The language of this statute is mandatory, thus any violation of OCGA § 17–8–57 requires a new trial regardless of whether there has been any showing of actual prejudice to the defendant. See Patel v. State, 282 Ga. 412, 415, 651 S.E.2d 55 (2007). See also Collier v. State, 288 Ga. 756, 763, 707 S.E.2d 102 (2011) (Nahmias, J., specially concurring) (if violation of OCGA § 17–8–57 is found, “conviction will be reversed without further consideration of the effect of the error on the defendant's substantial rights or the fairness and integrity of the proceeding”); State v. Gardner, 286 Ga. 633, 634, 690 S.E.2d 164 (2010) (because violation of OCGA § 17–8–57 will always constitute plain error, failure to object does not waive issue on appeal).
[Cits.]" Patel v. State, 282 Ga. 412, 414 (2) ( 651 SE2d 55) (2007). To the extent the "plain error rule" has been articulated otherwise in the context of an alleged violation of OCGA § 17-8-57, such cases are hereby disapproved.
However, comments by the trial judge on its rulings that include expressions of opinion as to what has been proven, the credibility of a witness, or on a disputed issue of material fact are clearly improper under OCGA § 17–8–57. See Murphy v. State, 290 Ga. 459, 460(2), 722 S.E.2d 51 (2012); Chumley v. State, 282 Ga. 855, 857(2), 655 S.E.2d 813 (2008); Patel v. State, 282 Ga. 412, 414(2), 651 S.E.2d 55 (2007).Under analogous circumstances, our appellate courts have on several occasions considered whether a trial court violates OCGA § 17–8–57 by making statements to the jury that the defendant's statement was freely and voluntarily given, as determined by the trial court at a hearing outside the presence of the jury, and we find the reasoning in those cases equally applicable here. Freeman v. State, 295 Ga. 820, 821–822, 764 S.E.2d 390 (2014); Chumley, 282 Ga. at 857(2), 655 S.E.2d 813; Ray v. State, 181 Ga.App. 42, 44(3), 351 S.E.2d 490 (1986).
We disagree with Stinski's further contention that the charge as given constituted an expression of opinion on the evidence by the trial court in violation of OCGA § 17-8-57. See also Patel v. State, 282 Ga. 412, 415(2), n. 5, 651 S.E.2d 55 (2007) (" We recognize [286 Ga. 852] that in those instances in which a technical violation of OCGA § 17-8-57 occurs in the giving of a jury charge, when the charge does not otherwise assume certain things as facts and intimate to the jury what the judge believes the evidence to be, the giving of additional or curative instructions may suffice to correct the error." ).
Rouse, supra, 296 Ga. at 214, 765 S.E.2d 879 (citations omitted). See also Patel v. State, 282 Ga. 412, 415, 651 S.E.2d 55 (2007). Further, appellant's failure to contemporaneously object to the trial court's alleged violations of this statute does not preclude appellate review.
Murphy, 290 Ga. at 461 (2). Furthermore, beyond the issue of witness credibility, a trial court violates the statute by offering an opinion in front of the jury on any disputed issue of material fact involved in the case. See Patel v. State, 282 Ga. 412, 413-414 (2) (651 SE2d 55) (2007); Byrd v. State, 307 Ga. App. 589, 590-592 (705 SE2d 690) (2011). Applying these principles, the Supreme Court of Georgia in Murphy, 290 Ga. 459, concluded that the trial court violated OCGA § 17-8-57 in responding to an objection to a detective's testimony.
See Raheem v. State , 275 Ga. 87, 93-94, 560 S.E.2d 680 (2002) ("[T]he relevant portion of Raheem's videotaped statement was difficult, if not impossible to understand .... Under these circumstances and given the testimony heard by the trial court, this Court concludes that the trial court's finding that Raheem had not made any reference to whether his statement could be used in a courtroom was not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, Raheem's legal argument premised on a factual assertion to the contrary must fail."), disapproved on other grounds, Patel v. State , 282 Ga. 412, 413 n.2, 651 S.E.2d 55 (2007). See also Sparks v. Commonwealth , No. 2017-SC-000206-MR, 2017 WL 6379636, at *3 (Ky. Dec. 14, 2017) (holding that a defendant's "inaudible mumbling was not an invocation of his right to remain silent"); State v. Newell , 212 Ariz. 389, 132 P.3d 833, 842 (2006) (holding that a defendant's "barely audible, mumbled statement made while [the defendant] and the detective were both talking" was not a "sufficiently clear invocation of the right to counsel under Miranda "); People v. Kuns , No. F035946, 2002 WL 220626, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 13, 2002) (declining to presume that a defendant's "silence and mumbled answers" constituted invocations of the right to remain silent).
