Opinion
No. 24707-4-III.
March 22, 2007.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Klickitat County, No. 03-2-00379-0, Robert N. Hackett, Jr., J., entered November 9, 2005.
Counsel for Appellant(s), Walter S. Patrick (Appearing Pro Se), Klickitat, WA.Counsel for Respondent(s), Jennifer D Homer, Jerry Moberg Associates, Ephrata, WA.
Affirmed by unpublished opinion per Kato, J. Pro Tem., concurred in by Schultheis, A.C.J., and Kulik, J.
Walter Patrick sued several people, including Klickitat County Sheriff's Detective Steve Shields and Klickitat County, for damages. Mr. Patrick, Program Manager for Windward Center, claimed the deputy encouraged a mentally ill resident to seek a restraining order against him. The patient successfully obtained that order. Mr. Patrick brought this action under RCW 9A.50.020, claiming the deputy and the county interfered with a health care facility. The court dismissed the complaint. We affirm.
Mr. Patrick is the manager of Windward Center, a nonprofit organization that provides crisis support for individuals. It primarily aids the homeless, the mentally ill, the disabled, or individuals seeking diversion from criminal prosecution. Windward does not provide any kind of mental health or medical treatment, but helps its residents to obtain treatment. Mr. Patrick is a registered counselor; however, he has no therapist/patient relationship with anyone at Windward.
On May 27, 2003, Roy and Teresa Cage, two Windward residents, went to the Klickitat County Sheriff's Office. Meeting with Detectives Shields and Kallio and Deputy Schneider, they said Mr. Patrick was blackmailing people at Windward and violating IRS nonprofit rules. They also alleged Mr. Patrick had sexual relationships with many of the residents and had given sexually transmitted diseases to several women. Mr. Cage further revealed to the police he was psychotic. The police determined information they gave raised a civil issue, not a criminal one, and so advised the Cages. The police also explained they could seek a no contact order from district court.
The Cages obtained a temporary protection order on May 27, 2003, restraining Mr. Patrick from contacting or coming within 50 feet of them. The order was in effect for 14 days. On June 11, 2003, the court dismissed the order for protection because the Cages failed to appear.
On December 10, 2003, Mr. Patrick filed a complaint against Deputy Shields and Klickitat County, alleging breach of fiduciary duty and tortious interference with a health care facility pursuant to RCW 9A.50.020. The deputy and the county moved for summary judgment dismissal. Finding Mr. Patrick was unable to establish the elements of a claim under RCW 9A.50.020, the court dismissed the complaint. This appeal follows.
Mr. Patrick claims the court erred by granting summary judgment dismissal of his claims. We review orders of summary judgment de novo. Grundy v. Thurston County, 155 Wn.2d 1, 6, 117 P.3d 1089 (2005). Summary judgment is appropriate only if the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, and admissions in the record on review demonstrate (1) the absence of any genuine issues of material fact; and (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. CR 56(c). "'[T]he court must consider all facts submitted and all reasonable inferences from the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.'"Grundy, 155 Wn.2d at 6 (quoting Highline Sch. Dist. No. 401 v. Port of Seattle, 87 Wn.2d 6, 15, 548 P.2d 1085 (1976)). We may affirm the trial court on any grounds established by the pleadings and supported by the record. LaMon v. Butler, 112 Wn.2d 193, 200-01, 770 P.2d 1027, cert. denied, 493 U.S. 814 (1989).
Mr. Patrick sued Deputy Shields and Kittitas County for violating RCW 9A.50.020, which provides:
It is unlawful for a person except as otherwise protected by state or federal law, alone or in concert with others, to willfully or recklessly interfere with access to or from a health care facility or willfully or recklessly disrupt the normal functioning of such facility by:
(1) Physically obstructing or impeding the free passage of a person seeking to enter or depart from the facility or from the common areas of the real property upon which the facility is located;
(2) Making noise that unreasonably disturbs the peace within the facility;
(3) Trespassing on the facility or the common areas of the real property upon which the facility is located;
(4) Telephoning the facility repeatedly, or knowingly permitting any telephone under his or her control to be used for such purpose; or
(5) Threatening to inflict injury on the owners, agents, patients, employees, or property of the facility or knowingly permitting any telephone under his or her control to be used for such purpose.
Mr. Patrick claimed the deputy violated subsection (5) by acting in concert with the Cages in a manner that threatened him with bodily injury and caused services at the facility to be disrupted. As director of Windward, he contends his being subject to the restraining order had an adverse impact on the normal functioning of the facility and thus constituted a violation of RCW 9A.50.020.
There is no evidence in the record, however, to suggest the deputy or the county acted in concert with the Cages to disrupt programs offered by Windward. The Cages went to the police station complaining about Mr. Patrick. Deputy Shields informed them it was a civil, not a criminal, problem. He advised them they could go to district court to seek a restraining order. The record contains nothing that suggests the deputy gave this advice with a willful or reckless intent to disrupt Windward and its programs.
Mr. Patrick claims Mr. Cage was attempting to kill him. But nothing in the record supports his claim. The evidence is that the police were dispatched to Windward in response to a suicide threat by Mr. Cage. Nothing shows Mr. Cage threatened Mr. Patrick or the operations of Windward.
Moreover, there was no evidence of any interruption or disruption in services. Mr. Patrick himself acknowledged in deposition that he had been gone from the facility for more than a week at a time, but other staff members were able to continue Windward's programs during his absences. The restraining order was in effect for just 14 days and did not remove Mr. Patrick from the facility. Rather, it merely kept him from contacting and coming within 50 feet of the Cages. He thus failed to establish that the normal functions of Windward and its programs were disrupted.
Moreover, RCW 9A.50.020 applies to a "health care facility." RCW 9A.50.010(1) defines this term as "a facility that provides health care services directly to patients, including but not limited to, a hospital, clinic, health care provider's office, health maintenance organization, diagnostic or treatment center, neuropsychiatric or mental health facility, hospice, or nursing home." Mr. Patrick testified in his deposition that Windward provided no direct services, but facilitated access to them. Windward does not meet the definition of a health care facility. Summary judgment dismissal was proper.
Mr. Patrick claims the court mistakenly relied on Tyner v. Department of Social and Health Services, 92 Wn. App. 504, 963 P.2d 215 (1998), reversed, 141 Wn.2d 68, 1 P.3d 1148 (2000). In Tyner, Division One of this court decided whether a restraining order was a superseding intervening cause negating any liability of CPS for negligent investigation. Id. at 515-17. Division One held that because the court granted a protection order, it was the court's action, not the CPS investigation, that separated Mr. Tyner from his children. Id. at 520. Our Supreme Court reversed, finding that all material information was not before the trial court:
We hold that a judge's no-contact order will act as superseding intervening cause, precluding liability of the State for negligent investigation, only if all material information has been presented to the court and reasonable minds could not differ as to this question. Tyner, 141 Wn.2d at 88.
Even if the court erroneously relied on Tyner, dismissal was nonetheless proper. Because Mr. Patrick failed to establish a prima facie claim under RCW 9A.50.020, this ground alone mandates dismissal.
Affirmed.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040.
Schultheis, A.C.J. and Kulik, J., concur.