In that respect this matter is distinguishable from those murders in which the death penalty is not appropriate. Hance v. State, supra, Patrick v. State, 245 Ga. 417 ( 265 S.E.2d 553) (1980). The evidence shows that the victim was quite happy to see the defendant at her school.
Burger v. State, supra. See Patrick v. State, 245 Ga. 417 ( 265 S.E.2d 553) (1980). However, we need not decide whether the death penalty imposed in this case must be set aside on this ground.
Harris v. State, 237 Ga. 718 ( 230 S.E.2d 1) (1976). See Patrick v. State, 245 Ga. 417 ( 265 S.E.2d 553) (1980). Recently the United States Supreme Court has considered this section as applied to a specific factual situation.
In that respect this murder is distinguishable from ordinary murders in which the death penalty is not appropriate. Hance v. State, supra; Patrick v. State, 245 Ga. 417, 265 S.E.2d 553 (1980). The victim did not die instantaneously, and while she was distantly related to the appellant, this is not a domestic murder.
HILL, Presiding Justice. The United States Supreme Court by its order in Patrick v. Georgia, ___ U.S. ___ ( 101 S.C. 522, 66 L.Ed.2d 285) (1980), has vacated this court's judgment in Patrick v. State, 245 Ga. 417 ( 265 S.E.2d 553) (1980), and remanded this case for further consideration in light of Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 ( 100 S.C. 1759, 64 L.Ed.2d 398) (1980). As mandated, this court has reexamined this case.
By any rational standard the murder was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman. In that respect this murder is distinguishable from ordinary murders in which the death penalty is not appropriate. Hance v. State, supra; Patrick v. State, 245 Ga. 417 ( 265 S.E.2d 553) (1980). The victim did not die instantaneously, and while she was distantly related to the appellant, this is not a domestic murder.
ed and upheld on appeal, Holloway v. State, 137 Ga. App. 124 (3) ( 222 S.E.2d 898) (1975) (use of a gun in self-defense); Hart v. State, 137 Ga. App. 644 (1) ( 224 S.E.2d 755) (1976) (defense of family member); Freeman v. State, supra, 132 Ga. App. at 616 (accidental discharge of a weapon); Waters v. State, 248 Ga. 355 (3) ( 283 S.E.2d 238) (1981) (insanity); Jenkins v. State, 157 Ga. App. 310 (3) ( 277 S.E.2d 304) (1981) (reliability of eyewitness identification). Similarly, it has been held not to be error for the court to refuse to allow defense counsel to ask irrelevant questions, Curtis v. State, supra, 224 Ga. at (2) (whether the juror would favor legalized gambling, parimutuel betting and sale of whiskey); Frazier v. State, supra, 138 Ga. App. at 643 (the employment of the jurors' children, whether or not the jurors smoked or drank alcohol, and what newspapers and magazines they regularly read); White v. State, 230 Ga. 327, 336-337 ( 196 S.E.2d 849) (1973) (the jurors' ages); Patrick v. State, 245 Ga. 417 (3) ( 265 S.E.2d 553) (1980) (the thinking of other people as to the defendant's guilt). By the same token, it has been held not to be error for the court to refuse to allow defense counsel to ask prospective jurors concerning their service as jurors in other cases, McGinnis v. State, 135 Ga. App. 843 (2) ( 219 S.E.2d 485) (1975); Frazier v. State, supra, 138 Ga. App. at (2).
APPENDIX. Pass v. State, 227 Ga. 730 ( 182 S.E.2d 779) (1971); House v. State, 232 Ga. 140 ( 205 S.E.2d 217) (1974); Gregg v. State, 233 Ga. 117 ( 210 S.E.2d 659) (1974); Floyd v. State, 233 Ga. 280 ( 210 S.E.2d 810) (1974); Chenault v. State, 234 Ga. 216 ( 215 S.E.2d 223) (1975); Birt v. State, 236 Ga. 815 ( 225 S.E.2d 248) (1976); Coleman v. State, 237 Ga. 84 ( 226 S.E.2d 911) (1976); Young v. State, 239 Ga. 53 ( 236 S.E.2d 1) (1977); Peek v. State, 239 Ga. 422 ( 238 S.E.2d 12) (1977); Westbrook v. State, 242 Ga. 151 ( 249 S.E.2d 524) (1978); Finney v. State, 242 Ga. 582 ( 250 S.E.2d 388) (1978); Holton v. State, 243 Ga. 312 ( 253 S.E.2d 736) (1979); Patrick v. State, 245 Ga. 417 ( 265 S.E.2d 553) (1980); Thomas v. State, 245 Ga. 688 ( 266 S.E.2d 499) (1980); Cape v. State, 246 Ga. 520 ( 272 S.E.2d 487) (1980); Messer v. State, 247 Ga. 316 ( 276 S.E.2d 15) (1981); Waters v. State, 248 Ga. 355 ( 283 S.E.2d 238) (1981); Mathis v. State, 249 Ga. 454 ( 291 S.E.2d 489) (1982); Rivers v. State, 250 Ga. 288 ( 298 S.E.2d 10) (1982).
On appeal, we affirmed. Patrick v. State, 245 Ga. 417 ( 265 S.E.2d 553) (1980). On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court vacated this court's judgment in Patrick v. State, supra, and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 ( 100 S.C. 1759, 64 L.Ed.2d 398) (1980).
In many cases where we have upheld charges to the jury against attacks based on Sandstrom, it appears that the juries were instructed that criminal intent is never presumed, that the burden of proving intent rests on the State, or that intent is always an issue for the jury. Collins v. State, 248 Ga. 687 ( 286 S.E.2d 8) (1982); Wells v. State, 247 Ga. 792 (2) ( 279 S.E.2d 213) (1981); Lackey v. State, 246 Ga. 331 (11) ( 271 S.E.2d 478) (1980); Bridges v. State, 246 Ga. 323 (3) ( 271 S.E.2d 471) (1980); Blair v. State, 245 Ga. 611 (5) ( 266 S.E.2d 214) (1980); Patrick v. State, 245 Ga. 417 (8) ( 265 S.E.2d 553) (1980); Franklin v. State, 245 Ga. 141 (8, 9) ( 263 S.E.2d 666) (1980); Smith v. State, 244 Ga. 814 (4) ( 262 S.E.2d 116) (1979); Skrine v. State, 244 Ga. 520 ( 260 S.E.2d 900) (1979). See also Code Ann. § 26-605.