Opinion
No. 3-863 / 03-0417
Filed March 24, 2004
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Monona County, Jeffrey A. Neary, Judge.
A corporate landowner appeals from a district court ruling that established a boundary by acquiescence and quieted titled to certain land in neighboring landowners. AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.
Jeffrey Poulson of Corbett, Anderson, Corbett, Poulson Vellinga, L.L.P., Sioux City, for appellant.
Jay Denne and Colby Lessmann of Munger, Reinschmidt Denne, L.L.P., Sioux City, for appellee.
Heard by Zimmer, P.J., and Miller and Vaitheswaran, JJ.
Weaver Farms L.L.C. (Weaver Farms) appeals from a district court ruling that established a boundary by acquiescence between its property and property held by neighboring landowners Ronald and Marilyn Paseka, and quieted title to the disputed property in the Pasekas. While we affirm the district court's decision to establish a boundary by acquiescence in regard to the southern part of the property in question, we reverse the portion of the district court's ruling that established a boundary by acquiescence in the northern part of the property. We also remand this matter to limit its order quieting title to only a portion of the property in dispute.
Background Facts and Proceedings .
Ronald and Marilyn Paseka own agricultural property (Paseka land) located in Monona County. Their land is abutted on the east by property originally owned by Esther Butterfield (Butterfield land), which passed, following Esther's death, into the Esther Butterfield Trust (Trust). The Paseka land and Butterfield land are bisected by a highway that runs in a general east/west direction, dividing each property into northern and southern parcels.
Although the Pasekas did not purchase their property until 1990, Ronald Paseka began farming the Paseka land in 1974. At about this same time Terry Christensen began farming the Butterfield land under a lease, first with Esther Butterfield, then with the Trust. Over the next twenty-six years Christensen and Paseka planted crops side-by-side, both north and south of the highway. For most if not all of this time, Christensen and Paseka agreed that for the land south of the highway they would treat a two-foot ridge of dirt as the boundary between their fields, and that for the land north of the highway, they would treat a cottonwood tree as a boundary marker. These field boundaries were not part of the legally-described boundary between the Paseka land and the Butterfield land, but were located wholly within the Butterfield land.
Ronald testified he helped his father and uncle farm the property until about 1985, when he began renting the property on his own.
Jon Weaver and his company, Weaver Farms, became interested in purchasing the Butterfield land. In 2000 Weaver had a survey conducted, which revealed that the Pasekas' crops encroached onto the Butterfield land. In March 2001 Weaver Farms purchased the Butterfield land, and assumed Christensen's lease. At that time Jon Weaver noticed the crop line was different than it had been in 2000, and had another survey conducted. He then directed Christensen to plant his crops according to the marked survey lines. The ridge south of the highway was disked over and partially obliterated. Following the 2001 crop year, Weaver Farms terminated Christensen's lease.
This survey was conducted to find corner markers of land Weaver Farms owned which was located just south of the Butterfield property. Although the Butterfield land was not then Weaver's concern, the survey revealed the Pasekas' planting encroached onto the west side of the Butterfield property.
In March 2002 the Pasekas brought an action to establish a boundary by acquiescence, marked by the ridge in the south and the cottonwood tree in the north. They also sought to quiet title in themselves to the land located between that boundary and the legally-described eastern boundary of their property (disputed land). Weaver Farms counterclaimed to quiet title to the disputed land in itself. Following a bench trial, the district court concluded a boundary by acquiescence had been established, as indicated by the dirt ridge south of the highway and the tree north of the highway. The court then quieted title in the Pasekas to what it had previously described as the "south parcel" and the "north parcel."
Weaver Farms appeals contending the Pasekas failed to demonstrate that a boundary by acquiescence had been established in the disputed land either north of the highway (north parcel) or south of the highway (south parcel). It further contends the effect of the court's ruling was to quiet title in the Pasekas to, not only the disputed land, but to all of the adjoining land owned by Weaver Farms.
Scope of Review.
