2024 WL 1076822, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 20, 2024) (“Eleventh Amendment immunity extends to a state agency or political entity that effectively acts as an “alter ego” or an “arm” of the state, such as the OAG”) (citations omitted)). Sovereign immunity, as imparted by the Eleventh Amendment, deprives the court of jurisdiction. Williams ex rel. J.E. v. Reeves, 954 F.3d 729, 735 (5th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted).
Thus, Plaintiff cannot bring his claims against Defendants unless his claims fall within one of the three recognized exceptions to sovereign immunity: “suits seek[ing] injunctive or declaratory relief against state officials under Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, (1908); a state's waiver of immunity, Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 267 (1997); or Congress's abrogation of state immunity via Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 364 (2001).” Duncan, 469 Fed.Appx. at 366 (parallel citations omitted). Here, Plaintiff's does not plead, nor does it appear that his claims implicate any of the three exceptions. Similarly, to the extent that Plaintiff brings claims against the Individual Defendants in their official capacities, “the Individual Defendants are entitled to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity because ‘a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official's office.' ” Allen v. Benson, 691 F.Supp.3d 746, 756 (E.D. Tex. 2023) (quoting Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989)).
Accordingly, OAG and the Individual Defendants in their official capacities are entitled to sovereign immunity with regard to Plaintiff's claims and the Court RECOMMENDS Plaintiff's claims against OAG and the Individual Defendants in their official capacities be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for lack of jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1). B. Plaintiff's Claims are Barred by Qualified Immunity
Because the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction as to the OAG and the Individual Defendants in their official capacities, Defendant's remaining arguments regarding dismissal of those claims are not addressed. See Gordon, 2024 WL 1076822, at *1.
In the event Plaintiff pleads his claims against the Individual Defendants in their individual capacities, qualified immunity is implicated. (See generally Doc. 4). “Government officials who perform discretionary functions are entitled to the defense of qualified immunity, which shields them from suit as well as liability for civil damages, if their conduct does not violate ‘clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.' ” Bradyn S. v. Waxahachie Indep. Sch. Dist., 407 F.Supp.3d 612, 622 (N.D. Tex. 2019) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense that must be pled. Id. (citing Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980)). The Individual Defendants raised the defense in the instant Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 8 at 9).
After a defendant asserts qualified immunity, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to “rebut this defense by establishing that the official's allegedly wrongful conduct violated clearly established law.” See Pierce v. Smith, 117 F.3d 866, 871-72 (5th Cir. 1997) (quoting Salas v. Carpenter, 980 F.2d 299, 306 (5th Cir. 1992)). The Fifth Circuit does not require that “an official demonstrate that he did not violate clearly established federal rights.” Id. (citing Salas, 980 F.2d at 306). That burden falls solely on the plaintiff.
Courts apply a two-part inquiry when deciding whether an official is entitled to qualified immunity. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). The court must decide “whether the facts alleged or shown are sufficient to make out a violation of a constitutional or federal statutory right.” Id. If there was no violation, no further inquiry is necessary. Id. However, if the plaintiff sufficiently pleads a constitutional violation, the court must then decide “whether the right at issue was clearly established at the time of the government official's alleged misconduct.” Bradyn S., 407 F.Supp.3d at 622-23 (citing Saucier, 544 U.S. at 201). Under Pearson v. Callahan, district courts are allowed to exercise their discretion “in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.” 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). The second prong of the two-part inquiry involves two questions. See Bradyn S., 407 F.Supp.3d at 623 (citations omitted). The first inquiry is “whether the allegedly violated constitutional right[] [was] clearly established at the time of the incident.” Id. (citations omitted) (alterations in original). If so, the second inquiry is “whether the conduct of the defendant[] [official] was objectively unreasonable in light of that then clearly established law.” Id. (citations omitted) (alterations in original).
When considering a qualified immunity defense raised in the context of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court must decide whether “the plaintiff's pleadings assert facts which, if true, would overcome the defense of qualified immunity.” See Backe v. LeBlanc, 691 F.3d 645, 648 (5th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). “Thus, a plaintiff seeking to overcome qualified immunity must plead specific facts that both allow the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the harm he has alleged and that defeat a qualified immunity defense with equal specificity.” Id. “After the district court finds a plaintiff has so pled, if the court remains ‘unable to rule on the immunity defense without further clarification of the facts,' it may issue a discovery order ‘narrowly tailored to uncover only those facts needed to rule on the immunity claim.' ” Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Lion Boulos v. Wilson, 834 F.2d 504, 506 (5th Cir. 1987)). “For there to be liability under [§] 1983, a defendant must have been personally involved in the conduct causing a deprivation of constitutional rights, or there must be a causal connection between the actions of that person and the constitutional right sought to be redressed.” King v. Louisiana, 294 Fed.Appx. 77, 83 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (citing Lozano v. Smith, 718 F.2d 756, 768 (5th Cir. 1983)).
Here, the allegations against the Individual Defendants fail to overcome qualified immunity. Plaintiff's pleaded facts do not suggest any of the Individual Defendants was personally involved in any alleged constitutional deprivations, that their conduct was objectively unreasonable, or even specify which constitutional rights they allegedly violated. In fact, Plaintiff's Complaint is completely devoid of any facts showing how any of the Individual Defendants harmed Plaintiff or were involved in any of the claims he alleges. In sum, there are no allegations to overcome the Individual Defendants' claim of qualified immunity.
Thus, the Court RECOMMENDS Plaintiff's claims against the Individual Defendants in their individual capacities be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE, as they are barred by qualified immunity.
C. Leave to Amend
Ordinarily, a pro se plaintiff should be granted leave to amend his complaint before dismissal. Brewster v. Dretke, 587 F.3d 764, 767-68 (5th Cir. 2009). But leave is not required “if the plaintiff has already pleaded his best case.” Id. Here, no further amendment can overcome the sovereign immunity bar as to the OAG and Individual Defendants in their individual capacities. The same is true for qualified immunity. Thus, granting additional leave to amend would be futile and only cause needless delay.
IV. Recommendation
For the foregoing reasons, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED and Plaintiff's claims be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. (Doc. 8).
Instructions for Service and Notice of Right to Appeal/Object
In the event that a party has not been served by the Clerk with this Report and Recommendation electronically, pursuant to the CM/ECF procedures of this District, the Clerk is ORDERED to mail such party a copy of this Report and Recommendation by certified mail. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), any party who desires to object to this report must serve and file written objections within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy. A party filing objections must specifically identify those findings, conclusions, or recommendations to which objections are being made; the District Judge need not consider frivolous, conclusive, or general objections. Such party shall file the objections with the Clerk of the Court and serve the objections on all other parties. A party's failure to file such objections to the proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendations contained in this report shall bar the party from a de novo determination by the District Judge. Additionally, a party's failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendations contained in this report within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy shall bar that party, except upon grounds of plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the District Judge. Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428-29 (5th Cir. 1996).