Opinion
DBDCV196030164S
05-16-2019
Diana Pascola-Milton v. Liberty Mutual Fire Ins. Co.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Judge (with first initial, no space for Sullivan, Dorsey, and Walsh) Krumeich, Edward T., J.
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
Krumeich, J.
Plaintiff Diana Pascola-Milton has applied to vacate an arbitration award in her favor and against defendant Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company ("Liberty"). For the reasons stated below, the motion to vacate the arbitration award is denied.
Plaintiff brought suit against Liberty seeking underinsured motorist coverage in connection with a motor vehicle accident in which she was injured. After settling with the tortfeasor, plaintiff entered into an arbitration agreement with Liberty in which the parties agreed to voluntarily submit the claim to private arbitration with the understanding the award would be no less than $30,000 and no more than $150,000, the available underinsured motorist coverage on the policy. On January 30, 2019, the arbitrator entered an award in favor of plaintiff for economic damages of $35,135 and non-economic damages of $37,500, for a total award of $72,635.
On February 21, 2019, plaintiff moved to vacate the arbitration award pursuant to C.G.S. § 52-418. The motion states three reasons to vacate the award: "1.) The award has been procured by corruption, fraud or undue means; 2.) There has been evident partiality or corruption on the part of the arbitrator; 3.) The arbitrator has exceeded his powers or has so imperfectly executed them that a mutual final and definitive award upon the subject matter was not made." No subordinate facts were alleged to support the reasons stated which appear to be a restatement of the statutory language.
On May 13, 2019, plaintiff testified at a hearing on her application to vacate the arbitration award. She testified that she believed that the arbitrator was partial to the insurance company after she read the award. Before she read the decision plaintiff did not think the arbitrator was partial. Plaintiff testified her overall impression from reading the award was that the arbitrator made it seem like the accident was her fault and he underplayed the severity of the accident. She complained that the arbitrator undervalued her vehicle with a false comparison to the value of a truck. She took him to task for "overstepping boundaries" by making medical decisions about whether she over-treated and about her preexisting medical conditions. On cross examination plaintiff admitted she did not know if corruption, fraud or undue means were used to procure judgment.
In Norwalk Police Union v. City of Norwalk, 324 Conn. 618, 628 (2017), the Supreme Court reiterated the narrow scope of judicial review of an arbitration award does not include reexamination of the factual findings of the arbitration panel or the evidence underlying the findings: " ‘When the parties agree to arbitration and establish the authority of the arbitrator through the terms of their submission, the extent of our judicial review of the award is delineated by the scope of the parties’ agreement ... When the scope of the submission is unrestricted, the resulting award is not subject to de novo review even for errors of law so long as the award conforms to the submission ... Because we favor arbitration as a means of settling private disputes, we undertake judicial review of arbitration awards in a manner designed to minimize interference with an efficient and economical system of alternative dispute resolution.’ ... Accordingly, ‘the factual findings of the arbitrator ... are not subject to judicial review ... (’[u]nder an unrestricted submission, the arbitrators’ decision is considered final and binding; thus the courts will not review the evidence considered by the arbitrators nor will they review the award for errors of law or fact’ ... )." (Citations omitted.)
In LaFrance v. Lodmell, 322 Conn. 828, 851 (2017), the Supreme Court recently reiterated the restriction on judicial review of whether the arbitrators exceeded their powers to an examination of the submission and the award to determine whether the award conforms to the submission: "When the parties have agreed to a procedure and have delineated the authority of the arbitrator, they must be bound by those limits ... An application to vacate or correct an award should be granted where an arbitrator has exceeded his power. In deciding whether an arbitrator has exceeded his power, we need only examine the submission and the award to determine whether the award conforms to the submission ... Such a limited scope of judicial review is warranted given the fact that the parties voluntarily bargained for the decision of the arbitrator and, as such, the parties are presumed to have assumed the risks of and waived objections to that decision ... ‘It is clear that a party cannot object to an award which accomplishes precisely what the [arbitrator was] authorized to do merely because that party dislikes the results ...’ "
The Appellate Court has also noted that: "[e]very reasonable presumption should be made in favor of the arbitration award, and the burden of proof rests with the plaintiff to present sufficient evidence to set the award aside." IAAF Local 834 v. City of Bridgeport, 132 Conn.App. 326, 331 (2011) citing Milford Employees Ass’n v. Milford, 179 Conn. 678, 683, 427 A.2d 859 (1980).
The arbitration agreement confirms that the submission to arbitration was unrestricted subject to the limitations on the amount that could be awarded. The award stated that the parties were represented by counsel at the arbitration hearing and stipulated: "[t]he issues of liability and damages were to be decided by the arbitrator ..." Review of the award confirms the arbitrator decided both liability and damages. The award conformed to the submission. The arbitrator made a final and definitive award on the subject matter before him and did not exceed or imperfectly execute his powers. That plaintiff was not satisfied with the amount of the award or the arbitrator’s findings is not evidence of bias or partiality. There is no evidence the award was procured by corruption, fraud or undue means. The motion to vacate the arbitration award is denied.
The Court declines defendant’s request to decide the scope of the submission as law of the case or collateral estoppel.