Opinion
Civil Action No. 3:98-CV-0920-G
January 11, 2002
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Before the court is the motion of the defendant Bob Alford ("Alford") for dismissal of the plaintiff's claims against him under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 1985 for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted. For the reasons stated below, the motion to dismiss is granted.
I. BACKGROUND
Proceeding pro se, plaintiff Bradley E. Parsons ("Parsons") commenced this case on April 13, 1998 against the City of Rio Vista, against Johnson County, Texas, and against various employees of Johnson County (collectively, "the defendants") asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 1983, 1985 and 1986 and 18 U.S.C. § 242 for violation of his First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution. See generally Plaintiff's Complaint ("Complaint"). The suit arises from Parsons' detention and arrest for a traffic violation on April 17, 1997. See id. On August 7, 1998, the court granted the defendants' motion to abate and stay the proceedings in this case pending the resolution of state criminal charges brought against Parsons as a result of this incident. Order, filed August 7, 1998. At Parsons' instance, the court vacated the abatement on September 19, 2001 and reinstated the suit as an active case. Order, filed on September 19, 2001. On October 2, 2001, the court granted Parsons leave to amend his complaint (hereafter "First Amended Complaint"). Order, filed on October 2, 2001. Approximately two weeks later, Alford brought this motion to dismiss Parsons' claims pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). Defendant Sheriff Bob Alford's, In His Official and Individual Capacities, Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint and Brief ("Motion to Dismiss").
This case was administratively closed for some period of time, see generally Docket Sheet, and is currently the second oldest case on this court's civil docket.
Apparently, Parsons' complaint mistakenly alleges that the date of this incident was April 14, 1997. Defendants' Motion to Abate and Brief at 2 n. 2.
Parsons' claims against Alford, in both his individual and official capacities, appear to rest on three grounds. First, Parsons asserts that, after being booked into the Johnson County Law Enforcement Center, an employee of the Johnson County Sheriff's Department ("Sheriff's Department") told him that his bail would not be set until the following morning when a judge would be available to conduct his arraignment. First Amended Complaint at 11-12. Parsons contends the delay in bringing him before a magistrate violated his constitutional rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 12. Second, Parsons alleges that $8.95 was taken from his person while being booked into the Johnson County Jail and that the same exact bills and coins were not returned to him upon his release. Id. at 13. Parsons maintains that this action amounted to an unlawful seizure of his property without a warrant and an unconstitutional taking of his property without due process, in violation of his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 14-15. Third, Parsons makes a general allegation that Alford and other defendants "conspired" to deprive Parsons of his constitutional rights. Id. at 26. His suit against Alford is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 1985 for these alleged violations of his constitutional rights. Id. at 2, 13, 15.
According to Parsons, one of the bills "held a very special meaning to [him] as it was given [to] him on [his] wedding day by his wife, who had inscribed on it the words 'That the lack of money shall not divide.'" First Amended Complaint at 13.
Alford moves, in his individual capacity, to dismiss Parsons' claims on the grounds that Parsons' amended complaint fails to sufficiently allege a constitutional violation and that Parsons did not identify how Alford was personally involved in the events that gave rise to his claims. Motion to Dismiss at 2-3. Alford also moves, in his individual capacity, to dismiss the claims against him on the basis of qualified immunity. Id. at 3. Finally, Alford, in his official capacity, seeks dismissal of Parsons' claims for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted. Id.
II. ANALYSIS A. Standard for Dismissal Under Rule 12(b)(6)
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) authorizes dismissal of a complaint for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) should be granted only if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff could prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); Leffall v. Dallas Independent School District, 28 F.3d 521, 524 (5th Cir. 1994). Before dismissal is granted, the court must accept all well-pleaded facts as true and view them in the light most favorable to the non-movant. See Capital Parks, Inc. v. Southeastern Advertising and Sales System, Inc., 30 F.3d 627, 629 (5th Cir. 1994); Norman v. Apache Corporation, 19 F.3d 1017, 1021 (5th Cir. 1994); Chrissy F. by Medley v. Mississippi Department of Public Welfare, 925 F.2d 844, 846 (5th Cir. 1991).B. Individual Capacity Claims
Parsons' amended complaint makes factual allegations in support of a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deprivation of his constitutional rights under the Fourth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. See First Amended Complaint at 2. To state a claim under § 1983, Parson must allege facts that show (1) he has been deprived of a right secured by the Constitution and the laws of the United States; and (2) the deprivation occurred under color of state law. See Bass v. Parkwood Hospital, 180 F.3d 234, 241 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155 (1978)). In this instance, however, even when all the facts alleged are viewed in the light most favorable to Parsons, his § 1983 cause of action against Alford, in his individual capacity, fails because he has failed to show that he was deprived of any of his constitutional rights.
