Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:99-CV-2443-X
November 1, 2001
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court are Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed September 10, 2001; Plaintiff's Response, filed October 9, 2001; and, Defendant's Reply, filed October 15, 2001. For the reasons stated below, the Motion is GRANTED and Plaintiff's claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff David Patt, an African American, complains of racial discrimination in connection with his termination from Sweetheart Cup Co. ("Sweetheart") on July 23, 1999. Sweetheart Cup hired Plaintiff in 1991 in the unloading department as a clamp truck driver. Compl. ¶ 5. In consideration of his employment, Plaintiff agreed to conform to Sweetheart's rules and regulations. Plaintiff's Deposition at 11-19 [hereinafter "PI. Dep. ___"]. These rules and regulations, included in the employee handbook, specifically prohibit horseplay, fighting, disorderly conduct, and interference with the work or production of other employees. Id. They also provide that failure to comply with the Rules will result in disciplinary action up to and including discharge. Id.On July 21, 1999, Plaintiff became involved in an confrontation with Chris Gray, a fellow African-American employee. Id. at 20. Plaintiff approached Mr. Gray in his clamp truck on the warehouse floor. Id. at 22. Mr. Gray was working in the aisle, and therefore blocked Plaintiff's access through part of the warehouse. Id. Plaintiff, frustrated by the obstruction, ordered Mr. Gray to remove the materials from the aisle so that he could pass. Id. In response, Mr. Gray asked Plaintiff to wait, and offered to move the materials from the aisle after he had finished working with them. Id. at 30. Apparently unhappy with the delay, Plaintiff cursed Mr. Gray, mounted Mr. Gray's forklift, and attempted to move the materials out of the aisle himself. Id. at 27-29, 30, 39.
In addition to the cursing, Mr. Gray alleged that Plaintiff threatened him with physical violence. According to Mr. Gray, Plaintiff offered to "come off this lift and kick [Mr. Gray's] mother fucking ass." Ex. 3. Mr. Gray further alleged that Plaintiff hit him on the leg and foot with the forks of the lift. Id. Plaintiff denies striking Mr. Gray with the lift, and denies making the threatening statement, claiming that "he don't [sic] use that type of language." PI. Dep. 48. He admits, however, being angry and ordering Mr. Gray "to move the goddamn pallet out of the way." Id. at 27, 39; Ex. 4. The Court finds little material difference between the alleged threatening remarks, but because all doubts must be resolved in favor of the non-moving party, Burch v. City of Nacadoches, 174 F.3d 615, 619 (5th Cir. 1999), the Court will consider only those remarks Plaintiff admits having said.
Immediately after the confrontation, Mr. Gray complained to his supervisor, Mark Gorn, who, in turn, asked Plaintiff to describe in writing his version of what had happened. Id. at 31. Later that day, Mr. Gorn suspended Plaintiff. Id. at 33. After an internal review, Sweetheart discharged Plaintiff on July 23, 1999. Id. at 55.
On July 29, 1999, Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC, alleging that he "was suspended and discharged after an employee accused [Plaintiff] of threaten [sic] him." Plaintiff's Deposition Exhibit 7 [hereinafter "Ex. ___"]. Plaintiff further alleged that the earliest date of discrimination occurred on July 21, 1999 and the latest date on July 23, 1999. Id. The EEOC dismissed Plaintiff's charge and issued a right to sue letter on July 30, 1999. Ex. 8. Plaintiff filed suit in this Court on October 26, 1999.
Plaintiff's Original Complaint incorrectly identifies an earlier incident involving his supervisor, Mr. Gorn, as the confrontation that ultimately resulted in his discharge on July 23, 1999, and made the basis of Plaintiff's EEOC charge. Compl. ¶ 6. In his deposition, however, Plaintiff acknowledged the error in the Complaint, and now acknowledges that the confrontation with Mr. Gray represents the sole basis for his EEOC charge. PI. Dep. 185-87.
