Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County No. 06HL04224, Glenn A. Mahler, Judge.
Law Offices of Steven P. Nieto and Steven P. Nieto for Defendant and Appellant.
Millar, Hodges & Bemis and Richard W. Millar, Jr., for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
RYLAARSDAM, ACTING P. J.
Defendant Victoria Hawlish appeals from an order granting an application by plaintiff Crystal Paselk to renew an injunction under Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6 (all statutory references are to this code), which restrained defendant from harassing plaintiff and her family and required defendant to stay at least 150 yards away from them. Defendant contends the court erred in granting the petition because the original three-year injunction order had already expired by the time the court ruled on the petition, plaintiff failed to file a “new” petition, and there was no evidence plaintiff or her husband suffered emotional distress or that defendant engaged in a course of conduct directed at them. We reject these contentions and affirm the order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
At the time of the original petition for injunction, plaintiff and defendant were neighbors in Corona Del Mar. Plaintiff sought the injunction based on allegations defendant had entered her home without authorization, verbally assaulted her daughter, attempted to poison and kill her dog, dumped trash and dog feces in her front yard, spray-painted obscenities on her car, and accused her stepson of raping defendant’s daughter. The court issued the restraining order on October 10, 2003. The order required defendant to stay 150 yards away from plaintiff, her husband, and her two children and was to expire three years after the date of issuance.
In September 2005, defendant was convicted of attempted lewd and lascivious acts with a teenager and sentenced to 20 months in prison. One of the terms of defendant’s probation was that she not contact plaintiff or her family, or loiter anywhere near them. Because the condition was tied to the restraining order, it would be removed when the restraining order expired or became ineffective.
After defendant was released from prison on April 5, 2006, plaintiff saw her at various locations in Corona Del Mar. Because these locations were over 150 yards from plaintiff’s home, she dismissed them as coincidences.
On April 29, plaintiff’s husband was riding his bicycle along Pacific Coast Highway when defendant pulled up next to him in her car and drove next to him for about a mile. There was a reasonable amount of traffic and plaintiff’s husband could not recall whether the traffic was flowing at the same speed as his bicycle.
On May 11, plaintiff was driving past a ZPizza Restaurant, located within 135 feet from her residence, when she saw defendant standing outside the restaurant. Defendant, who was not carrying a pizza, glared at plaintiff, then waved to neighbors to come over to the restaurant. Plaintiff called her husband to warn him defendant was extremely close to their home. As plaintiff’s husband drove past ZPizza on his way home, defendant glared at him. He approached ZPizza to see if defendant would leave, but she did not and instead continued to socialize. Plaintiff’s husband called the police and reported the violation of the injunction. He also called defendant’s parole officer.
On September 29, plaintiff filed a “Request for Orders to Stop Harassment,” seeking to extend the prior injunction for another three years based on the April 29 and May 11 incidents. The court scheduled a hearing for October 16.
Following testimony from plaintiff, her husband, and defendant’s parole officer, the court issued a restraining order retroactive to September 29, 2006, the date the petition was filed, requiring defendant to stay at least 150 yards away from plaintiff and her family. The court relied solely on the May 11 ZPizza incident, noting that defendant had violated the prior restraining order knowing the order was in place and that her parole required her to comply with the order.
DISCUSSION
1. Granting of Petition After Original Injunction Order Expired
Defendant contends that because the original injunction expired on October 10, 2006, six days before the hearing on the current petition, “there was no valid [i]njunction [o]rder for [the court] to renew.” She acknowledges, however, the order was made “retroactive to the date of filing of the petition, September 29, 2006.”
