Pashley v. Pacific Elec. Ry. Co.

133 Citing cases

  1. Mills v. Mills

    147 Cal.App.2d 107 (Cal. Ct. App. 1956)   Cited 43 times
    In Mills, the defendant, Oscar Mills (Mills), purchased a piece of property from his parents, signing a promissory note for partial consideration.

    [19] Where a party fraudulently conceals the existence of a cause of action against him, the statute of limitations is tolled and the guilty party is estopped to plead the limitations. ( Kimball v. Pacific Gas Elec. Co., 220 Cal. 203 [ 30 P.2d 39]; Pashley v. Pacific Elec. Ry. Co., 25 Cal.2d 226 [ 153 P.2d 325]; Benner v. Industrial Acc. Com., 26 Cal.2d 346 [ 159 P.2d 24].) [20] The doctrine of equitable estoppel may be invoked to prevent a defendant from relying on the statute of limitations. [21] When a defendant who sets up the statute has previously by fraud or any violation of duty to the plaintiff caused him to subject his claim to the statutory bar, he must be charged with having wrongfully obtained an advantage which the courts will not allow him to hold.

  2. Scafidi v. Western Loan & Bldg. Co.

    72 Cal.App.2d 550 (Cal. Ct. App. 1946)   Cited 81 times
    Stating that the trial court may rely on admissions made by counsel to render judgment on the pleadings

    The remaining question to be determined is whether or not the facts pleaded by plaintiffs are prima facie sufficient to show a fraudulent concealment by defendants of the existence [ 72 Cal.App.2d 559 of their cause of action for money had and received. At this time it would be peculiarly difficult and inexpedient for an intermediate appellate court to attempt the formulation of an accurate or exclusive definition purporting to state what essential factors are sufficient to constitute the fraudulent concealment of a cause of action, and the question must be examined with due regard to such modifications in the preexisting rules of decision on this subject as may have been effected by the decisions of our Supreme Court in the cases of Kimball v. Pacific Gas Electric Co., 220 Cal. 203 [ 30 P.2d 39]; Pashley v. Pacific Elec. Ry. Co., 25 Cal.2d 226 [ 153 P.2d 325]; and Hobart v. Hobart Estate Co., 26 Cal.2d 412 [ 159 P.2d 958]. Reference particularly is made to the Pashley decision for a succinct and accurate recital of the historical sequences of the doctrine of fraudulent concealment in the jurisprudence of this state and for a comprehensive listing of the cases wherein it has been involved.

  3. Stafford v. Shultz

    42 Cal.2d 767 (Cal. 1954)   Cited 88 times
    Stating that a patient's action for injuries based on the physician's negligent treatment of the patient is an action sounding in tort and not upon a contract

    This principle has been applied and expressed in one form or another in several recent decisions dealing specifically with the question of fraudulent concealment of a cause of action in its relation to the statute of limitation. ( Hansen v. Bear Film Co., Inc., 28 Cal.2d 154, 178-179 [ 168 P.2d 946]; Sears v. Rule, 27 Cal.2d 131, 148 [ 163 P.2d 443]; Bollinger v. National Fire Ins. Co., 25 Cal.2d 399, 411 [ 154 P.2d 399]; Pashley v. Pacific Elec. Ry.Co., supra [ 25 Cal.2d 226 ( 153 P.2d 325)], at page 235.)"

  4. Cangemi v. Advocate South Suburban Hospital

    364 Ill. App. 3d 446 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006)   Cited 100 times
    Holding that fraudulent misrepresentation requires that "reliance by the person to whom the statement was made led to ... injury." (quoting Stewart v. Thrasher , 242 Ill.App.3d 10, 15–16, 182 Ill.Dec. 930, 610 N.E.2d 799, 803 (Ill.App.Ct. 4th Dist.1993) )

    " (Emphasis added.) Kenroy, 78 Ill. 2d at 563, 402 N.E.2d at 185, citing Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath Horwath v. Tuckman, 372 A.2d 168, 170-71 (Del. 1976), Pashley v. Pacific Electric Ry. Co., 25 Cal. 2d 226, 235-36, 153 P.2d 325, 330 (1944), Oddo v. Interstate Bakeries, Inc., 271 P.2d 417, 423-24 (8th Cir. 1959), Schram v. Burt, 111 F.2d 557, 563 (6th Cir. 1940), G. Bogert, Trusts Β§ 955, at 506-10 (2d ed. 1916), 2 H. Wood, Wood on Limitations Β§ 276, at 1374-75 (4th ed. 1916). The court determined that "the existence of an agency relationship, privity or even an actual conspiracy" between the defendants and the city alderman had been adequately alleged, and then held that section 22 of the Limitations Act (the predecessor of section 13-215) applied to toll the cause of action against defendants because they actively induced the alderman to fraudulently conceal the cause of action from the city Kenroy, 78 Ill. 2d at 564, 402 N.E.2d at 186.