II. ANALYSIS A. Grounds for Summary Judgment
The Defendant moves for summary judgement on all of Plaintiffs claims. First, the defendant contends that Plaintiff's race discrimination claims fail as a matter of law because Plaintiff did not provide sufficient evidence to meet his prima facie case. Defendant further argues that even had Plaintiff met his prima facie case, the Plaintiff produced no evidence suggesting that the Defendant's proffered reason for discharge was a pretext for discrimination. Finally, Defendant contends that Plaintiff's all other remaining claims fail as a matter of law because Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.B. Summary Judgment Standard
FED R. CIV. P. 56(c) provides that summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-24, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Once the movant has met its burden of showing that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that judgment as a matter of law is proper, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to establish with significant probative evidence that a genuine issue of material fact exists. See Kansa Reins. Co. v. Congressional Mortgage Corp. of Texas, 20 F.3d 1362, 1371 (5th Cir. 1994). The nonmovant may not rest upon the pleadings but must identify specific facts establishing that a genuine issue of material fact exists for trial. See Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994). The nonmovant "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). "A dispute about a material fact is `genuine' if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Bodenheimer v. PPG Indus., Inc., 5 F.3d 955, 956 (5th Cir. 1993) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). "In making its determination, the court must draw all justifiable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party." Id. (citation omitted).
1. Race Discrimination
Title VII makes it an unlawful employment practice for an employer "to discharge any individual . . . because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (West 1994). Absent direct evidence of discrimination based on race, the Court will apply the framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 35 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), and subsequent cases, in deciding Title VII race discrimination cases. Under that framework, the Plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000). Once the Plaintiff establishes his prima facie case, the burden of production shifts to the defendant. The Defendant must then provide some legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the employee's discharge. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. Finally, if the defendant carries its burden, the "mandatory inference of discrimination" created by Plaintiff's prima facie case, Texas Dep't. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 n. 10, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981), "drops out of the picture" and the fact finder must "decide the ultimate question: whether [the] Plaintiff has proven [intentional discrimination]" St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511-12, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993).In making this showing, the Plaintiff may rely on evidence that the employer's proffered reason for Plaintiff's discharge was a pretext for discrimination. "A prima facie case and sufficient evidence to reject the employer's explanation" may permit a trier of fact to infer that the employer intentionally discriminated, and may therefore prevent summary judgment. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 148. An employer may nevertheless be entitled to summary judgment, however, "if the Plaintiff create[s] only a weak issue of fact as to whether the employer's reason was untrue and there was abundant and uncontroverted independent evidence that no discrimination occurred." Id. According to Reeves, whether summary judgment is appropriate depends on a number of factors, including "the strength of Plaintiff's prima facie case, the probative value of the proof that the employer's explanation is false and any other evidence that supports the employer's case and that may be properly considered." Id. at 148-49.
In this case, Plaintiff fails to establish a prima facie case for race discrimination. A Title VII Plaintiff alleging discriminatory discharge must prove (1) that he is a member of a protected group, (2) that he was qualified for the job, (3) that he was discharged from the position, and (4) that he was replaced by someone outside of the protected class. See Byers v. Dallas Morning News, Inc., 209 F.3d 419, 426 (5th Cir. 2000). Here, Plaintiff indisputably establishes the first three elements of his prima facie case. Plaintiff plainly belongs to a protected group, and neither party disputes that he was qualified for the job, or that he was discharged from his position. The Plaintiff does, however, fail to produce competent summary judgment evidence that establishes the fourth element of his prima facie case. Nowhere in the record does Plaintiff indicate that he was replaced by someone outside of the protected class or that the position remained vacant after his discharge. The Court is mindful that only a very minimal showing is required for Plaintiff to establish his prima facie case. See Bauer v. Albemarle Corp., 169 F.3d 962, 967 (5th Cir. 1999). Nevertheless, Plaintiff fails to satisfy even this minimal showing. Because Plaintiff has not established the fourth element of his prima facie case, Sweetheart is entitled to summary judgment on the discriminatory discharge claim.
If this were not enough, it is also clear that Sweetheart articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for Plaintiff's discharge. After considering each employee's version of the events on July 21, 1999, the defendant reasonably concluded that Plaintiff was the initial aggressor, and discharged him for violating company policy. In his deposition testimony and in the statement he filed on the day of the confrontation, Plaintiff admits confronting Mr. Gray, and at the very least, verbally abusing him. Nowhere does Plaintiff present any evidence, except for his own conclusory allegations, that would create a material issue of disputed fact as to whether defendant's explanation for the discharge is false. See Auguster v. Vermilion Parish School Board, 249 F.3d 400, 403 (5th Cir. 2001) (An employee's "subjective belief of discrimination alone is not sufficient to warrant judicial relief") (internal citations omitted).