Section 1983 provides a federal cause of action for the deprivation, under color of law, of a citizen's "rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States." Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 132 (1994). It "afford[s] redress for violations of federal statutes, as well as of constitutional norms." Id. (internal citation omitted).
Moreover, Parsons' complaint does not plead with specificity facts showing why Alford is not entitled to qualified immunity. See Brown v. Texas AM University, 804 F.2d 327, 333 (5th Cir. 1986) ("the plaintiff must plead specific facts with sufficient particularity to meet all the elements necessary to lay a foundation for recovery, including those necessary to negative the defense of qualified immunity."); Wicks v. Mississippi State Employment Services, 41 F.3d 991, 995 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1131 (1995) ("the initial step in our review requires an examination of Wicks' complaint to see if his allegations negate Cook's defense of qualified immunity.").
Parsons contends Alford violated his "right to bail" under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments because he was held overnight before his bail was set by a judge. First Amended Complaint at 11-12. Specifically, Parsons alleges that he "asked Sgt. Moulder to call the judge so that [he] could be arraigned immediately. Sergeant Moulder told [Parsons] that the judge would be at the jail in the morning and [that he] would have to wait until then." Id. at 12. This averment does not state a violation of rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Parsons does not allege that there was any further delay in his arraignment. See generally First Amended Complaint. Several courts have held that, absent unreasonable delays, holding an individual overnight before arraignment does not constitute a constitutional violation. See county of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991) (holding that probable cause determination within 48 hours after warrantless arrest satisfies Fourth Amendment requirement of a prompt judicial determination of probable cause); Lamb v. Cartwright, 393 F. Supp. 1081, 1084 (E.D.Tex. 1975) (finding "plaintiffs were not denied their constitutional rights because they were not taken before a magistrate until the following morning. The right to be taken before a magistrate is one which must be viewed in light of the attendant circumstances."), affd, 524 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1975). Based on the pleadings before it, the court concludes there was not an unreasonable or excessive delay in Parsons' arraignment. Accordingly, Parsons has failed to plead a cognizable § 1983 claim against Alford for his temporary detention before arraignment.
Similarly, Parsons' claim that he has a constitutionally protected property interest in receiving the exact same currency upon his release that he surrendered during his processing is baseless. In this instance, the Sheriff's Department took possession of $8.95 from Parsons while he was being booked into the Johnson County Jail. First Amended Complaint at 13. Apparently, in accordance with the customary practice, the Sheriff's Department then deposited this money in a local financial institution. Id. at 13, 15; see also Motion to Dismiss at 5. Nowhere in his amended complaint does Parsons allege that he told the Sheriff's Department that the currency should be treated as a personal effect or that he was not given back $8.95 upon his release. See First Amended Complaint at 13-15. More importantly, however, Parsons has failed to establish that he has a constitutionally protected property interest, under either the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendments, in requiring Alford and the Sheriff's Department to return the exact same currency he surrendered upon his arrest.
The court also notes, notwithstanding Parsons' claim about the nature of the property in question, that it gives no weight to Parsons' argument that currency is a unique personal effect such as eyeglasses or keys. See Response to Defendant Alford', in His Official and Personal Capacities, Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint ("Response") at 7. By its very definition, currency is exchangeable.
Notably, Parsons fails to cite a single case in support of this claim in his rambling response to Alford' motion to dismiss. See generally Response. At best, Parsons simply repeats his argument that, pursuant to the Fourth Amendment, a warrant was required to seize his property. Id. at 3, 7, 10-11. It is axiomatic, however, that a warrant is not required for a search incident to a lawful arrest. See, e.g., Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 643, 648 (1983) (a warrantless search is constitutionally permissible where the individual whose possessions are to be searched has been lawfully arrested and the search is part of the routine procedure incident to incarceration). Here, Parsons was arrested for refusing to sign a speeding citation, see First Amended Complaint at 8, and, pursuant to established booking practices, the property on his person was temporarily taken from him during his detention. This action, as stated in Parsons' complaint, does not amount to either a violation of Parsons' Fourth Amendment right to be secure from unlawful seizures or his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Finally, Parsons fails to state an actionable claim against Alford for conspiracy under § 1985. In his amended complaint, Parsons contends that "Alford . . . conspired with other members of the [Sheriff's Department] to deprive [him] of his rights under the Fourth and Eighth Amendments, and . . . [that] Alford . . . took overt actions toward the furtherance of that conspiracy, thereby giving rise to action under 42 U.S.C. § 1985." First Amended Complaint at 26. To state a claim under § 1985(3), Parsons must allege: (1) a conspiracy involving two or more persons, (2) for the purpose of depriving, directly or indirectly, a person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, (3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy, and (4) which causes injury to a person or property, or a deprivation of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States. Hilliard v. Ferguson, 30 F.3d 649, 652-53 (5th Cir. 1994). The court concludes that Parsons has failed to allege sufficient facts to state a conspiracy claim. To successfully assert a claim under § 1985(3), "a plaintiff must plead the operative facts upon which his claim is based, more than conclusory allegations." Irwin v. Veterans Administration, 874 F.2d 1092, 1095 (5th Cir. 1989) (citing Holdiness v. Stroud, 808 F.2d 417, 424 (5th Cir. 1987)), aff'd, 498 U.S. 89 (1990); Young v. Biggers, 938 F.2d 565, 569 (5th Cir. 1991) ("Bald allegations that a conspiracy existed are insufficient."). Here, it is apparent that Parsons makes only bald allegations of a conspiracy, and therefore his claim is properly dismissed.
