( b) If it appears that the defendant maliciously shot the prosecutor, it is ordinarily a question for the jury whether he is guilty of assault with intent to murder, in that he intended to kill, or guilty of the statutory offense of shooting at another, in that he intended to inflict a lesser injury." So far as the offense of shooting at another is concerned, one may be guilty whether there is a specific intent to kill or not. Pate v. State, 87 Ga. App. 422, 423 ( 74 S.E.2d 138); Hart v. State, 55 Ga. App. 85 ( 189 S.E. 547). If the specific intent to kill is present, then, of course, it must be in such combination with the elements of manslaughter that this offense, rather than murder, would have been the crime had the victim died. "While a conviction of the offense of shooting at another is not legal where the evidence as a whole shows that the defendant deliberately shot the prosecutor, either maliciously or else justifiably, yet this is not true where, under any phase of the evidence, a shooting unlawful but not malicious can be inferred." Chester v. State, 3 Ga. App. 332 ( 59 S.E. 843). Kendrick v. State, 113 Ga. 759 ( 39 S.E. 286), and Tyre v. State, 112 Ga. 224 ( 37 S.E. 374), holding that, where under any view of the evidence a conclusion is demanded either that the defendant intended to murder his victim or that he was completely innocent, the conviction of shooting at another on an indictment charging assault with intent to murder