Opinion
Case No. 1:01-cv-487
December 7, 2001
JUDGMENT
On August 23, 2001, the Court entered an order returning the petition for insufficiencies (docket #2) and required Petitioner to submit a corrected petition within thirty days. Petitioner was warned that if he failed to comply that his action could be dismissed for want of prosecution. More than thirty days has elapsed, and Petitioner has failed to submit a corrected petition. Because Petitioner has failed to comply with the Court's order, dismissal of this action without prejudice for want of prosecution is appropriate. Therefore:
IT IS ORDERED that the captioned case be and hereby is DISMISSED without prejudice.
OPINION
This is a habeas corpus action brought by a state prisoner pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Promptly after the filing of a petition for habeas corpus, the Court must undertake a preliminary review of the petition to determine whether "it plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court." Rule 4, RULES GOVERNING § 2254 CASES; see 28 U.S.C. § 2243. If so, the petition must be summarily dismissed. Rule 4; see Allen v. Perini, 424 F.2d 134, 141 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 906 (1970) (district court has the duty to "screen out" petitions that lack merit on their face). A dismissal under Rule 4 includes those petitions which raise legally frivolous claims, as well as those containing factual allegations that are palpably incredible or false. Carson v. Burke, 178 F.3d 434, 436-37 (6th Cir. 1999). After undertaking the review required by Rule 4, the Court will dismiss the petition because it fails to raise a federally cognizable claim.
Discussion
I. Factual Allegations
Petitioner is serving an eighteen-to-fifty-year term at the West Shoreline Correctional Facility for first-degree criminal sexual conduct. His habeas action concerns the refusal to award him special good time credit.
Prisoners are eligible to receive two types of good time credit. Regular good time credit, RGT, is earned automatically each month that a prisoner remains misconduct-free. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 800.33; MICH. DEP'T OF CORR., Policy Directive 03.01.100, ¶¶ F-G (effective Nov. 13, 2000). In contrast, special good time credit, SGT, does not automatically accrue. Rather, SGT may be awarded upon the recommendation of the disciplinary credit committee and concurrence of the warden. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 800.33(5); MICH. DEP'T OF CORR., Policy Directive 03.01.100, ¶ J. The disciplinary credit committee is comprised of the prisoner's resident unit manager, the assistant resident unit manager, the case manager, counselors, and a corrections officer assigned to the prisoner's unit. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 800.33(5); MICH. DEP'T OF CORR., Policy Directive 03.01.100, ¶ K. An award of SGT can be made for good institutional conduct, which does not include a person who has "merely refrained from exhibiting negative behavior." See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 800.33(5); MICH. DEP'T OF CORR., Policy Directive 03.01.100, ¶ J.
Petitioner was eligible to receive 3,572 days of SGT. If petitioner would have been awarded the SGT, he would have been discharged on September 20, 1999. However, on June 30, 1999, Ionia Temporary Correctional Facility Warden Martin Makel declined to award Petitioner the SGT because of "your behavior since your last review." (Am'd Pet., Ex B.) Without the SGT,
Petitioner will not be discharged until July 1, 2009, nearly ten years later. Petitioner contends that the refusal to award him SGT violated his due process rights because he was not provided with a notice of intent, there was no recommendation by the good time committee, and he was not provided a written explanation for the refusal to award him credits. Petitioner also contends that the Director of the Michigan Department of Corrections Bill Martin, Warden Makel, Warden Berghuis, and unnamed "others" conspired to deprive him of liberty without due process of law.
II. Special Good Time Credits under Michigan Law
It is unclear whether Petitioner has properly exhausted his claims. Regardless, the Court may dismiss his action on the merits. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2).
Petitioner's claim fails to raise an issue of constitutional dimension. "It is true that the Constitution itself does not guarantee good-time credit for satisfactory behavior while in prison." Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). In Wolff, the Supreme Court found that where a State creates a statutory right to good-time credit and allows forfeiture of that credit through misconduct proceedings, a prisoner is entitled to minimum procedural due process protections. Id. at 556-58.
In contrast, under Michigan law, there is no statutory entitlement to SGT. Michigan law provides that prisoners do not have an automatic right to receive SGT, but may be awarded such credit by the warden as a reward for good conduct. SGT is distinct from RGT, which accrues automatically each month in which a prisoner is not found guilty of a major misconduct. Therefore, Petitioner was not deprived of SGT; rather, he simply did not earn that type of credit. Accordingly, he does not have a liberty or property interest in the SGT, and his procedural due process claim with regard to those credits is without merit. See Kentucky Department of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989). Any claim that Petitioner might have regarding the process that was accorded him arises solely under state law.
Conclusion
In light of the foregoing, the Court will summarily dismiss Petitioner's application pursuant to Rule 4 because it fails to raise a federally cognizable claim.
Certificate of Appealability
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), the Court must determine whether a certificate of appealability should be granted. A certificate should issue if Petitioner has demonstrated a "substantial showing of a denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). This Court's dismissal of Petitioner's action under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases is a determination that the habeas action, on its face, lacks sufficient merit to warrant service. It would be highly unlikely for this Court to grant a certificate, thus indicating to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals that an issue merits review, when the Court has already determined that the action is so lacking in merit that service is not warranted. See Love v. Butler, 952 F.2d 10 (1st Cir. 1991) (it is "somewhat anomolous" for the court to summarily dismiss under Rule 4 and grant a certificate); Hendricks v. Vasquez, 908 F.2d 490 (9th Cir. 1990) (requiring reversal where court summarily dismissed under Rule 4 but granted certificate); Dory v. Commissioner of Correction of the State of New York, 865 F.2d 44, 46 (2d Cir. 1989) (it was "intrinsically contradictory" to grant a certificate when habeas action does not warrant service under Rule 4); Williams v. Kullman, 722 F.2d 1048, 1050 n. 1 (2d Cir. 1983) (issuing certificate would be inconsistent with a summary dismissal). The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has disapproved issuance of blanket denials of a certificate of appealability. Murphy v. Ohio, 263 F.3d 466 (6th Cir. 2001). Rather, the district court must "engage in a reasoned assessment of each claim" to determine whether a certificate is warranted. Id. at 467. Each issue must be considered under the standards set forth by the Supreme Court in Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000). Murphy, 263 F.3d at 467. Consequently, this Court has examined each of Petitioner's claims under the Slack standard.
Under Slack, 529 U.S. at 484, to warrant a grant of the certificate, "[t]he petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court's assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong." The Court finds that reasonable jurists could not find that this Court's dismissal of each of Petitioner's claims was debatable or wrong. Petitioner's claim that the warden wrongfully refused to award him SGT fails to raise a claim of constitutional magnitude because Petitioner had not earned a liberty interest in the SGT. Therefore, the Court will deny Petitioner a certificate of appealability.
A Judgment consistent with this Opinion will be entered.