Instead, Plaintiff offers as evidence of pretext numerous incidents of disparate treatment that he alleges ultimately led to his suspension and discharge. Specifically, Plaintiff claims the disparate treatment included, inter alia, being subjected to abusive behavior by his supervisors, PI. Dep. 32, being held to a higher standard of scrutiny, Id. at 130-33, being required to attend certain classes, Id. at 97, and not being permitted to take time off for breaks, Id. at 124-27. Plaintiff further alleges that this pattern of disparate treatment began after he voiced his opposition to various discriminatory conduct taken against him by his supervisors. Id. at 84-85, 106. If taken as true, these allegations might provide evidence sufficient to survive summary judgment on claims for disparate treatment or retaliation. With respect to Plaintiffs discharge claim, however, these allegations do not establish pretext, particularly because Plaintiff admits having participated in the confrontation. Without providing substantial evidence that Sweetheart's legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for discharge is false, the Plaintiff cannot seriously contend that his participation in the confrontation was not the sole reason for his discharge. See Auguster, 249 F.3d at 403-04 (finding Plaintiff's allegations of disparate treatment not sufficient evidence of pretext after Plaintiff was terminated for his use of corporeal punishment in the classroom).
In fact, Plaintiff uses this evidence to establish additional claims under Title VII for disparate treatment and retaliation. For the reasons stated below, however, these claims fail because Plaintiff failed to present these claims in his EEOC charge.
2. Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies
As noted above, Plaintiff further claims that Defendant discriminated against him regarding the terms and conditions of his employment, and in retaliation for his opposition to various discriminatory practices by Sweetheart and its supervisors. These claims fail as a matter of law because Plaintiff did not exhaust his administrative remedies.
As a general rule, a Title VII Plaintiff may not bring claims in a lawsuit that were not included within the EEOC charge. See Auston v. Schubnell, 116 F.3d 251, 254 (5th Cir. 1997) (barring retaliation claim because Plaintiff "did not check the retaliation box on the charge form, nor did his account of the facts include any reference at all to retaliatory conduct"). In the Fifth Circuit, a Title VII complaint may properly include only those claims of discrimination that are reasonably related to or could be expected to grow out of an investigation of the allegations contained in the EEOC charge. See Thomas v. Texas Department of Criminal Justice, 220 F.3d 389, 395 (5th Cir. 2000) (finding district court abused its discretion in amending complaint to allow claim for race discrimination when original EEOC charge included only charge of gender discrimination); Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc., 431 F.2d 455, 466 (5th Cir. 1970).
To determine whether Plaintiffs claims fall within the scope of the EEOC charge, the Sanchez Court began with "the obvious proposition that the crucial element of the charge of discrimination is the factual statement contained therein." Sanchez, 431 F.2d 455, 462. A complaint filed pursuant to Title VII may contain any charge of discrimination "like or related" to the factual allegations in the EEOC charge. Id. at 466. Here, Plaintiff admits not having checked the box marked "retaliation" on the EEOC charge form. More importantly, however, his factual statement makes no mention, even remotely, of any of the discriminatory or retaliatory conduct he later alleges in his civil complaint. Instead, Plaintiff's EEOC charge alleges that he was discriminated against solely on the basis of his race, and on the count of being suspended and discharged for threatening a fellow employee. The Court finds no mention of any pattern of discriminatory conduct on the part of Sweetheart or its management. Nor does the Court find any mention of which supervisors might have been involved, or the time periods of their involvement. See Cheek v. Western Southern Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 497, 501 (7th Cir. 1994) ("[The] EEOC charge and complaint must, at a minimum, describe the same conduct and the same individuals."). The Court therefore finds Plaintiff's remaining claims barred for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
Plaintiff's EEOC charge, quite specifically, states "I was suspended and then discharged after an employee accused me of threaten [sic] him." Ex. 7.
Plaintiff contends that the "continuing violation" doctrine obviates the need for administrative exhaustion in this case. Under Title VII, a Plaintiff must file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC no more than 180 days after the alleged discriminatory conduct occurred. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). The "continuing violation" doctrine "accommodate[s] plaintiffs who can show that there has been a pattern or policy of discrimination continuing from outside the limitations period into the statutory limitations period, so that all discriminatory acts committed as part of this pattern or policy can be considered timely." Celestine v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 266 F.3d 343, ___ (5th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). This doctrine has no bearing, however, on the statutory requirement that Plaintiff exhaust his administrative remedies before filing a civil complaint.