Pashova v. Geist

6 Citing cases

  1. Nelson v. Burns

    16-cv-506-jdp (W.D. Wis. Feb. 14, 2019)

    Cases from other courts are not directly on point and do not show a clear trend.See Pashova v. Geist, No. 09-cv-340 JD, 2012 WL 1074072, at *10 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 29, 2012) (use of taser not excessive under the Fourth Amendment when suspect was restrained but was spitting and attempting to bite officers; "the Officers would have perceived the threat posed by accidental ingestion of or exposure to her saliva as a significant one, given their concerns that she was a drug user"; the suspect "was also indisputably disruptive, uncooperative, and unresponsive"); Brown v. Mundy, No. CV411-264, 2011 WL 6176740, at *2 (S.D. Ga. Dec. 12, 2011), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV411-264, 2012 WL 12679 (S.D. Ga. Jan. 3, 2012) (use of taser not excessive under Fourth Amendment because suspect "was kicking officers and spitting in their faces"); Stormer v. Koon, No. 08cv813, 2010 WL 1257592, at *6-7 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 30, 2010) (the defendants' use of knee strikes and fist strikes were not excessive under the Fourteenth Amendment even though the plaintiff was handcuffed and lying down in cell when the plaintiff kicked at defendants and spit blood at them); Zivojin

  2. Waters v. Lake City Police Ofc. John Stewart

    Civil Action No.: 4:15-cv-4143-RBH-TER (D.S.C. Jan. 29, 2019)

    Nevertheless, even assuming that an issue of fact exists as to whether Stewart used the taser, "the fact that Plaintiff was in handcuffs does not make [a] use of force per se objectively unreasonable." Sparks v. Henderson Cty. Sheriffs Office, No. 1:16-CV-9-FDW, 2018 WL 1413186, at *8 (W.D.N.C. Mar. 21, 2018) (citing Beale v. Madigan, No. 5:11-CT-3244-F, 2014 WL 12513870, at *5 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 26, 2014) (unpublished) (holding that, although the plaintiff was handcuffed, the use of force was reasonable under the Fourteenth Amendment because "Plaintiff was in a detention center and swinging his body wildly in an attempt to disobey instructions"), affirmed after remand in light of Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466 (2015), 668 Fed. Appx. 448 (4th Cir. 2016); Pashova v. Geist, No. 1:09cv340-JD, 2012 WL 1074072, at *12 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 29, 2012) (holding that the use of a taser on an arrestee in a restraint chair was objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment because, although the plaintiff was not resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight, she was indisputably interfering with the officers' execution of their duties); Stormer v. Koon, No. 1:08cv813, 2010 WL 1257592, at *6-7 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 30, 2010) (the defendants' use of knee strikes and fist strikes were reasonable under the Fourteenth Amendment even though the plaintiff was handcuffed and lying down in cell where the plaintiff kicked defendants and spit blood at them because "the punches were inflicted in a good faith effort to make Plaintiff stop resisting and to make him stop spitting blood at the officers"). Stewart testified at the suppression hearing that Plaintiff refused to come out of the car and was cursing and kicking his feet.

  3. Sparks v. Henderson Cnty. Sheriffs Office

    1:16-cv-9-FDW (W.D.N.C. Mar. 21, 2018)

    Third, the fact that Plaintiff was in handcuffs does not make Collins' use of force per se objectively unreasonable. See, e.g., Beale v. Madigan, No. 5:11-CT-3244-F, 2014 WL 12513870, at *5 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 26, 2014) (unpublished) (holding that, although the plaintiff was handcuffed, the use of force was reasonable under the Fourteenth Amendment because "Plaintiff was in a detention center and swinging his body wildly in an attempt to disobey instructions"), affirmed after remand in light of Kingsley, 668 Fed. Appx. 448 (4th Cir. 2016); Pashova v. Geist, No. 1:09cv340-JD, 2012 WL 1074072, at *12 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 29, 2012) (holding that the use of a taser on an arrestee in a restraint chair was objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment because, although the plaintiff was not resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight, she was indisputably interfering with the officers' execution of their duties); Stormer v. Koon, No. 1:08cv813, 2010 WL 1257592, at *6-7 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 30, 2010) (the defendants' use of knee strikes and fist strikes were reasonable under the Fourteenth Amendment even though the plaintiff was handcuffed and lying down in cell where the plaintiff kicked defendants and spit blood at them because "the punches were inflicted in a good faith effort to make Plaintiff stop resisting and to make him stop spitting blood at the officers"). Finally, as discussed, supra, the reasonableness of Collins' use of force is also clear from Plaintiff's minimal injuries.

  4. Lewis v. Tazewell Cnty.

    Case No. 10-1268 (C.D. Ill. Mar. 7, 2013)   Cited 3 times

    Id. at 743; (Cf. Wilkins). To be certain, this Court's reading of Forrest v. Prine seems to directly contradict the Seventh Circuit's holdings in Ortiz and Lopez. The Northern District of Illinois confronted a similar dilemma in Pashova v. Geist, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43760 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 29, 2012). In that case, the Court ruled "Forrest stands directly contrary to Lopez, and both are 'good' law... [n]ormally this court would follow the more recent case, but after careful consideration the court is convinced that Lopez is the more definitive statement of the rule."

  5. Love v. Rockford Ill. Mun. Police Dep't

    CASE NUMBER 08 C 50254 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 15, 2013)   Cited 2 times

    The use of a taser alone does not per se constitute excessive force. See Pashova v. Geist, 2012 WL 1074072, * 11-12 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 29, 2012) (citing Seventh Circuit cases); see also Lewis v. Downey, 581 F. 3d 467, 476-77 (7th Cir. 2009) (use of taser is not per se unconstitutional force under the Eighth Amendment). Under the facts here, it was entirely reasonable to use the taser, particularly on the lower setting, to prevent plaintiff from ingesting the packets of drugs. Further, there is no evidence that Wassner used any force beyond that minimally necessary to accomplish that purpose.

  6. Pam v. City of Mich. City

    CIVIL NO. 3:12cv265 (N.D. Ind. Sep. 7, 2012)   Cited 3 times
    Asserting only that the officer was acting in his official capacity when he allegedly committed a constitutional deprivation cannot serve to hold the municipality liable

    Id. at 394. See also, Pashova v. Geist, 2012 WL 1074072 (N.D. Ind. 2012). The Seventh Circuit has held that the Fourth Amendment governs the time period between when the arrest was made and the determination of probable cause.