Maryland evidentiary law quite clearly permits the exclusion of expert testimony on subjects that are comprehensible by a jury of average intelligence. Patterson v. City of Baltimore, 130 Md. 645, 101 A. 589 (1917). As the Supreme Court, in Paris, supra, has held that expert testimony is not necessary in an obscenity case, the circuit court's exclusion of Iman's expert testimony was proper.

The availability of the property for a particular use, contributing to its market value, is not to be ignored merely because it has not in fact been applied to that use. The valuation for condemnation purposes must disregard the effect of the public project, for which the property is acquired, but must take into consideration all the uses to which it is capable of being applied at the time of the appropriation and which affect its marketability. Consolidated G.E.L. P. Co. v. Baltimore, 130 Md. 20; Baltimore v. Carroll, 128 Md. 73; Brack v. Baltimore, 125 Md. 378; 128 Md. 437; Baltimore v. Garrett, 120 Md. 613; Callaway v. Hubner, 99 Md. 529; Baltimore v. Smith, 80 Md. 458; Patterson v. Baltimore, 130 Md. 645."

Market value is defined as the price which an owner willing but not obliged to sell would accept for the property and which a buyer willing but not obliged to buy would pay therefor. 20 C.J. 727; 10 R.C.L. 128, 153; Realty Imp. Co. v. Consolidated Gas etc. Co., 156 Md. 581, 587, 144 A. 710; Baltimore City v. Garrett, 120 Md. 608, 87 A. 1057; Baltimore City v. Megary, 122 Md. 20, 89 A. 331; Patterson v. Mayor and City Council, 124 Md. 153, 160, 91 A. 966; Brack v. Mayor and City Council, 125 Md. 378, 93 A. 994; Brack v. Mayor and City Council, 128 Md. 430, 97 A. 548; Consolidated Gas Co. v. Mayor and City Council, 130 Md. 20, 99 A. 968; Patterson v. Mayor and City Council, 130 Md. 645, 101 A. 589. Where, as in this case, the size and shape of the land taken preclude the theory that it has any market value, the owner is entitled to be awarded its actual value, and in such a case, where the part so taken is a segment of a larger tract, the fairest and indeed the only method of determining the compensation to be awarded the landowner is to compare the fair market value of the whole tract before the taking with the fair market value of the part remaining after the taking, allowing to the owner, however, in any event, as an irreducible minimum, the value of the part taken.

As the Court below had no jurisdiction to grant the relief prayed in the petitions of the Maryland Trust Company and the Safe Deposit and Trust Company of Baltimore, the evidence offered by the city to prove the value of the lots for which it was awarded $1.00 damages, and the cost of constructing the tubes in Jones' Falls was clearly inadmissible. And that is so regardless of the question whether the city, not having appealed within the time allowed from the award of the Commissioners, can now dispute the correctness of said awards ( Timanus v. M. C.C. of Baltimore, 128 Md. 111), and without regard to the question whether evidence of the cost of constructing concrete tubes of the kind mentioned would be admissible, in any state of the proceedings, where a street, etc., is laid out, opened, etc., by the Commissioners for Opening Streets under section 175 of the City Charter of 1898. Patterson v. M. C.C. of Baltimore, 130 Md. 645. It follows from what has been said that in No. 35 Appeals, the appeal of the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, the order of the Court below, to the extent that it granted the relief prayed by the Maryland Trust Company, and attempts to limit the right to a reduction of the benefit assessments to those who have appealed and have not paid their assessments, must be reversed, and the petition of the Maryland Trust Company of February 6th, 1919, must be dismissed.

It is provided by the Act of 1912, Chapter 32 (Revised Edition of the City Charter, 1915, section 172) that the Commissioners for Opening Streets "shall be charged with the duty of opening, extending, widening, straightening, and, if the ordinance so provides, grading, or closing any street, lane, alley, or part thereof, situated in Baltimore City whenever the same shall have been directed by ordinance to be done, and shall perform such other duties as the Mayor and City Council may, by ordinance, prescribe." It was held in Patterson v. Mayor, etc., of Baltimore, 130 Md. 645, that prior to the passage of that Act "there was no provision in the Charter for an ordinance to include the opening and grading of a street but it was first intended to require the City to first condemn the land for the opening (if it was not dedicated or otherwise acquired), and then provide for the grading, paving and curbing." Then after noting the changes and exceptions made by the Act of 1912, CHIEF JUDGE BOYD said: "But regardless of that it is clear that the Legislature itself made a distinction between opening and grading, paving or curbing, and therefore it is difficult to see how an ordinance for opening a street can be construed to include the grading, paving or curbing. * * * Our examination of the authorities strengthens the views we have on the subject.

The availability of the property for a particular use, contributing to its market value, is not to be ignored merely because it has not in fact been applied to that use. The valuation for condemnation purposes must disregard the effect of the public project, for which the property is acquired, but must take into consideration all the uses to which it is capable of being applied at the time of the appropriation and which affect its marketability. Consolidated G.E.L. P. Co. v. Baltimore, 130 Md. 20; Baltimore v. Carroll, 128 Md. 73; Brack v. Baltimore, 125 Md. 378; 128 Md. 437; Baltimore v. Garrett, 120 Md. 613; Callaway v. Hubner, 99 Md. 529; Baltimore v. Smith, 80 Md. 458; Patterson v. Baltimore, 130 Md. 645. Applying the principles just stated to the present case we think the prayer we have quoted should have been granted.