Opinion
CL-2024-0286
11-22-2024
Jonathan Patrick v. Morgan Patrick
Appeal from Madison Circuit Court (DR-23-900081)
LEWIS, JUDGE
Jonathan Patrick ("the husband") appeals from a judgment entered by the Madison Circuit Court ("the trial court") that, among other things, divorced him from Morgan Patrick ("the wife") and ordered him to pay alimony to the wife. We reverse the trial court's judgment and remand this cause with instructions for the trial court to make those findings necessary to comply with § 30-2-57, Ala. Code 1975, in its award of alimony.
The divorce judgment refers to the alimony award as both "periodic" and "rehabilitative."
Procedural History
The parties married on June 8, 2013. The husband filed a complaint for a divorce on January 27, 2023. The wife filed an answer to that complaint pro se on March 7, 2023. On April 5, 2023, the wife filed an amended answer with the assistance of counsel. In that filing, the wife also asserted a counterclaim for a divorce and for other relief. The husband filed a reply to the counterclaim on April 18, 2023.
A trial was held on January 30, 2024. On February 2, 2024, the trial court entered a final judgment divorcing the parties. The trial court's final judgment divided the marital property; awarded the husband sole legal and physical custody of T.C.P. ("the child"), the parties' only child; awarded the wife supervised visitation with the child subject to certain conditions; and ordered the husband to "pay periodic alimony to the wife [in] the [amount] of $1,500.00 per month for a period of thirty six (36) months or until the [w]ife shall die, marry, or said rehabilitative alimony terminates otherwise by law, whichever shall occur first." (Emphasis in original.)
The wife filed a motion to alter or amend the final judgment on February 9, 2024, requesting clarification regarding when she was required to execute a deed of her interest in the marital home to the husband. The trial court entered an amended final judgment on February 12, 2024, ordering the wife to execute that deed within seven days.
On February 15, 2024, the husband filed a timely motion to alter, amend, or vacate the judgment or, in the alternative, for a new trial, challenging the trial court's division of the marital property and its alimony award. The trial court denied that motion on March 11, 2024. The husband filed a timely notice of appeal to this court on April 17, 2024.
Discussion
On appeal, the husband challenges, among other things, the trial court's award of alimony to the wife. Section 30-2-57, Ala. Code 1975, which is titled "Rehabilitative or periodic alimony," provides, in pertinent part:
"(a) Upon granting a divorce or legal separation, the court shall award either rehabilitative or periodic alimony as provided in subsection (b), if the court expressly finds all of the following:
"(1) A party lacks a separate estate or his or her separate estate is insufficient to enable the party to acquire the ability to preserve, to the extent possible, the economic status quo of the parties as it existed during the marriage.
"(2) The other party has the ability to supply those means without undue economic hardship.
"(3) The circumstances of the case make it equitable.
"(b) If a party has met the requirements of subsection (a), the court shall award alimony in the following priority:
"(1) Unless the court expressly finds that rehabilitative alimony is not feasible, the court shall award rehabilitative alimony to the party for a limited duration, not to exceed five years, absent extraordinary circumstances, of an amount to enable the party to acquire the ability to preserve, to the extent possible, the economic status quo of the parties as it existed during the marriage.
"(2) In cases in which the court expressly finds that rehabilitation is not feasible, a goodfaith attempt at rehabilitation fails, or good-faith rehabilitation only enables the party to partially acquire the ability to preserve, to the extent
possible, the economic status quo of the parties as it existed during the marriage, the court shall award the party periodic installments of alimony for a duration and an amount to allow the party to preserve, to the extent possible, the economic status quo of the parties as it existed during the marriage as provided in subsection (g)."(Emphasis added.)
Although neither party specifically argues that the trial court erred in failing to make the express findings required by § 30-2-57(a) or (b), "this court has reversed a trial court's judgment and remanded the case for it to enter ... mandated findings as to a judgment ... ex mero motu." Merrick v. Merrick, 352 So.3d 770, 775 (Ala. Civ. App. 2021) (citing Regions Bank v. Allen, 256 So.3d 669, 671 (Ala. Civ. App. 2018)).
Specifically, with respect to an award of alimony,
"in Merrick v. Merrick, 352 So.3d 770 (Ala. Civ. App. 2021), this court discussed the application of Ala. Code 1975, § 30-2 57, stating: 'The legislature has clearly required that an alimony award be either rehabilitative alimony or periodic alimony and that, to award either type of alimony, the trial court must make certain express findings ....' 352 So.3d at 775. Those requirements include findings as to those matters discussed in § 30-2-57(a), Ala. Code 1975, and, if a periodic-alimony award is to be made, a finding 'that rehabilitative alimony is not feasible,' § 30-2-57(b)(1), Ala. Code 1975, based upon the trial court's consideration of the various factors described in § 30-2-57(d) &(f), Ala. Code 1975."Lopez v. Rodriguez, 379 So.3d 455, 461 (Ala. Civ. App. 2023).
"[T]he legislature has clearly directed that a trial court must make express findings as to the establishment of the basis for an alimony award and as to the specific type of alimony that is awarded." Id. at 462. "The general purpose of making specific findings of fact is to allow the trial court 'to carefully review the evidence and to perfect the issues for review on appeal.'" White v. Jones, [Ms. CL-2023-0511, Feb. 16, 2024] ___So. 3d___,____(Ala. Civ. App. 2024) (quoting Ex parte Vaughn, 495 So.2d 83, 87 (Ala. 1986)).
In this case, the trial court's judgment does not contain the express findings that § 30-2-57(a) requires to support an award of either periodic or rehabilitative alimony. If the court intended to award periodic alimony, it also failed to satisfy § 30-2-57(b) by omitting an express finding that rehabilitative alimony was not feasible based upon its consideration of the various factors described in § 30-2-57(d) and (f). See Lopez, 379 So.3d at 461. Because the trial court's judgment does not satisfy the requirements of § 30-2-57, regardless of whether it intended to award rehabilitative or periodic alimony, we reverse the judgment and remand this cause to the trial court with instructions that it enter a new judgment in compliance with § 30-2-57.
The husband also argues that the trial court erred in its division of the marital property. However, "[i]n light of our reversal on the alimony issue, we pretermit any discussion regarding the equity of the marital property award because '[t]he issues of property division and alimony are interrelated, and they must be considered together on appeal.'" Lopez, 379 So.3d at 462 (quoting Turnbo v. Turnbo, 938 So.2d 425, 430 (Ala. Civ. App. 2006)). Therefore, the trial court is directed on remand to reconsider the division of marital property along with its determination of the alimony issue.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded for the trial court to enter a judgment in accordance with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
Moore, P.J., and Edwards, Hanson, and Fridy, JJ., concur.