Section 1985 provides, in relevant part:
(3) If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire . . . for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; . . . in any case of conspiracy set forth in this section, if one or more persons engaged therein do, or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his person or property, or deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the party so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages, occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or more of the conspirators.
28 U.S.C. § 1985(3).
Parsons § 1985 claim is also deficient because he fails to assert that he is a member of a well-defined class characterized by (1) some inherited or immutable characteristic such as sex, race, or national origin, or (2) political beliefs or associations. See McLean v. International Harvester Company, 817 F.2d 1214, 1219 (5th Cir. 1987). No such invidious racial or other class-based animus has been alleged here. See generally First Amended Complaint. Finally, to the extent Parsons is asserting a claim against Alford under 28 U.S.C. § 1986, see First Amended Complaint at 15, this claim too must be dismissed. "To maintain a cause of action under § 1986 the plaintiff must have a valid cause of action under § 1985." Wells v. City of Carroliton, Texas, 678 F. Supp. 632, 635 (N.D.Tex. 1988) (citing Bradt v. Smith, 634 F.2d 796, 801-02 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 830 (1981)). Because the court has concluded that Parsons has failed to state a valid claim under § 1985, it necessarily follows that he has failed to state a valid claim under § 1986.
C. Official Capacity Claims
Parsons' amended complaint also appears to make § 1983 claims against Alford in his official capacity. See generally First Amended Complaint. However, § 1983 claims against a city official in his official capacities, are, in essence, actions against the city itself. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991); Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 195 (5th Cir. 1996). A suit against a government employee in his official capacity is not a suit against the official, but rather a suit against the official's office, so it is no different than a suit against the city itself. See Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 47 1-72 (1985); Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691 n. 55 (1978); Baker, 75 F.3d at 195. A defendant sued in his official capacity is entitled to the same defenses available to the government entity. Hafer, 502 U.S. at 25.To state a valid claim under § 1983 against Alford in his official capacity ( i.e., against Johnson County), Parsons must identify "proof of three elements: a policymaker; an official policy; and a violation of constitutional rights whose 'moving force' is the policy or custom." Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, __ U.S. __ 122 S.Ct. 53 (2001); see also Palmer v. City of San Antonio, Texas, 810 F.2d 514, 516 (5th Cir. 1987) (quoting Grandstaff v. City of Borger, Texas, 767 F.2d 161, 169 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 916 (1987), abrogated on other grounds in Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 167-68 (1993)). To avoid dismissal of his claims against Johnson County, Parsons need only satisfy the liberal notice pleading requirements of FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a). See Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 164 (noting that federal courts may not apply the heightened pleading requirement for § 1983 claims against government officials to similar claims against a city). Under § 1983, a municipality may be liable if the execution of one of its customs or policies deprives a plaintiff of his constitutional rights. As discussed previously, however, Parsons has failed to state any deprivation of his constitutional rights in his amended complaint. Accordingly, Johnson County's motion to dismiss the § 1983 claims against it is granted. See Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986) (per curiam); Saenz v. Heldenfels Brothers, Inc., 183 F.3d 389, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1999) (when a plaintiff has suffered no constitutional injury, then there can be no municipal liability based on an alleged unconstitutional policy).
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the motion to dismiss Parsons' claims against Alford in his individual and official capacities is GRANTED. Judgment will be entered that Parsons take nothing from Alford or Johnson County on those claims.
In Wicks v. Mississippi State Employment Services, 41 F.3d 991, 997 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1131 (1995), the Fifth Circuit held that immediate dismissal is ordinarily not justified where a civil rights plaintiff has filed only one pleading and that pleading fails to allege specific facts sufficient to state a claim. As noted previously, however, Parsons has already amended his complaint. Thus, he has been afforded a fair opportunity to plead his case, and dismissal may properly be considered. See Jacquez v. Procunier, 801 F.2d 789, 792 (5th Cir. 1986) ("plaintiffs cannot be allowed to continue to amend or supplement their pleadings until they stumble upon a formula that carries them over the threshold. . . . At some point a court must decide that a plaintiff has had a fair opportunity to make his case").