  5. Baker v. Beech Aircraft Corp.

    39 Cal.App.3d 315 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974)   Cited 108 times
    Holding that where there is no legal "relationship imposing a duty to speak, actual fraud will estop the defense of the statute of limitations"

    There are other allegations, however, to the effect appellants relied on Beech's representations of the fitness of the plane and it was on the basis of such representations that they were lulled into inaction during the period when they could have properly brought their lawsuit. In Pashley v. Pacific Elec. Ry. Co., 25 Cal.2d 226 [ 153 P.2d 325], the court cited Waugh v. Guthrie Gas, Light, Fuel Improvement Co., 37 Okla. 239 [ 131 P. 174, 179] which held "It is no sufficient answer to say, as have counsel in their brief, that plaintiff must have known that he was blown up, and realized he was injured. This he undoubtedly knew; but it was the fact that defendant by its negligence was the cause of the injury that gave rise to the cause of action against it, not the mere fact of injury.

  6. Bernson v. Browning-Ferris Industries

    7 Cal.4th 926 (Cal. 1994)   Cited 248 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that fraudulent concealment β€œtolls the applicable statute of limitations, but only for that period during which the claim is undiscovered by plaintiff or until such time as plaintiff, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have discovered it”

    Like the discovery rule, the rule of fraudulent concealment is an equitable principle designed to effect substantial justice between the parties; its rationale "is that the culpable defendant should be estopped from profiting by his own wrong to the extent that it hindered an `otherwise diligent' plaintiff in discovering his cause of action." ( Id. at p. 100, italics omitted; see also Pashley v. Pacific Elec. Ry. Co. (1944) 25 Cal.2d 226, 231-232 [ 153 P.2d 325].)(1b) Consistent with these principles, a cause of action for libel generally accrues when the defamatory matter is published ( Strick v. Superior Court (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 916, 922 [ 192 Cal.Rptr. 314]); under the discovery rule, however, the date of accrual may be delayed where the defendant's actions hinder plaintiff's discovery of the defamatory matter. (See Manguso v. Oceanside Unified SchoolDist. (1979) 88 Cal.App.3d 725 [ 152 Cal.Rptr. 27]; McNair v. Worldwide Church of God (1987) 197 Cal.App.3d 363, 379 [ 242 Cal.Rptr. 823]; see also Cain v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.Co. (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 310, 314-315 [ 132 Cal.Rptr. 860] [claim for violation of right to privacy accrues upon discovery of the invasion].)

  7. Carruth v. Fritch

    36 Cal.2d 426 (Cal. 1950)   Cited 67 times
    Reversing demurrer where plaintiff delayed suit because defendant fraudulently induced her to believe she would be fully compensated

    Under certain circumstances, the representations of one who is charged with negligence resulting in personal injuries may toll the statute of limitations. For example, in Pashley v. PacificElec. Ry. Co., 25 Cal.2d 226 [ 153 P.2d 325], a passenger on a streetcar alleged that, by reason of the negligence of the defendant, he received an injury to his eye. The complaint also pleaded facts which may be summarized as follows: A physician employed by the railway company removed glass splinters from Pashley's eye and told him that he must go to no other doctor; the company would not be responsible if he did so. He was assured that there was no permanent injury to his eye, but the company's physician asked him to return in two years for a final check-up.

  8. Snow v. A.H. Robins Co.

    165 Cal.App.3d 120 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985)   Cited 45 times
    Holding that plaintiff's fraud cause of action did not accrue until she became aware of facts from which she could conclude that defendant fraudulently misrepresented a material fact

    (3) With respect to actions based on fraud, the statute of limitations is tolled whenever plaintiff is able to show the defendant fraudulently concealed facts which would have led him to discover his potential cause of action. ( Pashley v. Pacific Elec. Ry. Co. (1944) 25 Cal.2d 226, 231-232 [ 153 P.2d 325].) In Pashley, the Supreme Court concluded: "[ΒΆ] Technical rules as to when a cause of action accrues apply therefore only in those cases which are free from fraud committed by the defendant.

  9. Government of Virgin Islands v. Lansdale

    CIVIL NO. 2001/0157, CIVIL NO. 1992/0079 (D.V.I. Oct. 5, 2009)

    A defendant who, by fraud or deceit, conceals material facts and makes misrepresentations to "hinder[] the plaintiff from bringing an action within the statutory period, is estopped from taking advantage of his own wrong." Pashley v. Pacific Elec. Co., 153 P.2d 325, 328 (Cal. 1944). Fraudulent concealment halts the statute of limitations when there is "active conduct by a defendant, above and beyond the wrongdoing upon which the plaintiff's claim is filed, to prevent the plaintiff from suing in time." Santa Maria v. Pacific Bell, 202 F.3d 1170, 1177 (9th Cir. 2000).

  10. In re Northern District of Cal., Etc.

    503 F. Supp. 194 (N.D. Cal. 1980)   Cited 6 times

    Warrington v. Charles Pfizer Co., 274 Cal.App.2d 564, 569-70, 80 Cal.Rptr. 130 (1969).Pashley v. Pacific Elec. Ry. Co., 25 Cal.2d 226, 153 P.2d 325 (1944). DISCUSSION