A chapter 650 action to establish a boundary by acquiescence is typically reviewed on error. See Iowa Code §§ 650.4, .15 (2001); Ollinger v. Bennett, 562 N.W.2d 167, 170 (Iowa 1997). However, the statutory formalities of a chapter 650 action were not observed in this case. Rather it appears, and the parties agree, that this matter was tried in equity. Thus, our review is de novo. Blumenthal Inv. Trusts v. City of West Des Moines, 636 N.W.2d 255, 260 (Iowa 2001). In such cases we give weight to the district court's fact-findings, especially concerning witness credibility, but are not bound by those findings. Iowa R. App. P. 6.14(6)( g).
Boundary by Acquiescence .
To establish a boundary by acquiescence the Pasekas must show they and Weaver Farms own adjacent properties, and that for a period in excess of ten years, the Pasekas and Weaver Farms and/or their predecessors in title mutually recognized, acknowledged and treated as the boundary between the properties, a line, definitively marked by a fence or in some manner. See Ollinger, 562 N.W.2d at 170. They must make this showing by clear evidence. Tewes v. Pine Lane Farms, Inc., 522 N.W.2d 801, 806 (Iowa 1994). Here, it is clear the properties are adjacent, and the boundary sought to be established by the Pasekas was recognized and treated as the boundary between the two properties, by the Pasekas and their predecessors in title, for a period in excess of ten years. This leaves two issues of dispute.
The first is whether the Pasekas established a definitively marked line. In Iowa, a boundary line cannot be an approximation, but must be specifically located. Heer v. Thola, 613 N.W.2d 658, 662 (Iowa 2000). "`The line acquiesced in must be known, definite, and certain, or known and capable of ascertainment. The line must have certain physical properties such as visibility, permanence, stability, and definite location.'" Id. (quoting 12 Am. Jur.2d Boundaries § 86, at 487 (1997) (footnotes omitted)). We conclude, as did the district court, that the dirt ridge located in the disputed land south of the highway meets this standard.
Weaver Farms argues testimony from Jon Weaver and his mother Josephine demonstrates that no ridge existed in south parcel. Whether the ridge in fact existed is a finding governed almost entirely by the district court's assessment of the credibility of various witnesses, most of whom were subject to some interest or, in the case of Christensen, potential bias. Clearly, the court gave more credence to the testimony of witnesses who identified a ridge in the south parcel, than it did to the testimony of the witnesses who denied the ridge's existence. We not only give weight to this finding by the court, Iowa R. App. P. 6.14(6)( g), but concur in it. The one clearly disinterested witness to speak to the issue testified that, when he surveyed the property in 2001, he noticed a "slight ridge" in the south parcel.
The ridge is clearly not a straight line. It is irregular and slightly meandering, which is likely due, at least in part, to the fact that Paseka and Christensen would occasionally till the ridge to minimize weeds. However, Christensen testified that, prior to being disked over, the ridge had not changed location since Esther Butterfield had it created, sometime prior to 1974, to assist with the drainage of her field. Moreover, the ridge was enhanced, albeit in a less than symmetrical fashion, by the yearly crop residue on both sides. While the mere "edge of a . . .field" might not be a sufficiently visible or permanent line, see Heer, 613 N.W.2d at 662, here the ridge and crop residue, taken together, established a visible, permanent, and definite line. Cf. Tewes, 522 N.W.2d at 806 (concluding substantial evidence supported district court determination that three posts in a row, "made more definitive by each year's crop residue," created a sufficiently definite line, even though crop residue line varied from year to year).
We cannot reach the same conclusion, however, regarding the north parcel. As the southern ridge does not continue north of the highway, the only established boundary marker in that area is the cottonwood tree. This is a solitary reference point, and insufficient to establish a clear and definitive line. Cf. De Viney v. Hughes, 243 Iowa 1388, 1393-94, 55 N.W.2d 478, 481 (1952) (concluding two visible ends of drainage tile were not "sufficiently definite to run a line in accordance therewith").
