Parrott v. Meacham

23 Citing cases

  1. Ruddock v. Burrowes

    243 Conn. 569 (Conn. 1998)   Cited 171 times
    Holding that disciplinary dismissal in prior action did not automatically foreclose plaintiffs from seeking recourse under accidental failure of suit statute and 211discussing balance that court must strike when weighing remedial nature of statute and "the responsibility of the court to establish standards for the processing of cases and also, when necessary, to enforce compliance with such standards"

    When we have done so, our decision has focused on conduct other than mistake, inadvertence or excusable neglect. For example, we have held that § 52-592 (a) affords no relief in cases in which a plaintiff's prior action was dismissed because the plaintiff withdrew it voluntarily; see Parrott v. Meacham, 161 Conn. 573, 575, 290 A.2d 335 (1971); Baker v. Baningoso, supra, 134 Conn. 387; or consented to its dismissal. Such consent may be inferred from a plaintiff's failure to file a memorandum in opposition to a defendant's motion to strike; Hughes v. Bemer, 206 Conn. 491, 495, 538 A.2d 703 (1988); or from a plaintiff's inordinate delay in appointing an administrator or executor.

  2. Richey v. Cellmark Pulp Paper, Inc.

    2005 Ct. Sup. 7305 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2005)

    ' When we have done so, our decision has focused on conduct other than mistake, inadvertence or excusable neglect. For example, we have held that § 52-592(a) affords no relief in cases in which a plaintiff's prior action was dismissed because the plaintiff withdrew it voluntarily; see Parrot v. Meacham, 161 Conn. 573, 575, 290 A.2d 335 (1971); Baker v. Baningoso, supra, 134 Conn. at 387, 58 A.2d 5; or consented to its dismissal. Such consent may be inferred from a plaintiff's failure to file a memorandum in opposition to a defendant's motion to strike; Hughes v. Bemer, 206 Conn. 491, 495, 538 A.2d 703 (1988); or from a plaintiff's inordinate delay in appointing an administrator or executor.

  3. LaCroix v. Board of Educ. of City of Bridgeport

    844 F.2d 88 (2d Cir. 1988)   Cited 3 times
    Applying Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-592 to § 1983 claim because "[t]he limitations period for actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is governed by the state statute of limitations applicable to personal injury cases."

    It is well settled that the Accidental Failure of Suit Act does not extend the limitations period for actions that have been voluntarily withdrawn. Parrott v. Meacham, 161 Conn. 573, 290 A.2d 335 (1971); Baker v. Baningoso, 134 Conn. 382, 384, 58 A.2d 5, 8 (1948). The reason for this rule is that "if the plaintiff can begin over again by voluntary withdrawal, he can keep his case alive indefinitely."

  4. Plante v. Charlotte Hungerford Hospital

    300 Conn. 33 (Conn. 2011)   Cited 58 times
    Holding that when medical malpractice action has been dismissed pursuant to § 52-190a (c) for failure to supply opinion letter by similar health care provider, plaintiff may commence otherwise time barred action pursuant to matter of form provisions of § 52-592, only if that failure was caused by simple mistake or omission, rather than egregious conduct or gross negligence attributable to plaintiff or plaintiff's attorney

    Lacasse v. Burns, supra, 473. "See Hughes v. Bemer, supra, [ 206 Conn.] 495 (failure to file a required memorandum of law operates as a consent to judgment on the merits resulting from granting a motion to strike); Pavlinko v. Yale-New Haven Hospital, 192 Conn. 138, 144, 470 A.2d 246 (1984) (dismissal pursuant to Practice Book § 231 [now § 13-14] for deliberate refusal to answer questions at deposition); Parrott v. Meacham, 161 Conn. 573, 575, 290 A.2d 335 (1971) (voluntary withdrawal of prior suit); Baker v. Baningoso, [supra, 134 Conn. 387] (voluntary withdrawal of prior suit)." Lacasse v. Burns, supra, 214 Conn. 473.

  5. Lacasse v. Burns

    214 Conn. 464 (Conn. 1990)   Cited 210 times
    In Lacasse, the question before the court was whether the accidental failure of suit statute applied in a case where the state had expressly waived its sovereign immunity under the highway defect statute, General Statutes § 13a–144.

    In cases where we have either stated or intimated that the "any matter of form" portion of 52-592 would not be applicable to a subsequent action brought by a plaintiff, we have concluded that the failure of the case to be tried on its merits had not resulted from accident or even simple negligence. See Hughes v. Bemer, supra, 495 (failure to file a required memorandum of law operates as a consent to judgment on the merits resulting from granting a motion to strike); Pavlinko v. Yale-New Haven Hospital, 192 Conn. 138, 144, 470 A.2d 246 (1984) (dismissal pursuant to Practice Book 231 for deliberate refusal to answer questions at a deposition); Parrott v. Meacham, 161 Conn. 573, 575, 290 A.2d 335 (1971) (voluntary withdrawal of prior suit); Baker v. Baningoso, 134 Conn. 382, 387, 58 A.2d 5 (1948) (voluntary withdrawal of prior suit). Unlike these cases, the records in the present appeals reveal nothing about the reasons for dismissal of the plaintiffs' actions, other than that the orders were entered pursuant to Practice Book 251. Given the state of the records in these cases, as well as the wide range of circumstances that could logically result in a dismissal under this rule, we conclude that it would be inappropriate to preclude the plaintiffs from taking advantage of 52-592 and bringing their actions once again.

