Pate v. Children's Hospital

8 Citing cases

  1. Moore v. Johnson

    826 F. Supp. 1106 (W.D. Mich. 1993)   Cited 5 times
    Awarding summary judgment to defendant and declining to extend right of recovery for intentional infliction of emotional distress to infant on grounds that infant not physically present when alleged conduct occurred; after the fact discovery of the defendant's alleged outrageous conduct would not suffice

    In Michigan, where a third person can bring a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, it is referred to as the "bystander rule." See Pate v. Children's Hospital of Michigan, 158 Mich. App. 120, 404 N.W.2d 632 (1986) ("clearly contemplates [that the bystander (a close relative) witness] a sudden, brief, and inherently shocking accidental event which causes the injury or death, which contemporaneously, and by its very nature, results in emotional and physical injury to the plaintiff."). Plaintiffs respond by arguing that Infant Doe is not attempting to state a claim under a third-party theory (or under the "bystander" rule).

  2. Conway v. Detroit Pub. Sch. Cmty. Dist.

    No. 360875 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 23, 2023)

    In Pate v Children's Hosp of Michigan, 158 Mich.App. 120, 123; 404 N.W.2d 632 (1986), for example, this Court held that "while presence at the side of a loved one at the time of her death is certainly a grievous event, without more it is simply not the sort of inherently shocking and sudden event to which the doctrine of bystander recover[y] for emotional distress and resulting physical injury was intended to apply." Given that this Court found witnessing the death of a loved one insufficient to establish negligent infliction of emotional distress, we conclude that witnessing a loved one lose her job is not sufficient to give rise to such a claim.

  3. Frame v. Kothari

    115 N.J. 638 (N.J. 1989)   Cited 58 times
    Holding that a misdiagnosis is insufficient to support a claim for NIED because there was no "close temporal connection between the misdiagnosis and the injury, as well as the contemporaneous observation of the injury by the family member"

    Likewise, the Michigan Court of Appeals has denied recovery when the doctor failed to diagnose pneumonia in plaintiff's sister. Pate v. Children's Hosp. of Michigan, 158 Mich. App. 120, 404 N.W.2d 632 (1986). Two days later the sister died in the hospital emergency room while in plaintiff's arms.

  4. Brennan v. Chippewa Cnty. War Mem'l Hosp., Inc.

    No. 315795 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 16, 2014)

    The trial court correctly dismissed Brennan's individual claim. Citing Gustafson v Faris, 67 Mich App 363; 241 NW2d 208 (1976), this Court in Pate v Children's Hosp of Mich, 158 Mich App 120, 123; 404 NW2d 632 (1986), stated, "Gustafson clearly contemplates a sudden, brief, and inherently shocking accidental event which causes the injury or death, which contemporaneously, and by its very nature, results in emotional and physical injury to the plaintiff." While premised on a different medical need, in Pate as "[i]n this case, plaintiff has alleged that [the] death was caused by defendants' negligent omissions two days earlier when the defendants failed to admit decedent for care and observation relative to a[n] . . . ailment, failed to obtain an adequate history, failed to diagnose that decedent was suffering from a [medical condition], and failed to obtain an expert consultation relative to decedent's [medical] condition."

  5. Nugent v. Bauermeister

    195 Mich. App. 158 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992)   Cited 18 times
    Holding that the familial limitations set forth above "have consistently been applied by this Court," declining to expand the class of persons who may recover under an IIED claim, and collecting cases

    These limitations have consistently been applied by this Court since Gustafson was decided. See Miller v Cook, 87 Mich. App. 6; 273 N.W.2d 567 (1978); Williams v Citizens Mutual Ins Co of America, 94 Mich. App. 762; 290 N.W.2d 76 (1980); Pate v Children's Hosp of Michigan, 158 Mich. App. 120; 404 N.W.2d 632 (1986); Wargelin v Sisters of MercyHealth Corp, 149 Mich. App. 75; 385 N.W.2d 732 (1986); Henley v Dep't of State Hwys Transportation, 128 Mich. App. 214; 340 N.W.2d 72 (1983); Detroit Automobile Inter-Ins Exchange v McMillan (On Remand), 159 Mich. App. 48; 406 N.W.2d 232 (1987). We decline to deviate from Gustafson by expanding the class of persons entitled to bystander recovery from immediate family members to close friends of the injured third party.

  6. Gore v. Rains Block

    189 Mich. App. 729 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991)   Cited 22 times
    In Gore, where the defendants had already admitted the elements of malpractice, the court held that a malpractice plaintiff is entitled to recover damages for the malpractice and the mental anguish caused by the legal malpractice.

    Emotional distress damages are available in Michigan to a bystander who witnesses a negligent injury inflicted on a close family member. May v William Beaumont Hosp, 180 Mich. App. 728, 749; 448 N.W.2d 497 (1989); Pate v Children's Hosp of Michigan, 158 Mich. App. 120, 123; 404 N.W.2d 632 (1986). Actual physical harm is an element of damages for emotional distress which may also be available in other tort actions. Ledbetter v Brown City Savings Bank, 141 Mich. App. 692, 703; 368 N.W.2d 257 (1985).

  7. Doe v. Johnson

    817 F. Supp. 1382 (W.D. Mich. 1993)   Cited 19 times
    Distinguishing between duty to disclose actual knowledge of AIDS or AIDS symptoms and duty to disclose knowledge of high-risk behavior

    In Michigan, where a third person can bring a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, it is referred to as the "bystander rule." See Pate v. Children's Hospital of Michigan, 404 N.W.2d 632 (Mich.Ct.App. 1986) ("clearly contemplates [that the bystander (a close relative) witness] a sudden, brief, and inherently shocking accidental event which causes the injury or death, which contemporaneously, and by its very nature, results in emotional and physical injury to the plaintiff."). Plaintiffs responded by arguing that Infant Doe is not attempting to state a claim under a third-party theory (or under the "bystander" rule).

  8. Williams v. Baker

    572 A.2d 1062 (D.C. 1990)   Cited 110 times
    Adopting zone of danger test for the District of Columbia

    Plaintiffs seeking to recover damages for medical misdiagnoses of third persons have fared poorly under all theories of liability. See, e.g., Frame v. Kotheri, 115 N.J. 638, 560 A.2d 675 (1989); Pate v. Children's Hosp., 158 Mich. App. 120, 404 N.W.2d 632 (1986); Wilson v. Galt, 100 N.M. 227, 668 P.2d 1104, cert. quashed, 100 N.M. 192, 668 P.2d 308 (1983); Amodio v. Cunningham, 182 Conn. 80, 438 A.2d 6 (1980).Affirmed.