See Babson v. Babson, 374 Mass. 96, 101-102 (1977), quoting from Mazzola v. Myers, 363 Mass. 625, 633 (1973). It is appropriate for us to render a decision in this case despite the parties' agreement that the amendment contained an inadvertent scrivener's mistake, cf. Pastan v. Pastan, 378 Mass. 148, 149 (1979); Babson v. Babson, supra at 101-103 (1977), because only an interpretive decision by the highest State court will dispose of contrary interpretations by the Internal Revenue Service. See Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 465 (1967). We conclude on the basis of the discussion below that the amendment should be reformed so as to delete only the first paragraph of the first section of article Third and to retain the remainder of section 1 as found in the 1968 trust instrument.

Compare Putnam v. Putnam, 366 Mass. 261, 268-269 (1974), with Persky v. Hutner, 369 Mass. 7, 15 (1975). See also Pastan v. Pastan, 378 Mass. 148, 155 (1979). The donor of a trust and "[a] testator may allow the burden of both the Federal and State tax to fall where the law has placed it, or he may shift the burden and provide that it shall be ultimately paid out of the shares of those who otherwise could not be required to bear any part of either tax."

Id. It is firmly established that considering tax implications is proper when inferring intent. Berman, supra at 511 n. 6. Pastan v. Pastan, 378 Mass. 148, 155 (1979). In the area of trusts and estates, the reduction of taxes is often not just a factor affecting intent, but rather the overriding purpose of the entire transaction.

The parties all agree and convincingly argue that Mary's will was obviously written with tax considerations in mind and was a standard instrument in many ways for accomplishing estate tax minimization. For example, Mary's will specifically bequeathed to Joseph the maximum amount allowable as a marital deduction and prohibited the funding of the marital deduction share with assets that would not qualify for the marital deduction or not be part of the taxable estate. Her will also contains provisions designed to avoid the estate tax pitfalls encountered by the litigants in Pastan v. Pastan, 378 Mass. 148 (1979); First Nat'l Bank v. First Nat'l Bank, 375 Mass. 121 (1978); Babson v. Babson, 374 Mass. 96 (1977); and Putnam, supra. And this court has often recognized that "[i]nherent in the provisions of [a] will is the intent that no general provision should be applied to produce a Federal estate (or [generation skipping transfer]) tax result that would solely benefit the Federal tax gatherers."

Even though the IRS is not a party to this action, and the case may be viewed as lacking "the usual adversary characteristics," we may decide the issue. Pastan v. Pastan, 378 Mass. 148, 149 n. 5 (1979). First Nat'l Bank v. First Nat'l Bank, 375 Mass. 121 (1978).

Therefore, unless a contrary intent can be ascertained from the trust instrument, it is reasonable to require the trustee to also determine the amount or size of the particular bequests based on the date-of-distribution values of the assets used to satisfy those bequests. Compare Pastan v. Pastan, 378 Mass. 148, 390 N.E.2d 253, 256 (1979), where the testamentary trust contained the following pertinent language: "`In the administration . . . of the Trusts established under this Will, the Executors . . . shall have the following powers: J. . . . to make any division or distribution required under the terms of this will in kind or in money, . . . and to that end to allot to any part or share such stock, securities or other property, real or personal, as to them seems proper in their absolute judgment, and their judgment as to the value of such stock, securities, or other property so allocated shall be conclusive on all parties. . . .'"

They are not to be viewed as controlling in further proceedings upon remand. See, e.g., Boston Safe Deposit Trust Co. v. Stone, 348 Mass. at 349; Pastan v. Pastan, 378 Mass. 148, 154 (1979). The judgments are reversed, and the matter is remanded to the Probate and Family Court for the entry of judgments consistent with this opinion.