Summary
striking plaintiff's allegation that a manager who harassed her had a sexual relationship with an employee in another office as "scandalous, . . . impertinent and of extremely unlikely relevance"
Summary of this case from Cruz v. Oxford Health Plans, Inc.Opinion
No. 01 Civ. 5420 (VM)
May 24, 2002
DECISION AND ORDER
Defendant Louis Sollecito ("Sollecito") moved pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(f) to strike certain allegations of plaintiff Donna Parrish's ("Parrish") complaint as "immaterial, impertinent or scandalous matter." On April 25, 2002, Magistrate Judge Yanthis denied Sollecito's motion. Sollecito then filed objections with this Court.
For the reasons expressed by the Court in the statement made on the record at the conference with the parties on May 24, 2002, a copy of which statement is attached hereto and incorporated herein, the Court strikes the last sentence of paragraph four of Parrish's complaint.
PARRISH v. SOLLECITO, et al. 01 Civ. 5420 Statement of the Court Regarding Defendant's Motion to Strike May 24, 2002
Paragraph four of Plaintiff Donna Parrish's ("Parrish") complaint alleges that defendant Louis Sollecito ("Sollecito") has had an extramarital affair with one of his employees, who works at a different location than where Parrish worked. Sollecito filed a motion pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(f) to strike that allegation as "immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter." Parrish opposed the motion.
On April 25, 2002, Magistrate Judge Yanthis denied Sollecito's motion on the grounds that the disputed sentence might be stricken later in response to an objection at trial or motion in limine such that it would not be submitted to the jury. It is not clear to the Court on what legal grounds his decision was based. Sollecito filed its objections to the Magistrate Judge's ruling with this Court. Parrish opposed the Solecito's objections, and argues that Magistrate Judge Yanthis's decision was correct on the law.
A district court reviews non-dispositive orders issued by a magistrate judge under the "clearly erroneous or contrary to law" standard. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); see also Thomas B. Hoar, Inc. v. Sara Lee Corp., 900 F.2d 522, 525 (2d Cir. 1990). The party seeking to overturn a magistrate judge's decision carries a heavy burden. See Citicorp v. Interbank Card Ass'n, 87 F.R.D. 43, 46.
Nevertheless, also, "immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter" in a party's pleading may be stricken by the court "upon the court's own initiative at any time." Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(f). Before deciding whether to strike an allegation, a Court must frame the issues. Once framed, and "keeping in mind that motions to strike are generally disfavored and will not be granted unless the matter asserted clearly has no bearing on the issue in dispute", the Court will assess the particular allegation.Kounitz v. Slaatten, 901 F. Supp. 650, (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (citing Burger v. Health Ins. Plan of Greater New York, 684 F. Supp. 46, 52 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)). It is also appropriate to strike matters whose materiality is highly unlikely or whose effect would be prejudicial. Lipsky v. Commonwealth United Corp., 551 F.2d 887, 893 (2d Cir. 1976).
Parrish alleges a hostile work environment claim and asserts that "Sollecito[,] a married man, maintained at company expense as his mistress, a corporate employee" which "reflects at minimum a negative attitude towards women, their availability for sexual purposes for a fee, and a close intertwining of that attitude with the employment setting itself." (Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law, at 3.) Parrish has not alleged any facts, nor made any argument, that her workplace "environment" extends to the office in which the employee at issue worked.
Parrish relies on Leibovitz v. New York City Transit Authority, 252 F.3d 179, 190 (2d Cir. 2001), to argue that a hostile work environment claim may be based on discriminatory conduct that occurred outside of a plaintiff's presence. Parrish is correct that other instances of hostility directed at persons other than the plaintiff may lend some support to a plaintiff's claim of a hostile workplace environment.
At the same time, there is no sexual harassment without a showing of adverse effect on the terms and conditions of employment. Id. at 189. And in Liebovitz, however, the plaintiff's claim was ultimately unsuccessful because she "failed to allege or prove that harassment of other women adversely affected the terms and conditions of her own employment." Id. at 190. In particular, she "was not herself a target of the alleged harassment, was not present when the harassment supposedly occurred, and did not even know of the harassment while it was ongoing." Id. of course,
Similarly, here, Parrish has failed to allege or provide a satisfactory argument linking Sollecito's alleged relationship with an employee to her workplace experiences. Nothing suggests that the alleged relationship between Sollecito and the other employee constitutes is an instance of hostility or harassment against that female employee. Furthermore, Parrish was employed at a different office from the employee at issue.
Accordingly, because the allegation is scandalous, as well as impertinent and of extremely unlikely relevance, the Court strikes the last sentence of paragraph four pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(f).