Summary
noting plaintiffs' car would have qualified as a "temporary substitute automobile" under defendant's liability policy if that policy had provided such common coverage; yet policy did not, and "in the absence of a statutory requirement for the inclusion of such a clause, the courts have no power simply to create coverage out of the whole cloth when none exists on the face of an insurance contract"
Summary of this case from Allstate Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. PaolinoOpinion
No. 84-2370.
July 30, 1985.
Appeal from the Circuit Court, Dade County, Richard S. Fuller, J.
Mandina Ginsberg and Marc Ginsberg, Miami, for appellants.
Blackwell, Walker, Gray, Powers, Flick Hoehl and Todd A. Cowart, Miami, for appellee.
Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and HUBBART and DANIEL S. PEARSON, JJ.
The plaintiffs were involved in a collision with a vehicle which would have undoubtedly qualified as a "temporary substitute automobile" under the defendant Sigler's liability policy if, as most other policies probably do, it provided that coverage. See National Indemnity Co. v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 472 So.2d 856 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985). Sigler's Commercial Union policy, however, did not. Because, in the absence of a statutory requirement for the inclusion of such a clause, the courts have no power simply to create coverage out of the whole cloth when none exists on the face of an insurance contract, e.g., Travelers Ins. Co. v. C.J. Gayfer's and Co., Inc., 366 So.2d 1199 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979); see generally Haenal v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 88 So.2d 888 (Fla. 1956), the trial court correctly entered declaratory judgment that the Commercial Union policy did not apply.
Affirmed.