Opinion
2013-05-3
In the Matter of Emmanuel PATTERSON, Petitioner–Respondent, v. Andrea W. EVANS, Chairwoman, New York State Division of Parole, and Malcolm R. Cully, Superintendent, Collins Correctional Facility, Respondents–Appellants.
Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Victor Paladino of Counsel), for Respondents–Appellants. Emmanuel Patterson, Petitioner–Respondent Pro Se.
Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Victor Paladino of Counsel), for Respondents–Appellants. Emmanuel Patterson, Petitioner–Respondent Pro Se.
PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., PERADOTTO, CARNI, LINDLEY, AND WHALEN, JJ.
MEMORANDUM:
Petitioner commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding seeking to vacate the determination of the New York State Division of Parole (Board) denying his release to parole supervision. Respondents appeal from a judgment granting the petition and directing a de novo hearing before a different panel. We reverse the judgment and dismiss the petition.
“It is well settled that parole release decisions are discretionary and will not be disturbed so long as the Board complied with the statutory requirements enumerated in Executive Law § 259–i” ( Matter of Gssime v. New York State Div. of Parole, 84 A.D.3d 1630, 1631, 923 N.Y.S.2d 307,lv. dismissed17 N.Y.3d 847, 930 N.Y.S.2d 542, 954 N.E.2d 1168;see Matter of Johnson v. New York State Div. of Parole, 65 A.D.3d 838, 839, 884 N.Y.S.2d 545;see generally Matter of King v. New York State Div. of Parole, 83 N.Y.2d 788, 790–791, 610 N.Y.S.2d 954, 632 N.E.2d 1277). The Board is “not required to give equal weight to each of the statutory factors” but, rather, may “place[ ] greater emphasis on the severity of the crimes than on the other statutory factors” ( Matter of MacKenzie v. Evans, 95 A.D.3d 1613, 1614, 945 N.Y.S.2d 471,lv. denied19 N.Y.3d 815, 2012 WL 5258825;see Matter of Huntley v. Evans, 77 A.D.3d 945, 947, 910 N.Y.S.2d 112). Where parole is denied, the inmate must be informed in writing of “the factors and reasons for such denial of parole” (§ 259–i[2][a][i] ). “Judicial intervention is warranted only when there is a ‘showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety’ ” ( Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 476, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 741 N.E.2d 501;see Matter of Johnson v. Dennison, 48 A.D.3d 1082, 1083, 849 N.Y.S.2d 741;Matter of Gaston v. Berbary, 16 A.D.3d 1158, 1159, 791 N.Y.S.2d 781).
Here, we conclude upon our review of the hearing transcript and the Board's written decision that the Board considered the required statutory factors and adequately set forth its reasons for denying petitioner's application for release ( see Matter of Siao–Pao v. Dennison, 11 N.Y.3d 777, 778, 866 N.Y.S.2d 602, 896 N.E.2d 87,rearg. denied11 N.Y.3d 885, 873 N.Y.S.2d 258, 901 N.E.2d 751;Matter of Galbreith v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 58 A.D.3d 731, 732, 871 N.Y.S.2d 696;Matter of Romer v. Dennison, 24 A.D.3d 866, 868, 804 N.Y.S.2d 872,lv. denied6 N.Y.3d 706, 812 N.Y.S.2d 36, 845 N.E.2d 468). We further conclude that the Board's determination does not exhibit “ ‘irrationality bordering on impropriety’ ” ( Silmon, 95 N.Y.2d at 476, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 741 N.E.2d 501).
It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously reversed on the law without costs and the petition is dismissed.