Accordingly, contrary to the plaintiff's contention, upon renewal, the Supreme Court properly granted those branches of the Port Authority's motion which were for summary judgment dismissing the causes of action alleging violations of Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6) insofar as asserted against it. Furthermore, the Supreme Court properly determined that, pursuant to the law-of-the-case doctrine, it was appropriate, upon renewal, to grant those branches of the motion of the defendant Zano Industries, Inc., which were for summary judgment dismissing the causes of action alleging violations of Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6) insofar as asserted against it ( see generally Pastrana v. Cutler, 115 A.D.3d 725, 983 N.Y.S.2d 33;Romagnolo v. Pandolfini, 75 A.D.3d 632, 634, 906 N.Y.S.2d 76). Although, pursuant to the law-of-the-case doctrine, this Court is not bound by the Supreme Court's prior determination, under the circumstances presented here, we decline to disturb the Supreme Court's invocation of that doctrine ( see Pastrana v. Cutler, 115 A.D.3d 725, 983 N.Y.S.2d 33;Romagnolo v. Pandolfini, 75 A.D.3d at 634, 906 N.Y.S.2d 76). The plaintiff's cross motion, denominated as one for leave to renew, did not offer any new facts not offered in support of the plaintiff's opposition to the Port Authority's motion which was for leave to renew its prior motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it.

Contrary to the plaintiff's contention, the Supreme Court properly relied upon the law of the case doctrine in determining that her General Business Law § 349 claim was governed by a three-year statute of limitations, and that her fraud claim was not pleaded with the requisite degree of specificity (see Maragliano v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 119 A.D.3d 534, 536, 987 N.Y.S.2d 885 ; Grossman v. Team Care Home Care Agency, Inc., 14 A.D.3d 652, 652, 789 N.Y.S.2d 303 ). Although, pursuant to the law of the case doctrine, this Court is not bound by the Supreme Court's prior determination, we find no basis here to disturb the Supreme Court's invocation of that doctrine (see Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London v. North Shore Signature Homes, Inc., 125 A.D.3d 799, 1 N.Y.S.3d 841 ; Pastrana v. Cutler, 115 A.D.3d 725, 727, 983 N.Y.S.2d 33 ; see also Gaidon v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 96 N.Y.2d 201, 210, 727 N.Y.S.2d 30, 750 N.E.2d 1078 ; Loiodice v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 125 A.D.3d 723, 726, 4 N.Y.S.3d 102 ; Brualdi v. IBERIA, Lineas Aereas de Espana, S.A., 79 A.D.3d 959, 960–961, 913 N.Y.S.2d 753 ). Further, the Supreme Court properly determined that the plaintiff's General Business Law § 349 claim accrued, insofar as asserted against the American Express defendants, on the date she closed on the purchase of the subject property, and not when she discovered the alleged deceptive act (see Corsello v. Verizon N.Y., Inc., 18 N.Y.3d 777, 789, 944 N.Y.S.2d 732, 967 N.E.2d 1177 ; Gaidon v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 96 N.Y.2d 201, 210, 727 N.Y.S.2d 30, 750 N.E.2d 1078 ; Loiodice v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 125 A.D.3d 723, 726, 4 N.Y.S.3d 102 ; Beller v. William Penn Life Ins. Co., 8 A.D.3d 310, 314, 778 N.Y.S.2d 82 ).

Sirica previously moved for the same relief, which was denied on the merits by the Supreme Court in an order entered November 22, 2006, and Sirica has not appealed from that order (see Kaygreen Realty Co., LLC v IG Second Generation Partners, L.P., 116 AD3d 667, 668-669; cf. Ramanathan v Aharon, 109 AD3d 529, 530-531). Although, pursuant to the doctrine of law of the case, this Court is not bound by the order entered November 22, 2006, we decline to disturb the Supreme Court's invocation of that doctrine (see e.g. Pastrana v Cutler, 115 AD3d 725, 727; Romagnolo v Pandolfini, 75 AD3d 632, 634). Broadway's remaining contentions have been rendered academic in light of our determination.

In light of the foregoing, the Court also denies the branch of Arbabzadeh' motion seeking the dismissal of plaintiff's Labor Law § 240 (1) claim against her. Finally, the Court denies, in its entirety, the motion by Alem for summary judgment dismissing the complaint against her, such motion being untimely, successive, and barred, in part, by the law of the case doctrine (see Miceli v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 3 NY3d 725, 786 NYS2d 379 [2004]; Pastrana v Cutler, 115 AD3d 725, 983 NYS2d 33 [2d Dept 2014]; Sutter v Wakefern Food Corp., 69 AD3d 844, 892 NYS2d 764 [2d Dept 2010]). A review of the court's computerized system reveals that Alem's motion was made more than four months after the filing of the note of issue is this case.

iva for summary judgment on the third-party contractual indemnification claim against Island Pump, it is noted that by Order dated November 15, 2015, this Court denied a prior summary judgment motion by Island Pump which sought dispositive relief on the same issue. After considering the motion, as well as opposition papers submitted by Shell and Motiva, the Court determined triable issues existed as to whether the terms of the parties' 2004 blanket agreement continued to govern all of their subsequent agreements and, if so, whether the unsigned 2009 purchase order retaining Island Pump to perform the subject renovation work incorporated the indemnification obligations set forth in the earlier blanket agreement, inasmuch as the motion by Shell and Motiva seeks summary judgment on the very same contractual indemnification claim, requiring the Court to reconsider issues that were previously decided on the merits, the Court finds that it is precluded by the law of the case doctrine (see Pastrana v Cutler, 115 AD3d 725, 983 NYS2d 33 [2d Dept 2014]; Romagnolo v Pandolfini, 75 AD3d 632, 906 NYS2d 76 [2d Dept 2010]; Gualano v Abington Sq. Condominium Assn., 69 AD3d 793, 894 NYS2d 453 [2d Dept 2010]). "[T]he law of the case doctrine addresses the potentially preclusive effect of judicial determinations made in the course of a single litigation before final judgment.