APPENDIX Rice v. State, 292 Ga. 191, 733 S.E.2d 755 (2012) ; Tate v. State, 287 Ga. 364, 695 S.E.2d 591 (2010) ; Humphreys v. State, 287 Ga. 63, 694 S.E.2d 316 (2010) ; Stinski v. State, 286 Ga. 839, 691 S.E.2d 854 (2010) ; O'Kelley v. State, 284 Ga. 758, 670 S.E.2d 388 (2008) ; Rivera v. State, 282 Ga. 355, 647 S.E.2d 70 (2007) ; Williams v. State, 281 Ga. 87, 635 S.E.2d 146 (2006) ; Lewis v. State, 279 Ga. 756, 620 S.E.2d 778 (2005) ; Riley v. State, 278 Ga. 677, 604 S.E.2d 488 (2004) ; Franks v. State, 278 Ga. 246, 599 S.E.2d 134 (2004) ; Sealey v. State, 277 Ga. 617, 593 S.E.2d 335 (2004) ; Raheem v. State, 275 Ga. 87, 560 S.E.2d 680 (2002), disapproved on unrelated grounds by Patel v. State, 282 Ga. 412, 413 n. 2, 651 S.E.2d 55 (2007) ; Lance v. State, 275 Ga. 11, 560 S.E.2d 663 (2002) ; Lucas v. State, 274 Ga. 640, 555 S.E.2d 440 (2001) ; Rhode v. State, 274 Ga. 377, 552 S.E.2d 855 (2001) ; Colwell v. State, 273 Ga. 634, 544 S.E.2d 120 (2001) ; Esposito v. State, 273 Ga. 183, 538 S.E.2d 55 (2000) ; Heidler v. State, 273 Ga. 54, 537 S.E.2d 44 (2000) ; Morrow v. State, 272 Ga. 691, 532 S.E.2d 78 (2000) ; Pace v. State, 271 Ga. 829, 524 S.E.2d 490 (1999) ; Cook v. State, 270 Ga. 820, 514 S.E.2d 657 (1999) ; DeYoung v. State, 268 Ga. 780, 493 S.E.2d 157 (1997) ; Raulerson v. State, 268 Ga. 623, 491 S.E.2d 791 (1997) ; McMichen v. State, 265 Ga. 598, 458 S.E.2d 833 (1995).
APPENDIXTate v. State, 287 Ga. 364, 695 S.E.2d 591 (2010) ; Humphreys v. State, 287 Ga. 63, 694 S.E.2d 316 (2010) ; Stinski v. State, 286 Ga. 839, 691 S.E.2d 854 (2010) ; O'Kelley v. State, 284 Ga. 758, 670 S.E.2d 388 (2008) ; Rivera v. State, 282 Ga. 355, 647 S.E.2d 70 (2007) ; Williams v. State, 281 Ga. 87, 635 S.E.2d 146 (2006) ; Lewis v. State, 279 Ga. 756, 620 S.E.2d 778 (2005) ; Riley v. State, 278 Ga. 677, 604 S.E.2d 488 (2004) ; Franks v. State, 278 Ga. 246, 599 S.E.2d 134 (2004) ; Sealey v. State, 277 Ga. 617, 593 S.E.2d 335 (2004) ; Raheem v. State, 275 Ga. 87, 560 S.E.2d 680 (2002), disapproved on unrelated grounds by Patel v. State, 282 Ga. 412, 413 n. 2, 651 S.E.2d 55 (2007) ; Lance v. State, 275 Ga. 11, 560 S.E.2d 663 (2002) ; Lucas v. State, 274 Ga. 640, 555 S.E.2d 440 (2001) ; Rhode v. State, 274 Ga. 377, 552 S.E.2d 855 (2001) ; Colwell v. State, 273 Ga. 634, 544 S.E.2d 120 (2001) ; Heidler v. State, 273 Ga. 54, 537 S.E.2d 44 (2000) ; Morrow v. State, 272 Ga. 691, 532 S.E.2d 78 (2000) ; Pace v. State, 271 Ga. 829, 524 S.E.2d 490 (1999) ; Cook v. State, 270 Ga. 820, 514 S.E.2d 657 (1999) ; DeYoung v. State, 268 Ga. 780, 493 S.E.2d 157 (1997) ; Raulerson v. State, 268 Ga. 623, 491 S.E.2d 791 (1997) ; Bishop v. State, 268 Ga. 286, 486 S.E.2d 887 (1997) ; McMichen v. State, 265 Ga. 598, 458 S.E.2d 833 (1995).
Such prospective jurors are not impartial....”); Raheem v. State, 275 Ga. 87, 90(5)(a), 560 S.E.2d 680 (2002) (“A prospective juror who would not be able or willing to consider the sentence of life with the possibility of parole upon a conviction for murder is biased in a manner that would make him or her unqualified to serve.”), disapproved on other grounds by Patel v. State, 282 Ga. 412, 413(2), n. 2, 651 S.E.2d 55 (2007). That said, a juror predisposition against parole may not have the same implications under current law.