  6. Viejas Band of Kumeyaay Indians v. Lorinsky

    116 Conn. App. 144 (Conn. App. Ct. 2009)   Cited 33 times
    In Viejas Band of Kumeyaay Indians v. Lorinsky, 116 Conn.App. 144, 976 A.2d 723 (2004), the court addressed some of the very same arguments in this action.

    At the conclusion of the hearing, the court agreed and summed up its position as follows: "I feel the mere technicality that [Viejas] withdrew the action rather than waiting for the federal court to grant the motion to dismiss, which the court had to do because the court must be cognizant of any motion to dismiss, and if there's lack of jurisdiction, [the court] must grant it. I think it's a mere technicality, and I think the accidental failure of suit statute does apply in this case, and, therefore, I'll deny the motion." Lorinsky cites to Parrott v. Meacham, 161 Conn. 573, 290 A.2d 335 (1971), for the proposition that an action that is voluntarily withdrawn does not fall within the protection of § 52-592. In Parrott, the plaintiff filed an action in state court, and three years later a judgment of nonsuit was entered against him for his failure to proceed at trial when ordered to do so. He then asked his attorneys to withdraw the case and six months later instituted a second action in state court, identical to the first, through new counsel "purporting to act under the provisions of . . . § 52-592.

  7. Lind-Larsen v. Fleet Nat Bank of Connecticut

    84 Conn. App. 1 (Conn. App. Ct. 2004)   Cited 42 times
    In Lind Larsen v. Fleet Nat. Bank of Connecticut, 84 Conn.App. 1, 12-13, 852 A.2d 799 (2004), our Appellate Court, quoting from New England Mortgage Realty Co. v. Rossini, 121 Conn. 214, 219, 183 A. 744 (1936), held that it is the law in this jurisdiction that "inherent in a mortgage is the right of the mortgagee to insist upon full payment before giving up his security."

    (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Parrott v. Meacham, 161 Conn. 573, 575, 290 A.2d 335 (1971). The plaintiff argues that the 1993 action was timely filed and complies with § 52-592.

  8. Billerback v. Cerminara

    72 Conn. App. 302 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002)   Cited 25 times
    In Billerback v. Cerminara, 72 Conn.App. 302, 306, 805 A.2d 757 (2002), the Appellate Court held that the language of § 52-593 means that "once the plaintiff discovered that she had filed a complaint against an improper party, she could file the claim against the proper party and not be barred by the statute of limitations, only after the termination of the original action for failure to name the right person as defendant in the first action."

    Finally, the plaintiff concurs that the judgment rendered in the first action was not the appropriate judgment required by § 52-593. First, the plaintiff argues that she could not continue litigating the original action to secure the appropriate judgment because if she had, she would have been responsible for Phil Cerminara's and Nancy Cerminara's court costs as well exposing herself to a possible vexatious litigation action. Next, the plaintiff, relying on Parrott v. Meacham, 161 Conn. 573, 290 A.2d 335 (1971), asserts that she believed she could not withdraw the original action voluntarily and still initiate an action under § 52-593. See id., 575 (discussing effect of voluntary withdrawal in relation to General Statutes § 52-592).

  9. Rosario v. Hasak

    50 Conn. App. 632 (Conn. App. Ct. 1998)   Cited 32 times
    In Rosario, the Appellate Court rejected a plaintiffs attempt to commence a new action pursuant to § 52-592 on the basis of the "trial court's conclusion that the plaintiffs failure to return the original complaint to court until two and one-half years after it was served could hardly be considered diligent.... The plaintiff commenced the fourth and final action five years after the automobile accident occurred and three years after he commenced the original action.

    However, "[i]n cases where [the Supreme Court has] either stated or intimated that the `any matter of form' portion of § 52-592 would not be applicable to a subsequent action brought by a plaintiff, [the Supreme Court has] concluded that the failure of the case to be tried on its merits had not resulted from accident or even simple negligence. See Hughes v. Bemer, [ 206 Conn. 491, 495, 538 A.2d 703 (1988)] (failure to file a required memorandum of law operates as a consent to judgment on the merits resulting from granting a motion to strike); Pavlinko v. Yale-New Haven Hospital, 192 Conn. 138, 144, 470 A.2d 246 (1984) (dismissal pursuant to Practice Book § 231 [now § 13-14] for deliberate refusal to answer questions at a deposition); Parrott v. Meacham, 161 Conn. 573, 575, 290 A.2d 335 (1971) (voluntary withdrawal of prior suit); Baker v. Baningoso, 134 Conn. 382, 387, 58 A.2d 5 (1948) (voluntary withdrawal of prior suit)." Lacasse v. Burns, 214 Conn. 464, 473, 572 A.2d 357 (1990); see also Skibeck v. Avon, 24 Conn. App. 239, 242-43, 587 A.2d 166, cert. denied, 219 Conn. 912, 593 A.2d 138 (1991).

  10. Santos v. 1145 Poquonnock Road Operations, LLC

    CV176028790 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 14, 2017)

    Contrary to the plaintiff's understanding, the defendant is correct in that the plaintiff's voluntary withdrawal of the action precludes the availability of General Statutes § 52-592. See Parrott v. Meacham, 161 Conn. 573, 575, 290 A.2d 335 (1971) (voluntary withdrawal of an action cannot constitute accidental failure of suit); Baker v. Baningoso, 134 Conn. 382, 387, 58 A.2d 5 (1948) (same). See also Richey v. Cellmark Pulp & Paper, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Tolland, Docket No. CV-04-4000319-S, (April 22, 2005, Scholl, J.), in which the court concludes " that the nonsuit was entered not because of excusable neglect by the Plaintiff but as a matter of strategy since he believed he had sued the wrong party, a determination not made by the court but by the Plaintiff himself.