Thus, courts have held the automatic stay violated by letters giving notice of intent to terminate a lease, Southside Leasing Co. v. Merchant's Plaza, Inc. ( In re Merchant's Plaza, Inc.), 35 B.R. 888, 893-94 (Bankr.D.Tenn. 1983); see A. Dan Chisolm, Inc. v. B.P. Oil, Inc., Gulf Products Division ( In re A. Dan Chisolm, Inc.), 57 B.R. 718, 720 (Bankr.M.D.Fla. 1986) (notice of intent to terminate franchise may violate stay); by a letter informing the debtor that a creditor medical clinic would provide no future medical services due to his refusal to pay, Olson v. McFarland Clinic ( In re Olson) 38 B.R. 515, 517-18 (Bankr.N.D. Iowa 1984), by a letter from an attorney informing the debtor he had been retained by a creditor to collect a delinquent account, DeLay v. Underwood ( In re DeLay), 25 B.R. 898, 901 (Bankr.W.D.Mo. 1982) modified on other grounds, 48 B.R. 282 (W.D.Mo. 1984); by a college that refused to give transcripts to the debtor to force payment, Parraway v. Andrews University, 50 B.R. 316, 319 (W.D.Mich. 1984) (collecting cases), and by a creditor who made repeated visits and telephone calls to the debtor. In re Gibson, 16 B.R. 682, 683-84 (Bankr.S.D. Ohio 1981).
See also In re Williams, 438 B.R. 679, 694 (10th Cir. BAP 2010) (citing and following Paul ); Ammons v. Eddy Federal Credit Union (In re Ammons), 2012 WL 1252621, *8 (Bankr.D.N.M.2012) (citing Paul ). See generally In re Pratt, 462 F.3d 14, 19 (1st Cir.2006) (refusal to either repossess collateral or release lien was “objectively coercive” and violated discharge injunction); Parraway v. Andrews Univ. (In re Parraway), 50 B.R. 316, 319 (W.D.Mich.1984) (university's policy of withholding transcripts until students paid their debts violated discharge injunction). B. Credit Reporting and the Discharge Injunction.
There are case law examples of acts that are demonstrated to have such a coercive impact, such that they are held to count as a proscribed act under the statute. See, e.g., Parraway v. Andrews Univ. (In re Parraway), 50 B.R. 316, 319 (W.D. Mich. 1984) (holding that a defendant-university's policy of not releasing transcripts to students who owed debts to the university, regardless of the bankruptcy discharge, was a violation of the discharge). Parraway had clear evidence of a quid pro quo linking the university's act (We will not release transcripts . . .) with the collection effort (. . . until you pay us.), and reasonably concluded that the act would likely have the requisite coercive impact on a student or former student to render the act an effective collection device.
D.Tenn. 1983); see A. Dan Chisholm, Inc. v. B.P. Oil, Inc., Gulf Products Division (In re A. Dan Chisholm, Inc.), 57 B.R. 718, 720 (Bankr.M.D.Fla. 1986) (notice of intent to terminate franchise may violate stay); by a letter informing the debtor that a creditor medical clinic would provide no future medical services due to his refusal to pay. Olson v. McFarland Clinic (In re Olson) 38 B.R. 515, 517-18 (Bankr. N.D.Iowa 1984), by a letter from an attorney informing the debtor he had been retained by a creditor to collect a delinquent account, DeLay v. Underwood (In re DeLay), 25 B.R. 898, 901 (Bankr.W.D.Mo. 1982) modified on other grounds, 48 B.R. 282 (W.D.Mo. 1984); by a college that refused to give transcripts to the debtor to force payment, Parraway v. Andrews University, 50 B.R. 316, 319 (W.D.Mich. 1984) (collecting cases) and by a creditor who made repeated visits and telephone calls to the debtor, In re Gibson, 16 B.R. 682, 683-84 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio 1981). On the other hand, a court has said that a letter from a credit union announcing it would do no further business with the debtor unless the debt was reaffirmed would not have violated the automatic stay if it had been sent to the debtor's attorney, [ In re] Brown, 49 B.R. [558] at 561 [(Bkrtcy.M.D.Pa. 1985)], and we have treated other communications that merely set forth the fact of the debt as amendable proofs of claim not voided by the automatic stay, see [ In re] Sambo's Restaurants, 754 F.2d [811] at 816 [(9th Cir. 1985)]; County of Napa v. Franciscan Vineyards, Inc. (In re Franciscan Vineyards, Inc.) 597 F.2d 181, 182-83 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 915, 100 S.Ct. 1274, 63 L.Ed.2d 598 (1980).