Opinion
Civil Action No: 00-2213, Section: "D" (5)
April 11, 2002
MINUTE ENTRY
Before the court are the following motions:
(1) "Motion for Leave of Court to File Amended Complaint Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 1985" filed by Plaintiff, Nicholas Pastor; and
(2) "Motion to Dismiss" filed by Defendant, George Green.
The motions, set for hearing on Wednesday, March 20, 2002, are before the court on briefs, without oral argument. Having reviewed the memoranda of counsel and the applicable law, the court now rules.
In this matter, Plaintiff initially sued Charles Foti, Jr., individually and in his official capacity as Orleans Parish Criminal Sheriff and unknown sheriff's deputies (referred to as John Doe or Doe), alleging that these defendants violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 1985, the Louisiana constitution and Louisiana Civil Code Article 2315, while Plaintiff was detained at the Orleans Parish Prison on July 28, 1999.
On February 25, 2002 (more than two and a half years after the incident in question), Plaintiff sought leave of court to file an Amended Complaint to substitute "Deputy George Green" for the previously unidentified "John Doe" deputy. Because Plaintiff's failure to name Deputy Green was due to a lack of knowledge as to his identity, and not of a mistake in his name, Plaintiff is prevented from availing himself of the relation back doctrine of Federal Rule of Procedure 15(c). Jacobsen v. Osborne, 133 F.3d 315 (5th Cir. 1998).
"Because there is no federal statute of limitations for § 1983 claims, district courts use the forum states personal injury limitations." Moore v. McDonald, 80 F.3d 616, 620 (5th Cir. 1994). Louisiana's liberative prescriptive period for delictual obligations is one year. La. Civ. Code Art. 3492.
However, under Louisiana Civil Code Article 2324(c), the interruption of prescription against one joint tortfeasor is effective against all joint tortfeasors. Thus, the court must determine:
Whether Deputy Green is alleged to have a joint tortfeasor relationship with the original Defendant, Sheriff Foti (who is still a Defendant in this case), and if so, why prescription is not interrupted on Plaintiff's claims against Deputy Green.
Consistent with the practice of borrowing state statutes of limitations for § 1983 claims, federal courts also look to state law for its tolling provisions. Burge v. St. Tammany, 996 F.2d 786, 788 (5th Cir. 1993). in Louisiana, when suit is filed against one joint tortfeasor, prescription is interrupted as to all joint tortfeasors. La. Civil Code Art. 2324(c).
As to the John Doe deputy (who is identified as Deputy Green in the proposed Amended Complaint), Plaintiff alleges that the deputy committed a battery upon Plaintiff, and sues him under § 1983 and Louisiana state tort law. As to his claims against Sheriff Foti, Plaintiff includes an allegation that Sheriff Foti failed to adequately train, supervise and control the actions of his deputies, and sues Sheriff Foti under § 1983 and Louisiana's tort law. Under Louisiana negligence law, Plaintiff also asserts that:
Foti either controlled or had the ability to control the actions and omissions of Green and the unknown corrections officers exercising custody of the Plaintiff, including but not limited to the battery committed upon the Plaintiff. Foti is therefore vicariously liable in solido with Green and the unknown corrections officers for any and all damages resulting from the actions or omissions of Green and the unknown corrections (officers]. . . .
(Proposed Amended Complaint, 39).
In the context of vicarious liability, an employee and employer are not joint tortfeasors, since "[l]iability is imposed upon the employer without regard to his own negligence or fault; it is a consequence of the employment relationship." Sampay v. Morton Salt Co., 395 So.2d 326, 328 (La. 1981).
So, the question that remains (aside from Plaintiff's claim that Sheriff Foti is vicariously liable for his employee's acts under state law) is "whether Sheriff Foti and Deputy Green are joint tortfeasors as to Plaintiff's claims which allege that Sheriff Foti was also negligent in failing to adequately train, supervise and control the actions of his deputies and Deputy Green was negligent in committing a battery". The court finds in the affirmative.
While neither the original nor proposed amended complaints explicitly allege that Sheriff Foti and Deputy John Doe/Deputy Green are joint tortfeasors, the facts claimed treat the defendants as joint tortfeasors. Defendants are deemed joint tortfeasors even though their concurrent negligence results from different acts or breaches of different obligations. Duplechain v. Clausing Machine Tools, 420 So.2d 720, 722 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1982). Thus, the timely filing of Plaintiff's original complaint against Sheriff Foti (who is still a Defendant in this case) interrupts prescription of Plaintiff's claims against Deputy Green.
However, when interruption hinges on the status of joint tortfeasors, when no liability is found on the part of the timely sued tortfeasor, prescription will not be interrupted as to the other joint tortfeasors not timely sued since no joint or solidary obligation exists. Gioustover v. Progressive American Ins. Co., 561 So.2d 961, 964 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1990). Thus, if it is later determined in this matter that Sheriff Foti has no liability, prescription of Plaintiff's claims against Deputy Green will not be interrupted.
Accordingly;
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff's "Motion for Leave of Court to File Amended Complaint Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 1985" be and is hereby GRANTED and Plaintiff's Amended Complaint attached to Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File (Doc. No. 24) be DOCKETED into the record; and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the "Motion to Dismiss" filed on behalf of Deputy George Green, be and is hereby DENIED.