Id., at 200, 931 A.2d 916. [15] The application of this dichotomy to the various categories of claims brought pursuant to § 47-278 provides, at least in principle, for a commonsense rule: violations of duties imposed directly by CIOA sound in tort and 744are circumscribed by § 52-577, whereas violations of the declaration or bylaws, by contrast, sound in contract and are governed by § 52-576, See, e.g., Pasco Common Condominium Assn., Inc. v. Benson, 192 Conn. App. 479, 508, 218 A.3d 83 (2019). When a claim may be pursued separately under both statutory and contractual theories, the longer of the two limitation periods should be employed.
Pasco Common Condo. Ass'n v. Benson, 192 Conn.App. 479, 520 (Conn. Ct. App. 2019).
''Such discussion would be purely academic because it would have no effect on the final outcome of this case.'' Pasco Common Condominium Assn., Inc.v.Benson, 192 Conn.App. 479, 508 n.22, 218 A.3d 83 (2019). Accordingly, we decline to consider the merits of the defendant's constitutional claim.
See, e.g., JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Winthrop Properties, LLC , 312 Conn. 662, 670, 94 A.3d 622 (2014) (scope of statute "is an issue of statutory interpretation over which we exercise plenary review"); Pasco Common Condominium Assn., Inc. v. Benson , 192 Conn. App. 479, 489, 218 A.3d 83 (2019) (applying plenary review to trial court's interpretation of statute of limitations governing special defense). Thus, whether a successful fax transmission constitutes personal delivery under § 52-593a (a) presents a question of statutory construction over which our review is plenary.
We construe the use of the disjunctive "or" to reflect that the legislature intended for § 52-591 to be applicable when the plaintiff in the prior action sued either (1) in a representative capacity or (2) for the benefit of another person or entity. See State v. Dennis , 150 Conn. 245, 248, 188 A.2d 65 (1963) ("[t]he use of the disjunctive ‘or’ between the two parts of the statute indicates a clear legislative intent of separability"); see also Pasco Common Condominium Assn., Inc. v. Benson , 192 Conn. App. 479, 490, 218 A.3d 83 (2019) ("It is a basic tenet of statutory construction that the legislature [does] not intend to enact meaningless provisions. ... [I]n construing statutes, we presume that there is a purpose behind every sentence, clause, or phrase used in an act and that no part of a statute is superfluous.
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Pasco Common Condominium Assn., Inc. v. Benson , 192 Conn. App. 479, 516, 218 A.3d 83 (2019). Our review of the March 28, 2014 decree reveals no intention, express or implied, by the Probate Court to keep the issue of attorney's fees open to afford the defendants an opportunity to present additional evidence in support of their request for those fees at a later date.
The determination of which statute of limitations applies to an action is a question of law over which our review is plenary. See, e.g., Pasco Common Condominium Assn., Inc . v. Benson , 192 Conn. App. 479, 501, 218 A.3d 83 (2019). The court stated that, "[f]or written contracts, the limitation period is established as a six year period .... For oral contracts the limitation period is established as a three year period ...."
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Pasco Common Condominium Assn., Inc . v. Benson , 192 Conn. App. 479, 516, 218 A.3d 83 (2019). "In construing a trial court's judgment, [t]he determinative factor is the intention of the court as gathered from all parts of the judgment. ... Effect must be given to that which is clearly implied as well as to that which is expressed. ... The judgment should admit of a consistent construction as a whole."
The plaintiff thus posits that the statute of limitations set forth in § 52-577 "did not begin to run until [her death] on July 24, 2015." On our plenary review of that question of law; see Pasco Common Condominium Assn., Inc . v. Benson , 192 Conn. App. 479, 501, 218 A.3d 83 (2019) ; we disagree. In this appeal, the plaintiff does not dispute that § 52-577 governs tort claims brought by a beneficiary against a trustee.
Our courts have consistently held that because breach of fiduciary duty is an action that sounds in tort, such claims are governed by a three year statute of limitations pursuant to § 52-577. See Flannery v. Singer Asset Finance Co., LLC , 312 Conn. 286, 290 n.4, 94 A.3d 553 (2014) ; Pasco Common Condominium Assn., Inc. v. Benson , 192 Conn. App. 479, 514–15, 218 A.3d 83 (2019) ; Ahern v. Kappalumakkel , 97 Conn. App. 189, 192 n.3, 903 A.2d 266 (2006). As previously discussed, BAHR's counterclaim unambiguously states a claim for breach of fiduciary duty.