Opinion
3:23-cv-00961-SB
09-20-2023
STEVEN PATTERSON, Plaintiff, v. PATRICK HENRY; KEVIN TILLSMAN; SUSAN SNELL; and JOHN O'BRIEN, Defendants.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION
HON. STACIE F. BECKERMAN, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
Plaintiff Steven Patterson (“Patterson”), a self-represented litigant, filed this action against Defendants Kevin Tillsman, Susan Snell, John O'Brien, and Multnomah County Circuit Court Judge Patrick Henry (“Judge Henry”), alleging claims of discrimination, breach of contract, and violations of the First and Seventh Amendments. Judge Henry moves to dismiss Patterson's claims against him, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 11.)
The parties have not consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636. For the reasons that follow, the Court recommends that the district judge grant Judge Henry's motion to dismiss.
BACKGROUND
The estate of Patterson's grandmother, Virla Mae Thompson, is the subject of an ongoing probate proceeding in Multnomah County Circuit Court. (See Compl. at 4, ECF No. 1.) Patterson alleges that the personal representatives in the probate proceeding, Defendants Susan Snell and John O'Brien, engaged in wrongful acts. (Id. at 1.) The state probate docket reflects that Judge Henry presided over the proceeding and issued orders relating to the management of the estate and the appointment of personal representatives. Patterson names Judge Henry in the caption of his complaint but does not include any specific factual allegations against him. (See id. at 1-12.)
The Court takes judicial notice of the docket and filings in the state probate proceeding, In re: Virla Mae Thompson, No. 15PB03276 (Multnomah Cnty. Cir. Ct. Aug. 29, 2023). Federal Rule of Evidence 201 provides that a court may take judicial notice “on its own” of “a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute because it: (1) is generally known within the trial court's territorial jurisdiction; or (2) can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” FED. R. EVID. 201(b)-(c). Under this rule, courts may take judicial notice of “undisputed matters of public record,” but may not take judicial notice of “disputed facts stated in public records.” Lee v. City of L.A., 250 F.3d 668, 690 (9th Cir. 2001).
LEGAL STANDARDS
To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff's “complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a probability requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Mashiri v. Epsten Grinnell & Howell, 845 F.3d 984, 988 (9th Cir. 2017) (simplified).
DISCUSSION
Judge Henry moves to dismiss Patterson's claims on the ground that Patterson fails to state a plausible claim for relief against him, and asks the Court to dismiss the claims with prejudice because he is entitled to judicial immunity. (Def.'s Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 11.) As explained below, the Court recommends that the district judge grant Judge Henry's motion to dismiss and dismiss any claims against Judge Henry with prejudice.
I. FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM
Judge Henry moves to dismiss Patterson's claims against him because Patterson does not include any factual allegations in his complaint regarding Judge Henry and therefore fails to state a plausible claim for relief. (Def.'s Mot. Dismiss at 4.) The Court agrees that in the absence of any specific factual allegations in the complaint regarding Judge Henry, Patterson has failed to state a plausible claim for relief. SeeIqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556)). Accordingly, the Court recommends that the district judge grant Judge Henry's motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).
II. DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE
Judge Henry asks the Court to dismiss Patterson's claims with prejudice because amending the complaint to attempt to state a claim against Judge Henry would be futile. (Def.'s Mot. Dismiss at 5-6.) Specifically, Judge Henry argues that Patterson cannot state a claim against him because he is immune from liability for his judicial acts. (Id.) The Court agrees.
Judge Henry argues that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), but the Ninth Circuit typically evaluates judicial immunity under Rule 12(b)(6). See LaTulippe v.Harder, 574 F.Supp.3d 870, 879 n.3 (D. Or. 2021) (“Defendants styled their second motion to dismiss as a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1), but judicial immunity is properly considered under Rule 12(b)(6), as a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.” (citing Mullis v. U.S. Bankr. Ct. for Dist. of Nev., 828 F.2d 1385, 1388 (9th Cir. 1987) and 5B Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1350 (3d ed.))).
“Under Ninth Circuit case law, district courts are only required to grant leave to amend if a complaint can possibly be saved.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). “If judicial and prosecutorial immunity bar recovery, no amendment could cure the deficiency and the action [is] properly terminated on a motion to dismiss.” Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1986).
“A judge is absolutely immune from liability for his judicial acts even if his exercise of authority is flawed by the commission of grave procedural errors.” Stump v Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 359 (1978). “The relevant cases demonstrate that the factors determining whether an act by a judge is a ‘judicial' one relate to the nature of the act itself, i. e., whether it is a function normally performed by a judge, and to the expectations of the parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity.” Id. at 362; see also Langston v. Orr, 569 Fed.Appx. 487, 488 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that “[t]he district court properly dismissed [the self-represented plaintiff's] claims against [the defendant judge] in his individual capacity on the basis of judicial immunity because [the plaintiff] failed to allege facts showing that [the judge] took nonjudicial actions against him, or that [the judge's] judicial actions were taken in complete absence of all jurisdiction” (citing, inter alia, Ashelman, 793 F.2d at 1075-76, 1078)).
Although Patterson does not include any specific factual allegations against Judge Henry in his complaint, the fact that Judge Henry presided over the probate action at issue here necessarily means that Judge Henry's relevant conduct was judicial in nature. In his response to Judge Henry's motion to dismiss, Patterson acknowledges that he is challenging the actions Judge Henry took in his judicial capacity. (See Pl.'s Resp. Def.'s Mot. Dismiss at 1, ECF No. 14, referencing Judge Henry's alleged failure to issue certain “order[s]” in the probate action and his alleged failure adequately to supervise the estate's personal representatives). Because Judge Henry's only relevant conduct at issue in this action was judicial in nature, Judge Henry is entitled to judicial immunity from suit and any amendment to Patterson's complaint would be futile. See, e.g., McCoy v. Uale, No. 21-16877, 2022 WL 10382922, at *1 (9th Cir. Oct. 18, 2022) (affirming dismissal of claims against judge without leave to amend because “all of [the judge's] relevant conduct was judicial in nature and therefore covered by his judicial immunity” (citing Lund v. Cowan, 5 F.4th 964, 971 (9th Cir. 2021))).
Although it is unclear what type of relief Patterson is seeking from Judge Henry, courts have recognized that judicial immunity applies to claims for money damages as well as claims for equitable relief. See, e.g., Alvarez Acuna v. Fireside Thrift Co., No. CV-05-3876-PHX-JAT, 2006 WL 1312528, at *5 (D. Ariz. May 11, 2006) (“[I]f a defendant can successfully assert judicial immunity from damages, that immunity will also bar declaratory and injunctive relief. In other words, judicial immunity is not limited to immunity from damages, it also extends to actions for declaratory, injunctive, and other equitable relief.” (citing Mullis, 828 F.2d at 1394)).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, the Court recommends that the district judge GRANT Judge Henry's motion to dismiss (ECF No. 11), and dismiss Patterson's claims against Judge Henry with prejudice.
SCHEDULING ORDER
The Court will refer its Findings and Recommendation to a district judge. Objections, if any, are due within fourteen (14) days from service of the Findings and Recommendation. If no objections are filed, the Findings and Recommendation will go under advisement on that date. If objections are filed, a response is due within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of the objections. When the response is due or filed, whichever date is earlier, the Findings and
Recommendation will go under advisement.