When we have done so, our decision has focused on conduct other than mistake, inadvertence or excusable neglect. For example, we have held that § 52-592 (a) affords no relief in cases in which a plaintiff's prior action was dismissed because the plaintiff withdrew it voluntarily; see Parrott v. Meacham, 161 Conn. 573, 575, 290 A.2d 335 (1971); Baker v. Baningoso, supra, 134 Conn. 387; or consented to its dismissal. Such consent may be inferred from a plaintiff's failure to file a memorandum in opposition to a defendant's motion to strike; Hughes v. Bemer, 206 Conn. 491, 495, 538 A.2d 703 (1988); or from a plaintiff's inordinate delay in appointing an administrator or executor.

' When we have done so, our decision has focused on conduct other than mistake, inadvertence or excusable neglect. For example, we have held that § 52-592(a) affords no relief in cases in which a plaintiff's prior action was dismissed because the plaintiff withdrew it voluntarily; see Parrot v. Meacham, 161 Conn. 573, 575, 290 A.2d 335 (1971); Baker v. Baningoso, supra, 134 Conn. at 387, 58 A.2d 5; or consented to its dismissal. Such consent may be inferred from a plaintiff's failure to file a memorandum in opposition to a defendant's motion to strike; Hughes v. Bemer, 206 Conn. 491, 495, 538 A.2d 703 (1988); or from a plaintiff's inordinate delay in appointing an administrator or executor.

It is well settled that the Accidental Failure of Suit Act does not extend the limitations period for actions that have been voluntarily withdrawn. Parrott v. Meacham, 161 Conn. 573, 290 A.2d 335 (1971); Baker v. Baningoso, 134 Conn. 382, 384, 58 A.2d 5, 8 (1948). The reason for this rule is that "if the plaintiff can begin over again by voluntary withdrawal, he can keep his case alive indefinitely."

Lacasse v. Burns, supra, 473. "See Hughes v. Bemer, supra, [ 206 Conn.] 495 (failure to file a required memorandum of law operates as a consent to judgment on the merits resulting from granting a motion to strike); Pavlinko v. Yale-New Haven Hospital, 192 Conn. 138, 144, 470 A.2d 246 (1984) (dismissal pursuant to Practice Book § 231 [now § 13-14] for deliberate refusal to answer questions at deposition); Parrott v. Meacham, 161 Conn. 573, 575, 290 A.2d 335 (1971) (voluntary withdrawal of prior suit); Baker v. Baningoso, [supra, 134 Conn. 387] (voluntary withdrawal of prior suit)." Lacasse v. Burns, supra, 214 Conn. 473.

In cases where we have either stated or intimated that the "any matter of form" portion of 52-592 would not be applicable to a subsequent action brought by a plaintiff, we have concluded that the failure of the case to be tried on its merits had not resulted from accident or even simple negligence. See Hughes v. Bemer, supra, 495 (failure to file a required memorandum of law operates as a consent to judgment on the merits resulting from granting a motion to strike); Pavlinko v. Yale-New Haven Hospital, 192 Conn. 138, 144, 470 A.2d 246 (1984) (dismissal pursuant to Practice Book 231 for deliberate refusal to answer questions at a deposition); Parrott v. Meacham, 161 Conn. 573, 575, 290 A.2d 335 (1971) (voluntary withdrawal of prior suit); Baker v. Baningoso, 134 Conn. 382, 387, 58 A.2d 5 (1948) (voluntary withdrawal of prior suit). Unlike these cases, the records in the present appeals reveal nothing about the reasons for dismissal of the plaintiffs' actions, other than that the orders were entered pursuant to Practice Book 251. Given the state of the records in these cases, as well as the wide range of circumstances that could logically result in a dismissal under this rule, we conclude that it would be inappropriate to preclude the plaintiffs from taking advantage of 52-592 and bringing their actions once again.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the court agreed and summed up its position as follows: "I feel the mere technicality that [Viejas] withdrew the action rather than waiting for the federal court to grant the motion to dismiss, which the court had to do because the court must be cognizant of any motion to dismiss, and if there's lack of jurisdiction, [the court] must grant it. I think it's a mere technicality, and I think the accidental failure of suit statute does apply in this case, and, therefore, I'll deny the motion." Lorinsky cites to Parrott v. Meacham, 161 Conn. 573, 290 A.2d 335 (1971), for the proposition that an action that is voluntarily withdrawn does not fall within the protection of § 52-592. In Parrott, the plaintiff filed an action in state court, and three years later a judgment of nonsuit was entered against him for his failure to proceed at trial when ordered to do so. He then asked his attorneys to withdraw the case and six months later instituted a second action in state court, identical to the first, through new counsel "purporting to act under the provisions of . . . § 52-592.

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Parrott v. Meacham, 161 Conn. 573, 575, 290 A.2d 335 (1971). The plaintiff argues that the 1993 action was timely filed and complies with § 52-592.

Finally, the plaintiff concurs that the judgment rendered in the first action was not the appropriate judgment required by § 52-593. First, the plaintiff argues that she could not continue litigating the original action to secure the appropriate judgment because if she had, she would have been responsible for Phil Cerminara's and Nancy Cerminara's court costs as well exposing herself to a possible vexatious litigation action. Next, the plaintiff, relying on Parrott v. Meacham, 161 Conn. 573, 290 A.2d 335 (1971), asserts that she believed she could not withdraw the original action voluntarily and still initiate an action under § 52-593. See id., 575 (discussing effect of voluntary withdrawal in relation to General Statutes § 52-592).

However, "[i]n cases where [the Supreme Court has] either stated or intimated that the `any matter of form' portion of § 52-592 would not be applicable to a subsequent action brought by a plaintiff, [the Supreme Court has] concluded that the failure of the case to be tried on its merits had not resulted from accident or even simple negligence. See Hughes v. Bemer, [ 206 Conn. 491, 495, 538 A.2d 703 (1988)] (failure to file a required memorandum of law operates as a consent to judgment on the merits resulting from granting a motion to strike); Pavlinko v. Yale-New Haven Hospital, 192 Conn. 138, 144, 470 A.2d 246 (1984) (dismissal pursuant to Practice Book § 231 [now § 13-14] for deliberate refusal to answer questions at a deposition); Parrott v. Meacham, 161 Conn. 573, 575, 290 A.2d 335 (1971) (voluntary withdrawal of prior suit); Baker v. Baningoso, 134 Conn. 382, 387, 58 A.2d 5 (1948) (voluntary withdrawal of prior suit)." Lacasse v. Burns, 214 Conn. 464, 473, 572 A.2d 357 (1990); see also Skibeck v. Avon, 24 Conn. App. 239, 242-43, 587 A.2d 166, cert. denied, 219 Conn. 912, 593 A.2d 138 (1991).

Contrary to the plaintiff's understanding, the defendant is correct in that the plaintiff's voluntary withdrawal of the action precludes the availability of General Statutes § 52-592. See Parrott v. Meacham, 161 Conn. 573, 575, 290 A.2d 335 (1971) (voluntary withdrawal of an action cannot constitute accidental failure of suit); Baker v. Baningoso, 134 Conn. 382, 387, 58 A.2d 5 (1948) (same). See also Richey v. Cellmark Pulp & Paper, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Tolland, Docket No. CV-04-4000319-S, (April 22, 2005, Scholl, J.), in which the court concludes " that the nonsuit was entered not because of excusable neglect by the Plaintiff but as a matter of strategy since he believed he had sued the wrong party, a determination not made by the court but by the Plaintiff himself.