In Michigan, where a third person can bring a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, it is referred to as the "bystander rule." See Pate v. Children's Hospital of Michigan, 158 Mich. App. 120, 404 N.W.2d 632 (1986) ("clearly contemplates [that the bystander (a close relative) witness] a sudden, brief, and inherently shocking accidental event which causes the injury or death, which contemporaneously, and by its very nature, results in emotional and physical injury to the plaintiff."). Plaintiffs respond by arguing that Infant Doe is not attempting to state a claim under a third-party theory (or under the "bystander" rule).
In Pate v Children's Hosp of Michigan, 158 Mich.App. 120, 123; 404 N.W.2d 632 (1986), for example, this Court held that "while presence at the side of a loved one at the time of her death is certainly a grievous event, without more it is simply not the sort of inherently shocking and sudden event to which the doctrine of bystander recover[y] for emotional distress and resulting physical injury was intended to apply." Given that this Court found witnessing the death of a loved one insufficient to establish negligent infliction of emotional distress, we conclude that witnessing a loved one lose her job is not sufficient to give rise to such a claim.
Likewise, the Michigan Court of Appeals has denied recovery when the doctor failed to diagnose pneumonia in plaintiff's sister. Pate v. Children's Hosp. of Michigan, 158 Mich. App. 120, 404 N.W.2d 632 (1986). Two days later the sister died in the hospital emergency room while in plaintiff's arms.
The trial court correctly dismissed Brennan's individual claim. Citing Gustafson v Faris, 67 Mich App 363; 241 NW2d 208 (1976), this Court in Pate v Children's Hosp of Mich, 158 Mich App 120, 123; 404 NW2d 632 (1986), stated, "Gustafson clearly contemplates a sudden, brief, and inherently shocking accidental event which causes the injury or death, which contemporaneously, and by its very nature, results in emotional and physical injury to the plaintiff." While premised on a different medical need, in Pate as "[i]n this case, plaintiff has alleged that [the] death was caused by defendants' negligent omissions two days earlier when the defendants failed to admit decedent for care and observation relative to a[n] . . . ailment, failed to obtain an adequate history, failed to diagnose that decedent was suffering from a [medical condition], and failed to obtain an expert consultation relative to decedent's [medical] condition."
These limitations have consistently been applied by this Court since Gustafson was decided. See Miller v Cook, 87 Mich. App. 6; 273 N.W.2d 567 (1978); Williams v Citizens Mutual Ins Co of America, 94 Mich. App. 762; 290 N.W.2d 76 (1980); Pate v Children's Hosp of Michigan, 158 Mich. App. 120; 404 N.W.2d 632 (1986); Wargelin v Sisters of MercyHealth Corp, 149 Mich. App. 75; 385 N.W.2d 732 (1986); Henley v Dep't of State Hwys Transportation, 128 Mich. App. 214; 340 N.W.2d 72 (1983); Detroit Automobile Inter-Ins Exchange v McMillan (On Remand), 159 Mich. App. 48; 406 N.W.2d 232 (1987). We decline to deviate from Gustafson by expanding the class of persons entitled to bystander recovery from immediate family members to close friends of the injured third party.
Emotional distress damages are available in Michigan to a bystander who witnesses a negligent injury inflicted on a close family member. May v William Beaumont Hosp, 180 Mich. App. 728, 749; 448 N.W.2d 497 (1989); Pate v Children's Hosp of Michigan, 158 Mich. App. 120, 123; 404 N.W.2d 632 (1986). Actual physical harm is an element of damages for emotional distress which may also be available in other tort actions. Ledbetter v Brown City Savings Bank, 141 Mich. App. 692, 703; 368 N.W.2d 257 (1985).
In Michigan, where a third person can bring a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, it is referred to as the "bystander rule." See Pate v. Children's Hospital of Michigan, 404 N.W.2d 632 (Mich.Ct.App. 1986) ("clearly contemplates [that the bystander (a close relative) witness] a sudden, brief, and inherently shocking accidental event which causes the injury or death, which contemporaneously, and by its very nature, results in emotional and physical injury to the plaintiff."). Plaintiffs responded by arguing that Infant Doe is not attempting to state a claim under a third-party theory (or under the "bystander" rule).
Plaintiffs seeking to recover damages for medical misdiagnoses of third persons have fared poorly under all theories of liability. See, e.g., Frame v. Kotheri, 115 N.J. 638, 560 A.2d 675 (1989); Pate v. Children's Hosp., 158 Mich. App. 120, 404 N.W.2d 632 (1986); Wilson v. Galt, 100 N.M. 227, 668 P.2d 1104, cert. quashed, 100 N.M. 192, 668 P.2d 308 (1983); Amodio v. Cunningham, 182 Conn. 80, 438 A.2d 6 (1980).Affirmed.