“‘The general rule is that “courts have inherent power to enter judgments nunc pro tunc so as to relate back to the time when they should have been entered, but will do so only to avoid injustice.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] ‘A court will always exercise this authority when it is apparent that the delay in rendering the judgment, or a failure to enter it after its rendition, is the result of some act or delay of the court, and is not owing to any fault of the party making the application. . . . “[W]here the delay in rendering a judgment or a decree arises from the act of the court—that is, where the delay has been caused either for its convenience, or by the multiplicity or press of business, through the intricacy of the questions involved, or of any other cause not attributable to the laches of the parties—the judgment or the decree may be entered retrospectively as of a time when it should or might have been entered up.”’ [Citations.]” (Williamson v. Plant Insulation Co. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1406, 1415.) Here, in making the injunction retroactive, the court impliedly found the delay in rendering the order was of its own making and not due to any fault of plaintiff.
Defendant argues plaintiff waited over four months after the May 11 incident before filing her petition and did not make any attempt to schedule the hearing before October 16. But section 527.6, subdivision (d), the only authority defendant cites, allowed plaintiff to “apply for a renewal of the injunction by filing a new petition for an injunction” “[a]t any timewithin the three months before the expiration of the injunction.” Plaintiff filed her petition within the requisite timeframe. The statute contains no requirement that she obtain a hearing date before the original injunction expired.
2. “New” Petition
Defendant contends the request for renewal of the injunction should have been denied because section 527.6, subdivision (d) required plaintiff to file a “new” petition and she did not do so. The contention lacks merit.
Plaintiff filed her renewal petition on the prescribed Judicial Council form as 527.6, subdivision (m) mandates, citing the recent incidents. Defendant does not explain why this did not constitute a “new petition.” The contention is waived. (Benach v. County of Los Angeles (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 836, 852 [point waived by failure to support it with reasoned argument or authority].)
Defendant maintains the trial court ruled the renewal of the injunction did not require a new petition. The record does not support that characterization. Even if it did, we review the ruling, not the trial court’s rationale, and do not consider its oral comments. (Whyte v. Schlage Lock Co. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 1443, 1451.)
3. Emotional Distress and a Course of Conduct
Defendant also argues the court should have denied the renewal petition because the evidence did not show plaintiff or her husband suffered emotional distress or that defendant engaged in a course of conduct directed at them. We disagree.
In issuing the original injunction, the trial court necessarily found both emotional distress and a course of conduct. Because defendant did not appeal, she is bound by this finding. (In re Matthew C. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 386, 393 [if no timely appeal of appealable order, issues determined are res judicata].) She would also be bound if she had appealed and we had affirmed. And had we reversed, there would be no injunction to renew.
Defendant’s apparent position is that plaintiff must show the emotional distress or course of conduct occurred after the original injunction was issued in order to renew it. She cites no supporting authority. Although we may deem the point waived (Benach v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at p. 852), we shall exercise our discretion and address it on the merits.
Although “[i]njunctive relief will be denied where, at the time of the order or judgment, no reasonable probability exists of the recurrence of the past acts” (Donald v. Cafe Royale, Inc. (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 168, 184) or “where the defendant voluntarily discontinues the wrongful conduct” (Cisneros v. U.D. Registry, Inc. (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 548, 574), it need not be denied unless the trial court finds the discontinuance is both voluntary and in good faith. (Phipps v. Saddleback Valley Unified School Dist. (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 1110, 1118-1119.) “Compliance with a court order is not voluntary discontinuance . . . . [Citation.]” (Feminist Women’s Health Center v. Blythe (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1641, 1659; see also Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 121, 132-133.)
Here, the trial court could find it reasonably probable that, absent a renewed injunction, defendant would engage in renewed harassment. In the original injunction proceeding, the trial court necessarily found not only that defendant had engaged in harassment, but also that her harassing conduct evidenced a continuity of purpose. After the original injunction was granted and before it expired, defendant consciously violated the restraining order by socializing outside the ZPizza located 135 feet away from plaintiff’s residence, well within the area prohibited by the order, and refusing to leave even when approached by plaintiff’s husband. The trial court was not required to believe defendant’s claim she was merely at the ZPizza to purchase pizza and to run errands for her husband. We conclude that the trial court’s issuance of a renewed injunction was supported by substantial evidence.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. Respondent shall recover her costs on appeal.
WE CONCUR: BEDSWORTH, J., MOORE, J.