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Patkins v. Brown

California Court of Appeals, Third District, Sacramento
Apr 16, 2009
No. C058655 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 16, 2009)

Opinion


DAVID C. PATKINS, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. DAVID BROWN, as Director, etc., Defendant and Respondent. C058655 California Court of Appeal, Third District, Sacramento April 16, 2009

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Super. Ct. No. 07CS00815

HULL, J.

Plaintiff David C. Patkins was convicted of a felony and his conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. He then filed administrative complaints with the Court Reporters Board of California (Board), seeking to have the Board correct the transcript of his trial, and to discipline two court reporters, based on his claims that they made material mistakes in preparing his criminal trial transcript.

After the Board notified plaintiff that it found no basis to sustain his administrative claims against the two court reporters, he filed this civil suit, naming the Board’s executive director, David Brown, as the nominal defendant. Plaintiff appeals from the trial court’s order sustaining the Board’s demurrer without leave to amend. We conclude the trial court correctly ruled that the complaint does not state a cause of action. We affirm the judgment.

Facts and Proceedings

On June 25, 2007, plaintiff filed a handwritten verified complaint captioned “Declaratory Relief or Invalidity (C.C.P. § 1060; Cal. Gov. Code § 11350).” The complaint alleges plaintiff has the right to an accurate transcript of his criminal trial, and the Board has a legal duty to investigate complaints against court reporters. The complaint alleges that the Board failed in its duties in response to plaintiff’s administrative complaints, causing him emotional distress, and impairing his criminal appeal. The prayer asks the trial court to review the stenographic notes of the trial, have them reviewed by an outside expert, and grant plaintiff any other appropriate relief.

Among the many attachments to the complaint are two letters from a Board “Enforcement Analyst” dated May 21, 2007, advising plaintiff that portions of his trial transcript had been reviewed at his request and had been found to be accurate. Each letter referenced an administrative complaint against a different court reporter. In those administrative complaints, plaintiff in part alleged that a pathologist’s testimony had been mistranscribed, to his detriment.

The Board demurred, arguing that the complaint on its face showed that the Board had reviewed plaintiff’s administrative complaints, and plaintiff could not compel the Board to exercise its discretion to discipline court reporters. To the extent the complaint sought money damages, the Board argued it was immune. To the extent the complaint cited Government Code section 11350, seeking “invalidity,” that statute pertained to invalidating regulations, not Board actions. Thus, no cause of action was stated.

The Board sought judicial notice of an unpublished decision of the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, filed on November 19, 2003, affirming plaintiff’s conviction. The Board contended this was relevant to show that plaintiff had not raised the issue of inaccurate transcripts in his criminal appeal.

Plaintiff moved to compel production of evidence from the pathologist who had testified at his criminal trial. The trial court (Sapunor, J.) denied that motion.

Plaintiff opposed the demurrer. He argued the Board was not immune because the Board’s decisions on his administrative complaints were “falsehoods/invalid” and the transcripts are wrong. He opposed judicial notice of the opinion in his criminal case, on relevance grounds. He also made a number of allegations, and attached various documents, purporting to expand or explain his pleaded claims, but he never sought leave to amend his complaint. He also sought reconsideration of his motion to compel discovery from the pathologist.

The trial court (Frawley, J.) issued a thorough decision finding the complaint did not state a cause of action.

In part, the trial court construed the complaint as a petition for writ of administrative mandate, because it appeared the relief sought was to force the Board to take action to correct the transcripts and discipline the two court reporters. The trial court ruled that mandate would not lie to compel the Board to discipline the reporters. Nor would mandate lie to compel the Board to correct the transcripts. Instead, the criminal trial judge or the appellate court on direct appeal from the conviction had the exclusive authority to correct the transcripts.

The trial court sustained the demurrer and dismissed the action. Plaintiff timely filed this appeal.

Standard of Review

“This litigation was resolved upon general demurrer. Thus, for purposes of review, we will provisionally accept as true all material facts alleged in the complaint. [Citation.] But we do not accept as true plaintiff’s conclusions of law.” (Ess v. Eskaton Properties, Inc. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 120, 124-125.)

Discussion

I In Propria Persona Status

Plaintiff prosecutes this appeal without the assistance of counsel. He cites a United States Supreme Court case for the proposition that we should “grant deference” and hold him to a more lenient standard than we would hold attorneys appearing in this court. We disagree with this contention.

The case plaintiff relies on, Haines v. Kerner (1972) 404 U.S. 519 [30 L.Ed.2d 652], involved a federal civil rights suit under 42 United States Code section 1983 (§ 1983). We have previously acknowledged that in such cases Haines establishes a different standard of review, specifically that “Where a section 1983 complaint is drafted by a pro. per. litigant, it is held ‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers....’” (Bach v. County of Butte (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 554, 564.)

The complaint does not plead a section 1983 claim. It does make stray references to the federal constitutional rights to due process and to a jury trial, and cites the Sixth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The complaint also cites a case discussing the scope of the right, under the federal Equal Protection Clause, to transcripts of prior proceedings. (Kennedy v. Lockyer (9th Cir. 2004) 379 F.3d 1041.) The complaint does not cite section 1983, nor does plaintiff cite section 1983 in his briefs.

Accordingly, we must apply the normal rule that litigants are treated equally whether or not they employ an attorney. (Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 984-985 [“Except when a particular rule provides otherwise, the rules of civil procedure must apply equally to parties represented by counsel and those who forgo attorney representation”]; People v. Neilson (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 1529, 1534.)

