[Citations]" ( Geddes, supra, 126 Cal.App.4th at p. 424.) Prestige urges this court to follow Paterno v. Superior Court (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 548 [ 20 Cal.Rptr.3d 282]. Paterno, however, does not assist in the decision of the case before us.
DISCUSSION "In California, parties in both civil and criminal actions may disqualify an assigned judge without a showing of good cause on the basis of an affidavit asserting that the party believes the judge is biased." (Paterno v. Superior Court (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 548, 555 (Paterno).) Section 170.6(a)(2) governs the exercise of such peremptory challenges.
SmithKline pointed out that Judge Nichols had presided over this case for more than six years; transferring the case to a judge unfamiliar with the facts and issues would be "an inefficient use of judicial resources and, therefore, contrary to the purposes of coordination." SmithKline urged the court to follow McLaughlin v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1132 [ 29 Cal.Rptr.2d 559] rather than Paterno v. Superior Court (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 548, 555 [ 20 Cal.Rptr.3d 282]. According to SmithKline, the McLaughlin case commanded deference to the purposes and procedures of coordinated proceedings, whereas it was only in dicta that Paterno permitted a peremptory challenge after remand in a coordinated proceeding.
( Ibid . ) Although a reversal of a summary judgment motion on the merits is considered a grant of a new trial ( ibid. ; State Farm, supra , 121 Cal.App.4th at p. 497, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 146 ), we concluded our reversal of the judgment did not support a peremptory challenge under section 170.6, subdivision (a)(2), because "we did not remand the case for reconsideration of the merits of the ruling, and such a fundamental reexamination of the motion [was] unnecessary." ( Geddes , at p. 424, 23 Cal.Rptr.3d 857 ; accord, Paterno v. Superior Court (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 548, 560, 20 Cal.Rptr.3d 282 ( Paterno ) [reversal of determination of liability at trial as to one defendant and remand for a trial on damages was not a "new trial" for purposes of peremptory challenge because under § 656, the remand did not require a reexamination of a factual or legal issue that was in controversy in the first trial].)First Federal Bank of California v. Superior Court (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 310, 49 Cal.Rptr.3d 296, relied on by Unzueta, is not to the contrary.
(Id. at p. 1254.) Nevertheless, courts in civil cases have since characterized Peracchi as generally breaking "the pattern of appellate decisions advancing ever more generous interpretations of the term 'new trial' [citation]" (Paterno v. Superior Court (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 548, 558 (Paterno) and as disagreeing that "'the Legislature intended to protect, in all circumstances, parties who have prevailed on appeal from the presumed ire or potential bias of trial judges whose rulings have been reversed.' [Ciitation.
In examining the "new trial" requirement in section 170.6, appellate courts have reviewed the statutes and cases governing motions for a new trial. (See e.g., State Farm, supra, 121 Cal.App.4th at pp. 497-498; Paterno v. Superior Court (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 548, 559-560 (Paterno); Hendershot v. Superior Court (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 860, 864-865 (Hendershot).) In civil cases, courts have relied on the definition in section 656, which defines "new trial" as the "re-examination of an issue of fact in the same court after a trial and decision by a jury, court, or referee."
Although courts have interpreted the term "new trial" broadly, the inquiry generally has focused on whether the trial court on remand must make new findings or rule on the merits of the litigation. (Paterno v. Superior Court (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 548, 556-558 (Paterno); Pfeiffer Venice Properties v. Superior Court (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 761, 767.) "If the court's function is merely a ministerial act (such as the recalculation of interest)," the disqualification provision does not apply. (Paterno, supra, 123 Cal.App.4th at p. 558.)
In at least one court's view, in Peracchi, "the California Supreme Court broke the pattern of appellate decisions advancing ever more generous interpretations of the term `new trial' in section 170.6[, subdivision] (a)(2)." ( Paterno v. Superior Court (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 548, 558 [ 20 Cal.Rptr.3d 282]. The Peracchi court found that the legislative history of the amendment to section 170.6 did not support the assertion that "the Legislature intended to protect, in all circumstances, parties who have prevailed on appeal from the presumed ire or potential bias of trial judges whose rulings have been reversed."
We presume that the Judicial Council "was aware of existing related laws" when it enacted rule 3.516, and that it "intended to maintain a consistent body of rules." ( People v. Superior Court (Zamudio ) (2000) 23 Cal.4th 183, 199, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 463, 999 P.2d 686 ; cf. Paterno v. Superior Court (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 548, 555, 20 Cal.Rptr.3d 282 ( Paterno ) [Since rule 3.516 predecessor's "provisions for exercising a peremptory challenge upon initial assignment may be harmonized with section 170.6(a)(2) ’s postappeal right to peremptory challenge, the latter is simply one of the ‘provisions of law applicable to civil actions generally,’ which still retains vitality in coordination proceedings."].) As the trial court observed, "[i]t is commonplace that in a master-calendar docket management system any number of jurists may make rulings during the life of a case on matters such as demurrers, discovery motions, requests for interim injunctive relief, potentially dispositive motions, and trials.
Peracchi "broke the pattern of appellate decisions advancing ever more generous interpretations of the term ‘new trial’ in section 170.6(a)(2)." ( Paterno v. Superior Court (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 548, 558, 20 Cal.Rptr.3d 282.) Peracchi also disapproved of the principle that the "authority to exercise a section 170.6 challenge should hinge upon a case-by-case analysis of the level of discretion to be exercised by the judge and the degree of factfinding in which the judge will be engaged."