The Pasekas claim that, in addition to the tree, the boundary in the north parcel is marked by a "slight ridge." However, the district court did not rely on this alleged ridge when making its ruling, which indicates the court did not find that such a ridge in fact existed. As with the existence of the ridge in the south parcel, we not only give weight to this implicit finding by the district court, Iowa R. App. P. 6.14(6)( g), but concur in it. There is no ridge visible in the photographs of the north parcel. In addition, the surveyor who noticed a visible ridge in the south parcel did not notice such a ridge in the north parcel. We conclude the cottonwood tree is the only established marker of the alleged boundary in the north parcel.
The Pasekas' inability to establish a definite line north of the highway defeats their petition to establish a boundary by acquiescence in the north parcel. Accordingly, we focus solely on the south parcel in addressing the second area of dispute: whether there was clear proof Esther Butterfield or the Trust recognized and treated the alleged dividing line as the boundary between the Paseka land and Butterfield land.
There is no direct proof Esther or the Trust recognized the ridge in the south parcel as the boundary between the two properties. However, acquiescence "may be inferred by the silence or inaction of one party who knows of the boundary line claimed by the other and fails to take steps to dispute it for a ten-year period." Tewes, 522 N.W.2d at 806. The requirement that the burdened landowner know of the opposing party's claim a certain line is in fact the boundary line can be satisfied if the landowner has notice of the claim. Egli v. Troy, 602 N.W.2d 329, 333 (Iowa 1999).
Here, Esther knew of the ridge, as she had it created. In addition, the ridge was sufficiently visible that it could be observed by both Esther and the Trust representative who, according to Christensen, each visited the south parcel periodically. There is also evidence Esther and the Trust were on notice that the Pasekas were treating the ridge as the property boundary. Christensen testified that, during Esther's and the Trust representative's visits, they could observe that Paseka was farming up to the ridge. Moreover, Christensen's knowledge of the Pasekas' claim is evidence that Esther and the Trust "had sufficient opportunities to be put on notice of [the] claim." See Tewes, 522 N.W.2d at 807-08 ("the opportunity to know is properly considered in determining knowledge of a fact"). We conclude the record contains clear evidence of knowledge or notice on the part of Esther and Trust, for a period in excess of ten years, from which acquiescence to the boundary can be inferred.
Weaver Farms contends that such an analysis is flawed as Esther and the Trust were not in fact silent and inactive regarding the Pasekas' claim, but rather took affirmative steps to assert their successive rights of ownership over the south parcel. It relies on the fact that the only access to the south parcel is by a driveway located in the parcel, and argues Christensen's use of the drive, and Esther's and the Trust representative's presumptive uses of the drive, must be interpreted as a denial of the Pasekas' claim.
We cannot agree that the use of the driveway, which was the only access into not only the south parcel, but the rest of the Butterfield land south of the highway, is inconsistent with acquiescence. No evidence was presented, beyond the fact or supposition of use itself, that indicates any use of the drive in the ten years leading up to Weaver Farms's purchase of the Butterfield land was hostile or adverse to the Pasekas' claim. Cf. 12 Am. Jur.2d Boundaries § 85, at 487 ("When there is evidence of a continuous dispute between the owners, there can be no acquiescence.").
Quiet Title .
Weaver Farms argues that the district court's reference to the "south parcel" and "north parcel," when read in conjunction with the legal descriptions the court listed for those parcels, had the effect of quieting title in the Pasekas to all of the Butterfield land that lies to the east of the Paseka land. While a reading of the district court's order evinces an intent to quiet title to only the disputed land, we agree with Weaver Farms that the court's order does not clearly limit the title it vested in the Pasekas to only the disputed land. We therefore conclude that this matter should be remanded to the district court, so that it may clearly limit the quieting of title in the Pasekas to the disputed land south of the highway.
Conclusion .
The Pasekas failed to demonstrate that a boundary by acquiesce was established on the Butterfield land located to the north of the highway. We therefore reverse that portion of the district court's order that found such a boundary had been established, and quieted titled to the "north parcel" in the Pasekas. We affirm, however, the district court's conclusion that a boundary by acquiescence was established on the disputed portion of the Butterfield land located to the south of the highway. We also remand this matter to the district court so that it may amend the legal description of the "south parcel" to clearly and specifically quiet title to only that portion of the Butterfield land that lies between the southern ridge and the legally-described eastern boundary of the Paseka land.