II Appellant’s Contentions

The Board’s general purpose is “to establish and maintain a standard of competency for those engaged in the practice of shorthand reporting, for the protection of the public, in general, and for the protection of all litigants whose rights to personal freedom and property are affected by the competency of shorthand reporters, in particular.” (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 8015.) The Board has the power to investigate allegations of misconduct by licensed shorthand reporters, and to impose discipline for misconduct. (Id., § 8008, subds. (b) & (f).) A shorthand reporter may be disciplined for various reasons, including “gross negligence or incompetence in practice” (id., § 8025, subd. (d)), and we assume for purposes of this appeal this would include making significant mistakes in a transcript and refusing to correct those mistakes upon notice.

With this general statement of the Board’s purpose and powers in mind, we address the contentions we discern from plaintiff’s appellate briefing.

1. Plaintiff contends the trial court overlooked his theory that the Board decisions on his administrative complaints against the two court reporters “are falsehoods[s],” and reasons that because he claims the Board decisions were wrong, he has stated a claim for relief. In his reply brief he emphasizes that he seeks declaratory relief “against the negligent exercise of discretion by the Board[.]”

Plaintiff presents no legal authority supporting his view that this raises a viable legal theory. The trial court sustained the demurrer in part on the ground that the trial and appellate courts in plaintiff’s criminal case retained ultimate authority to correct the transcripts. This proposition of law is supported by the authorities cited by the trial court. (See City of Los Angeles v. Vaughan (1961) 55 Cal.2d 198, 201 [“The ultimate content of the transcript is that which is settled by the trial judge, not by the reporter”]; Agnew v. Larson (1961) 197 Cal.App.2d 444, 453 [“If the transcript is not complete, plaintiff should have requested correction in the trial court”].) Under these authorities, this lawsuit would not be the appropriate procedure for plaintiff to seek transcript corrections. Because plaintiff does not present any analysis addressing these authorities, he forfeits the claim of error. (In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 408.)

2. Plaintiff contends the trial court should not have characterized his complaint as one seeking administrative mandamus. He now disavows any desire to have the reporters disciplined, stating “How the Board resolved the foundation, cause, and discipline of missing and altered transcripts is out of plaintiff’s hands.” He appears to argue that he is seeking only a declaration that the transcript is inaccurate and, presumably, an order correcting the transcript.

For the reason we just stated, this lawsuit, whether treated as a complaint for declaratory relief or a petition for writ of administrative mandamus, is not the proper vehicle for him to seek transcript corrections. If he is not seeking administrative mandate, he was not harmed by the trial court’s conclusion that that remedy was not available to him.

3. Plaintiff mentions the denial of his discovery efforts, but does not explain how he can seek review of those matters on appeal from an order sustaining a demurrer. Nor does he explain why discovery is a proper response to a demurrer. If the discovery had shown that the transcript was in error, that would not show that this lawsuit stated a viable claim.

4. Plaintiff objects to the trial court’s references to the decision in his criminal appeal. It appears that the trial court impliedly granted the Board’s motion for judicial notice, as it outlined some facts from that decision in the ruling. We have previously granted the Board’s motion on appeal for judicial notice of the same decision.

In considering whether a complaint states a cause of action, the trial court and the appellate court may take judicial notice of relevant court decisions. (Grossmont Union High School Dist. v. State Dept. of Education (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 869, 879; Colvig v. RKO General, Inc. (1965) 232 Cal.App.2d 56, 63-64.) Because the gist of the complaint is that plaintiff’s criminal appeal was impaired by alleged transcript mistakes, the fact plaintiff did not claim transcript mistakes on direct appeal was relevant, and the decision on his direct appeal was therefore judicially noticeable.

More importantly, the trial court’s conclusion that the complaint did not state a cause of action did not turn on the procedural facts the trial court mentioned about the criminal appeal. Nor do we rely on that decision in reaching our conclusion that no cause of action is stated. Therefore, even if judicial notice should not have been taken of that decision, plaintiff has not demonstrated prejudice. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13; Code Civ. Proc., § 475.)

5. Plaintiff’s briefs make mention of facts not alleged in the complaint, including the existence of a federal habeas corpus case. These references do not show that the complaint states a cause of action. Nor has he sought leave to amend the complaint based on these references. (Cf. Code Civ. Proc., § 472c, subd. (a); Performance Plastering v. Richmond American Homes of California, Inc. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 659, 667-668 [party demonstrated on appeal how it could amend to state a cause of action].) Accordingly, we disregard these stray references to unpleaded facts.

6. Plaintiff claims the trial court did not resolve the controversy presented by his claim for declaratory relief. A complaint seeking declaratory relief is not vulnerable to a general demurrer so long as it pleads the existence of a controversy between the parties, because a plaintiff is entitled to a declaration resolving the controversy even if it is resolved adversely to the plaintiff. (Maguire v. Hibernia S. & L. Soc. (1944) 23 Cal.2d 719, 728-730.)

But because this opinion adequately memorializes the conclusion that plaintiff has no cause of action against the Board, there is no purpose in remanding for the trial court to issue a declaration so stating. (See Savient Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Department of Health Services (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1457, 1464; Haley v. L. A. County Flood Control Dist. (1959) 172 Cal.App.2d 285, 292-294.)

Disposition

The judgment is affirmed. Plaintiff shall pay the Board’s costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(2).)

We concur: SCOTLAND, P. J., BUTZ, J.


Summaries of

Patkins v. Brown

California Court of Appeals, Third District, Sacramento
Apr 16, 2009
No. C058655 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 16, 2009)
Case details for

Patkins v. Brown

Case Details

Full title:DAVID C. PATKINS, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. DAVID BROWN, as Director…

Court:California Court of Appeals, Third District, Sacramento

Date published: Apr 16, 2009

Citations

No. C058655 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 16, 2009)